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Résumé 
Ce mémoire ce veut, d’une part, un aperçu de l’état du droit au Canada et au Québec sur la 
maternité de substitution et la procréation assistée.  J’examine la dissonance entre ces pratiques 
et les interdictions criminelles en vertu de la Loi sur la procréation assistée, le vide 
réglementaire laissé par la décision de la Cour suprême dans le Renvoi relatif à la Loi sur la 
procréation assistée et que les provinces hésitent à remplir, ainsi que la discordance avec 
laquelle les lois sur la filiation sont façonnées dans les provinces dans le contexte de contrats de 
mères porteuses.  D’autre part, ce mémoire se veut une critique de l’emprise qu’à, au Québec, 
le droit de la famille sur la question des mères porteuses et de l’étroitesse avec laquelle les 
notions d’autonomie et de consentement sont utilisées par les juristes en la matière.  En dépit du 
fait d'être la seule province avec un cadre juridique sur la procréation assistée, les juristes et le 
législateur Québécois négligent de tisser des liens entre ce cadre et le discours juridique en droit 
familial sur la maternité de substitution.  En effet, dans le discours juridique en droit familial, 
les mères porteuses sont des sujets juridiques abstraits et leur réalité est pratiquement omise 
dans l'analyse juridique faite par les tribunaux en matière d’adoption au Québec.  A mon avis, 
un point de vue plus holistique est nécessaire à l'élaboration de nouvelles lois et politiques sur 
la procréation assistée et la maternité de substitution.  Je propose l’utilisation des cadres 
théoriques Against family law exceptionnalism et celui de la Relational theory comme outils 
d’analyse pour élargir la discussion sur le sujet, particulièrement, la théorie relationnelle de 
Jennifer Nedelsky: ses idées mettent de l’avant la complexité des sujets humains et de leurs 
relations, une complexité qui me semble primordiale à considérer dans l’analyse juridique de 
conflits créatifs (creative conflicts), tels que ceux emmenés à l’aube de la procréation assistée 
et la maternité de substitution.  
Mots clés : mères porteuses, procréation assistée, santé, Québec, Canada, autonomie, 
consentement, droit civil, droit de la famille, Relational theory, Against family law 
exceptionalism, théories féministes, conflits créatifs 
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Abstract 
This memoir is, on one hand, an overview of the state of the law in Canada and Québec on 
surrogacy and assisted reproduction.  I discuss the dissonance between the practice of surrogacy 
and assisted reproduction in the country and the current criminal prohibitions under the Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act, the regulatory vacuum left by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, which the provinces are reluctant to fill, as well 
as the incongruity with which parentage laws are being shaped in the provinces where surrogacy 
arrangements are involved.  On the other hand, this memoir is also a critic of the hold family 
law has had on the issue of surrogacy in Québec and of how narrow the concepts of autonomy 
and consent are in the language of civil legal thought on the issue.  Despite being the sole 
province with a legal framework on assisted reproduction, Québec has poorly connected this 
framework to family law’s discourse on surrogacy.  Indeed, surrogates have been, for the most 
part, studied as abstract legal subjects within an atomistic liberal perspective in family law and 
practically omitted under the legal analysis afforded by Québec adoption courts.  I argue that a 
more holistic point of view is necessary in the shaping of new laws and policy on surrogacy and 
assisted reproduction.  I propose Against Family Law Exceptionalism and Relational Theory as 
analytical tools to broaden the discussion on the subject.  I highlight Jennifer Nedelsky’s 
relational theory particularly, as her ideas underscore the complexity of human subjects and 
relationships, a complexity which I argue is primordial for jurists to consider when examining 
creative conflicts.   
Keywords: surrogacy, assisted reproduction, health, Québec, Canada, autonomy, consent, civil 
law, family law, Relational Theory, Against Family Law Exceptionalism, Feminist Theories, 
creative conflicts 
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Introduction 
 
My research started with an interest on surrogacy’s legal standing in Québec and Canada.  In 
part one, I outline Canadian policy on surrogacy and assisted reproduction.  The numerous gaps 
between the practice of surrogacy and the current legal framework respecting assisted 
reproduction in Canada are evident.  There are multiple perspectives that could be taken to 
examine the matter both at a national and international level and the gendered nature of the issue 
was one that caught my attention first.  
Where women’s bodies and health are concerned, it is striking how civil law scholarship in 
Québec have not undertaken the task of examining egg donation, surrogacy and infertility from 
a holistic viewpoint.  Moreover, the practice of surrogacy is analysed mainly from a contractual 
and adoption point of view and the civil law’s discourse on the topic is polarized: the debate 
bounces back and forth between those who agree with the practice because “women” as a 
category, are autonomous in principle, versus those who believe “women” should be protected 
from the potential of exploitation.  In Québec jurisprudence, the issue has been examined in the 
context of adoption cases, where courts have been debating between public order considerations 
and the interests of the child, choosing the latter as the driving principle on the matter.  I briefly 
outline and analyse this jurisprudential debate in part five.     
I found that the concept of autonomy, as it is debated by civil law doctrine in Québec, offers a 
narrow perspective: autonomy is limited to the legal notion of consent, which in itself, is 
polarized (consent in family law versus consent in contract law).  Indeed, civil scholarship in 
the province has omitted the medical reality of assisted reproduction in its discourse on consent, 
which is important, as surrogates are (albeit not always) subjected to assisted reproduction 
techniques.  Moreover, the notion of public order in civil law, although it is examined existing 
civil doctrine and jurisprudence on the matter, does very little, if not much, to account for the 
relationship between these two realities.    
Thus, surrogacy and assisted reproduction are interrelated and very dynamic areas which are 
continuously developing.  Jurisprudence and legislation on these matters are still in their 
embryonic stage both in Québec and Canada and this leaves room for a lot of creativity.  
Therefore, in my view, scholarship on surrogacy needs to be broader and explore the 
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connections and the contributions legal thought can make on the issue.  On this note, I found 
that two schools of thought, Against Family Law Exceptionalism (AFLE) and Relational 
Theory, can make very important contributions. 
Both schools encourage connection rather than separation.  Whereas the first explores more 
legal and conceptual connections, the second accounts for human relationships and contextual 
analysis in the law and takes a comprehensive approach on autonomy.  Much could be said 
about the general incoherence between civil law and social/fiscal regimes in the province of 
Québec, but that topic is not addressed in this paper.  My main focus remains the disjunction 
between civil law and legislation on assisted reproduction, particularly where the relationship 
between autonomy and consent is concerned, as well as how these concepts are viewed and 
discussed (and not discussed) in the law and in legal scholarship.   
I found Jennifer Nedelsky’s framework on relational autonomy to be particularly interesting, as 
it explores the relationship between humans’ inner (mind/body) reality and the law.  Indeed, in 
part six, I take a close look at her framework and explore her idea of a legal subject as multi-
faceted and creative.  Her contribution is relevant because it widens the liberalist notion of 
autonomy, releasing it from the strains of consent and independence.  Drawing on the work of 
health sociologists, I go on to briefly examine how consent is merely a restrictive and 
institutionalized form of autonomy even within the areas of medicine and biotechnology.  I use 
Christine Koggel and Susan Sherwin’s relational frameworks together with Ivan Illich’s on 
conviviality to place medical consent in perspective.  
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1. The Canadian Federal Policy on Surrogacy and Artificial Reproduction Technologies  
 
Pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court in 2010,1 the regulation of assisted reproduction 
in Canada falls within the purview of provincial jurisdiction, except where prohibited activities 
are concerned.  The commercialization of surrogacy and egg donation are prohibited activities 
in Canada, pursuant to the Assisted Human Reproduction Act (AHRA).2  Most provinces have 
not set up a comprehensive legal framework regulating the practice and research in the area of 
assisted reproduction activities, except for Québec.  When it comes to parentage issues affected 
by surrogacy arrangements, Alberta, British Colombia, Nova-Scotia, Newfoundland (and 
Labrador) and Québec have established legislation; in other provinces, policymaking has 
essentially been left to the courts.  In this part, I will briefly lay out the constitutional 
underpinnings of Canada’s assisted reproduction laws, as well as examine the AHRA 
commercial prohibitions which have been poorly enforced to this day.  My goal is to sketch a 
general picture of the national legal discourse on assisted reproduction. 
1.1 A Constitutional Dissonance: The Division of Powers  
In Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act,3 the Supreme Court of Canada decided that 
assisted reproduction should be regulated by provinces and territories, for most aspects, and as 
such, it struck down many provisions of the AHRA4 that it deemed unconstitutional.  The initial 
intention behind the enactment of the AHRA was to have a comprehensive national legal 
framework consisting of regulatory and criminal provisions overseeing research and practice in 
the area of assisted reproduction.5  
Following the Supreme Court judges’ analysis of the AHRA, four judges deemed it was valid 
because its pith and substance sought to prohibit negative practices regarding assisted 
procreation, while four deemed it did not fall within federal jurisdiction because its main scope 
was to regulate health services.  The ninth judge, Justice Cromwell, held that sections 10, 11, 
13, 14 to 18, 40 (2), (3), (3.1), (4) and (5), and 44 (2) and (3) were invalid pursuant to the 
                                                            
1 Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] 3 SCR 457 [Reference Re AHRA] 
2 Assisted Human Reproduction Act, SC 2004, c 2, s 12 [AHRA] 
3 Supra note 1 
4 AHRA, supra note 2 
5 Erin Nelson, Law, Policy and Reproductive Autonomy (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2013) at p. 257. [Nelson] 
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Constitution Act, 18676 because they “are best classified as relating to the establishment, 
maintenance and management of hospitals, property and civil rights in the province and matters 
of a merely local or private nature in the province.”7  These sections have been repealed.  
Sections 5 to 9 and 12,8 which regulate prohibited activities pertaining to sex-selection, cloning 
and surrogacy agreements, and which also prohibit the purchase or sale of gametes and/or 
embryos were not.  Since 2012, when the federal government announced the closing down of 
Assisted Human Reproduction Canada (AHRC),9 Health Canada is in charge of administering 
the provisions still in force in the AHRA and the Minister of Health retains inspection powers 
to enforce the parts of the act that regulate criminal prohibitions.10 
Canadian legal scholars who are prominent in the field generally seem to express uncertainty as 
to the AHRA’s future, both with respect to regulatory and criminal aspects of the legislation.11  
Respecting the regulatory aspects, scholars have pointed to the argument made by the Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (RCNRT)12 as to the pertinence of the federal 
power to legislate for peace, order and good government, in matters of genuine national 
                                                            
6 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5  
7 Supra note 1 at para 287 
8 Section 12 is not yet in force: AHRA, supra note 3 at 12; Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield & Colleen M. Flood, 
eds, Canadian Health Law and Policy, 4th ed (Markham, Ont.: Lexis Nexis Canada 2011) at 331. [Downie &Flood, 
Canadian Health Law 2011] 
9 Assisted Human Reproduction Canada (AHRC) was the agency formerly in charge of administering assisted 
reproduction under the AHRA; Nelson, supra note 5 at 256, 258; Francoise Baylis & Jocelyn Downie, “The Tale 
of Assisted Human Reproduction Canada: A Tragedy in Five Acts” (2013) 25:2 CJWL 183 at 201 [Baylis & 
Downie, “A Tragedy in Five Acts”] 
10 Nelson, supra note 5 at 258 
11 Downie & Flood, Canadian Health Law 2011, supra note 8 at 334: “The practical  impact of the Supreme Court’s 
decision remains to be seen.  References are advisory judicial opinions and, as such, are not binding on the 
government.  While these decisions are ordinarily treated just as any other judicial opinion, no specific remedial 
action is recommended or demanded by the Court’s decision.  Thus, and bearing in mind that the majority of the 
AHR Act is not in force, unless and until the federal government takes action in response to the Supreme Court’s 
decision, the Act remains the law on assisted reproduction in Canada”; Nelson, supra note 5 at 259 
12 Laura Neilson Bonikowski, “The Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies” The Canadian 
Encyclopedia (2 February 2012) online: http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/new-reproductive-
technologies-royal-commission-on/:  The Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies was established 
by the Canadian government in 1989.  “Its mandate was to investigate ‘current and potential medical and scientific 
developments related to new reproductive technologies’ in order to consider their ‘social, ethical, health, research, 
legal and economic implications and the public interest, and recommend what policies and safeguards should be 
applied’.  The Commission's final report, delivered in November 1993, was entitled Proceed with Care and 
contained 293 recommendations.” 
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concern,13 which has been one of the foundations for federal intervention in health care, 
alongside criminal power and conditional funding.14  Where the AHRA’s criminal prohibitions 
are concerned,15 the same scholars refer to the comments made by Supreme Court Justices Lebel 
and Deschamp that ‘ethics, morality, safety and public health’ concerns in the area of new health 
technologies, alone, do not warrant regulation on the basis of the federal criminal law power.16   
Since the Supreme Court’s decision,17 the regulation of assisted reproduction in Canadian 
common law provinces remains fragmented,18 and the federal prohibition on commercial 
surrogacy has barely been enforced.19  
1.2 A Dissonant Federal Power: Theory without Practice 
1.2.1 The Assisted Human Reproduction Act’s Prohibition, in Theory 
The Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies' report Proceed with Care issued 
concerns about the practice of surrogacy before the AHRA was drafted.  The Commission was 
in charge of examining “the implications of new reproductive technologies for women’s 
reproductive health and well-being, the causes treatment and prevention of male and female 
infertility, various reproductive and related technologies, social and legal arrangements, the 
status and rights of people using or contributing to reproductive services and the economic 
ramifications of these technologies.”20  The report was criticized on several grounds.  Where 
legal reasoning is concerned, scholars argued it was not being clear what types of criminal 
sanctions were recommended21 and that it failed to account for already existing legal remedies, 
                                                            
13 Nelson, supra note 5 at 259 n 186; Downie & Flood, Canadian Health Law 2011, supra note 8 at 334, n 222; 
Alana Cattapan, “Rhetoric and Reality: ‘Protecting’ Women in  Canadian Public Policy on Assisted Human 
Reproduction” (2013) 25:2 Can. J. Women & L. 202 at 206 [Cattapan] 
14 Cattapan, supra note 13 at 206 
15 Commercial surrogacy is prohibited pursuant to section 6 AHRA 
16 Nelson, supra note 5 at 259 ; Downie & Flood, Canadian Health Law 2011, supra note 8 at 333 
17 Supra note 1 
18 Downie &Flood, Canadian Health Law 2011, supra note 8 at 334 
19 Cattapan, supra note 13 at 204;  See part 1.2.2, below, for more on this topic 
20Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield & Colleen M. Flood, eds, Canadian Health Law and Policy, 2nd ed (Toronto: 
Butterworths 2002) at 381. [Downie &Flood, Canadian Health Law 2002] 
21 Patrick Healy, “Statutory Prohibitions and the Regulation of New Reproductive Technologies” (1995) 40:4  
McGill L.J. 905 at 915 [Healy]: “The Commission is unclear as to the nature of statutory prohibitions.  In several 
instances it suggests that conduct be prohibited ‘under threat of criminal sanction’.  In others it identifies conduct 
that should be ‘subject to prosecution’.  In yet other instances it urges that specified forms of conduct just be 
‘prohibited’ or that specified activities ‘not be permissible’.  Thus, it is not clear why some forms of activity should 
be made the object of criminal prohibition and others the object of a different type of statutory prohibition.  Nor is 
it clear what is meant by ‘criminal’ sanction.” 
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which it should have, before suggesting new ones.22  Moreover, respecting the Commission’s 
economic mandate, Professor Lorna Weir23 and Jasmin Habib24 brought to light the fact that the 
report did not account for the “alliance between, on the one hand, the health care system, and, 
on the other, research biomedicine, biotechnology and the pharmaceutical industry.”25  The 
Commission considered that surrogacy constitutes a violation to human dignity and the dignity 
of reproduction, as it commodifies women and children: it compromises the surrogate’s 
autonomy and psychosocial health and it risks causing ‘contentious filial connections’ which 
could harm the child’s self-perception.26  The Commission considered reproductive 
technologies as a matter of national concern that should be dealt with by the federal branch of 
criminal law, as well as under the branch of peace order and good government.27  As for the 
argument about national concern, the Commission’s report has been criticized for being 
                                                            
22 Lorna Weir & Jasmin Habib, “A Critical Feminist Approach to the Report of the Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies” online: (1997) 52 SPE at 143 online: 
<http://spe.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/spe/issue/view/536> [Weir & Habib]: “The legal reasoning of Proceed 
with Care has gained it little respect among lawyers.  Many of its recommendations would involve the creation of 
new criminal offenses/the use of criminal law powers.  Thus, the Commission argued that medical procedures 
performed on a pregnant woman against her will for the purported benefit of the fetus should be criminalized.  
However, such activities can already be dealt with through present assault legislation; moreover the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms affords another level of protection through its guarantees for the security of the person; this 
alternative legal strategy is nowhere discussed.  The Report repeatedly fails to consider existing law or other 
remedies before it leaps to new uses of criminal law powers.  Nowhere, for instance, does the Report discuss the 
appropriateness of criminalizing research activities.” 
23 Lorna Weir is professor of sociology at York University (Toronto).  She specializes in health and social theory. 
24 Jasmin Habib is an associate professor at the University of Waterloo 
25 Weir& Habib, supra note 22 at 144-145: “Its main section on the economics of assisted human reproduction 
contains precisely one recommendation. This is to suggest further study of patents. Yet the text never explains the 
significance of contemporary changes in patent law for the development of property claims to genetic resources. 
The chapter entitled ‘Commercial Interests and New Reproductive Technologies’, is arguably the worst in the entire 
Report. The Commission interpreted very restrictively its mandate to examine the economics of the technologies, 
limiting its field of inquiry to Canadian companies and Canadian subsidiaries of multinationals. The text does not 
place Canadian developments in an international context, thereby creating the impression that Canada is a cosy, 
self-determining nation-state.” 
26 Angela Campbell “Law’s Suppositions about Surrogacy against the Backdrop of Social Science” 43 :1(2012) 
Ottawa L. Rev. 29 at 44-45.  [Campbell, “Law’s Suppositions”]  
27 Canada, Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed with Care: Final 
Report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, vol. 1. (Ottawa: Minister of 
Government Services Canada, 1993) at 18 cited in Françoise Baylis, “The Regulation of Assisted Human 
Reproductive Technologies and Related Research: A Public Health Safety and Morality Argument” (2006) Expert 
Opinion at 4: “We reject the argument that new reproductive technologies as a general matter should continue to 
be subdivided into component parts and left to the provincial legislatures, or delegated to self-governing 
professional bodies, for regulation on a province-by province or even an institution-by-institution basis. 
Considering the overarching nature, profound importance, and fundamental inter-relatedness of the issues involved, 
we consider that federal regulation of new reproductive technologies – under the national concern branch of the 
peace, order, and good government power, as well as under the criminal law, trade and commerce, spending, and 
other relevant federal constitutional powers – is clearly warranted.” 
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unconvincing on the matter: the fact that human reproduction issues are interrelated “does not 
lead to a conclusion in law that ‘[n]ew reproductive technologies possess a conceptual and 
practical integrity and distinctiveness’.  It certainly does not allow the assertion that 
‘reproduction is easily distinguishable from other matters of human health’.”28  According to 
Professor Angela Campbell,29 the legislative debates show two main concerns behind the 
enactment of section 6 of the AHRA: one is (1) protecting Canadians from the potential harms 
of commercial surrogacy while at the same time (2) supporting citizens in the choices they make 
on family-building.30   
Pursuant to the AHRA, surrogacy and egg donation are allowed, but their commercialization is 
illegal in Canada.  Sections 6, 7, 8, 9 and 12 of the AHRA were not struck down by the Supreme 
Court in 201031 and are the main provisions regulating surrogacy and egg donation in the 
country.  Section 12 is not yet in force.  The Act implicitly recognizes surrogacy agreements 
while asserting that the validity of such agreements falls within the purview of provincial 
jurisdiction.32  A “surrogate mother” is defined as “a female person who — with the intention 
of surrendering the child at birth to a donor or another person — carries an embryo or foetus 
that was conceived by means of an assisted reproduction procedure and derived from the genes 
of a donor or donors.”33  The Act establishes 21 years as the minimum age for which a woman 
can act as a surrogate mother.34  The combined action of sections 6 and 60 of the AHRA 
criminalizes the payment to a “female person” acting as a surrogate mother,35 as well as paying 
third-parties to arrange for surrogate services and advertising such activities.36  Section 7 
                                                            
28 Healy, supra note 21 at 918 
29 Angela Campbell is a researcher and professor in the areas of family law, health law, criminal law, successions 
law and feminist legal studies, currently the Associate Dean of Graduate Studies at McGill Law 
30 Campbell, “Law’s suppositions”, supra note 26 at 45  
31 See part 1.1, above  
32 AHRA, supra note 4, s 6(5): “This section does not affect the validity under provincial law of any agreement 
under which a person agrees to be a surrogate mother.” 
33 AHRA, supra note 2, s 3 
34 Ibid, s 6(4) 
35 Ibid, s 6(1)  
 36 AHRA, supra note 2, ss 6 (2) (3), 60: “6 (1) No person shall pay consideration to a female person to be a surrogate 
mother, offer to pay such consideration or advertise that it will be paid. (2) No person shall accept consideration 
for arranging for the services of a surrogate mother, offer to make such an arrangement for consideration or 
advertise the arranging of such services. (3) No person shall pay consideration to another person to arrange for the 
services of a surrogate mother, offer to pay such consideration or advertise the payment of it. 
(4) No person shall counsel or induce a female person to become a surrogate mother, or perform any medical 
procedure to assist a female person to become a surrogate mother, knowing or having reason to believe that the 
female person is under 21 years of age (5) This section does not affect the validity under provincial law of any 
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prohibits the purchase, or offering to purchase or advertise for the purchase of sperm or ova 
from a donor or a person acting on behalf of a donor,37 as well as the purchase or sale or 
advertisement of purchase or sale of in vitro embryos.38  In each case, penalties range from 
$500,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or to both on conviction on 
indictment; or $250,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding four years, or to both for 
a summary conviction.39 
Moreover, section 12 AHRA prohibits the reimbursement of expenditures, except in accordance 
with regulations and with receipts.  During legislative debates in the House of Commons, back 
in May 2002, Mr. Rob Merrifield, a Member of Parliament for Yellowhead at the time, 
supported the banning of commercial surrogacy and suggested reimbursements should be tightly 
regulated in order to avoid the abuse of the practice, pursuant to the Health Committee’s 
recommendations.40  However, as we speak, article 12 AHRA has not yet entered into force and 
the regulations pertaining to the article’s purpose have yet to be adopted, which renders 
reimbursement for surrogacy and egg donation a murky issue according to Professors Downie 
& Baylis:41 “There is considerable confusion about when, how much and for what, a surrogate 
mother […] can be legally reimbursed with or receipts.”42  Since the enactment and entering 
into force of the AHRA in 2004, its enforcement has remained very weak43 and there is a lack 
                                                            
agreement under which a person agrees to be a surrogate mother 60. A person who contravenes any of sections 5 
to 7 and 9 is guilty of an offence and (a) is liable, on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding $500,000 or 
to impris- onment for a term not exceeding ten years, or to both; or (b) is liable, on summary conviction, to a fine 
not exceeding $250,000 or to imprison- ment for a term not exceeding four years, or to both.” 
37 AHRA, supra note 2, s 7(1) 
38 Ibid, ss 7 (2) (a) (b) 
39 Ibid, s 60 
40 House of Commons Debates, 37th Par1, 1st Sess, No 188 (21 May 2002) at 11540 (Rob Merrifield): “The health 
committee also heard compelling testimony recommending great caution in the regulation of surrogacy. We support 
the banning of commercial surrogacy and we share the committee's concern that the reimbursement for so-called 
allowable expenses could be abused by inflating expenses. The committee took these concerns seriously, 
recommending limits on the expenses for which reimbursements would be made. However we will be calling for 
tighter language in the reimbursement provisions to ensure that compensation for expenses does not become a de 
facto commercial transaction.” 
41 Jocelyn Downie is a researcher in the areas of health law and policy, ethics and professional responsibility, health 
law, health care policy, bioethics, professional responsibility and public policy analysis.  She is a professor and the 
Associate Dean of Graduate Studies at the Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University; Francoise Baylis is a 
professor and holds the Canada Research Chair in Bioethics and Philosophy at Dalhousie University’s Faculty of 
Medecine. 
42 Françoise Baylis & Jocelyn Downie “Wishing doesn’t make it so” (17 December 2013) online: Impact Ethics 
Forum: <https://impactethics.ca/2013/12/17/wishing-doesnt-make-it-so/> 
43 Cattapan, supra note 13 at 217-219;  Baylis & Downie, “Wishing doesn’t make it so”, supra note 42  
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of consensus among scholars and policy-makers on whether the commercialization of surrogacy 
and the purchase of gametes should still be prohibited in Canada.  
1.2.2 The Prohibition’s Weak Enforcement and Institutional Failures 
Following the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in 2010,44 Assisted Human Reproduction 
Canada (AHRC), the agency which had been charged with overseeing assisted human 
reproduction in Canada under the AHRA in 2004, lost most of its powers.  However, it 
maintained the power to administer, inspect and enforce in relation to sections 5 to 9 and 12 of 
the AHRA, which included "the prohibition on the purchase, offer to purchase, or advertising 
for purchase of gametes and embryos and the provisions with respect to the regulation of 
reimbursements for gametes, embryos, and surrogacy and the implementation and enforcement 
of these sections", as well as the activities provided at sections 24(1) b) c) d) f) h).45  In 2012, 
the AHRC was abolished and its remaining powers and responsibilities with respect to 
compliance, enforcement and outreach, were handed to Health Canada.46  According to Downie 
& Baylis, "the AHRC could have been more proactive with respect to its responsibility to 
promote the enforcement of the Act [...] the AHRC had the power to advise the minister of the 
imperative for Health Canada to introduce regulations.  There is no evidence that the AHRC 
provided such advice to the minister."47  According to Professor Nelson, “few who are familiar 
with the history of the ART regulation in Canada were surprised by the decision to wind down 
AHRC […] the agency was beleaguered by controversy and opposition.”48    
Although the AHRAs prohibitive provisions regarding surrogacy and egg donation still stand, 
only one surrogacy case was tried to date, so the measures have not really been enforced in the 
country.49  Indeed, in 2013, 27 charges were brought against Leia Picard, an Ontario surrogacy 
consultant, and her company, for illegally purchasing sperm, eggs and surrogacy services.  This 
                                                            
44 Reference Re AHRA, supra note 1 
45 Baylis & J. Downie, “A Tragedy in Five Acts,” supra note 9 at 198-199 
46 Ibid at 201 
47 Ibid at 194 
48 Nelson, supra note 5 at 258; Erin Nelson is a professor at the University of Alberta Faculty of Law.  She teaches 
tort law, health care ethics and the law, and law & medicine. 
49 Cattapan, supra note 13 at 217-219  
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was the first conviction under the AHRA.50  Mrs. Picard pleaded guilty and was charged 60 
000$ for violating sections 6 and 7 of AHRA.  According to Professors Françoise Baylis and 
Jocelyn Downie, along with creating more confusion, the Picard case causes concern because it 
could encourage the commercialization of surrogacy agreements for three reasons : one (1) is 
that the penalty suffered by Picard was so low that the professors worry it could be interpreted 
as a license for conducting business, another (2) is that the case will “entrench the view that 
reimbursement is currently legal” and third (3) Health Canada has not adopted a reimbursement 
policy.51 
The professors have stated that although Health Canada claims to have a policy on 
reimbursements, no such policy has actually been made public, apart from vague information 
posted online.52  Furthermore, Health Canada’s position has not been subject to parliamentary 
scrutiny or a RIAS evaluation, nor has the Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations 
reviewed it.  This, according to the professors “represents an avoidance of democratic 
accountability and compounds the vulnerability of Canadians who provide and access assisted 
human reproduction.  It should not be tolerated.”53  According to the Professors, the Supreme 
                                                            
50 Cattapan, supra note 13 at 217-219;  Tom Blackwell, “Illegal purchase of sperm, eggs and surrogacy services 
leads to 27 charges against Canadian fertility company and CEO,” The National Post (15 February 2013), online: 
<http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/02/15/illegal-purchase-of-sperm-eggs-and-surrogacy-services-leads-to-27-
charges-against-canadian-fertility-company-and-ceo/> [Blackwell, “Illegal Purchase”] 
51 Baylis & Downie, “Wishing doesn’t make it so”, supra note 42: “There is much to be concerned about with this 
case, not the least of which is the small financial penalty.  Indeed, the penalty is so low that others involved in 
similar activities might just consider fines a “cost of doing business”[…] we worry that this case will be taken as 
permission for individuals to set up businesses to facilitate the commercialization and commodification of human 
eggs and surrogacy – precisely what the AHRA was intended to prevent.  The AHRA stipulates that “trade in the 
reproductive capabilities of women and men and the exploitation of children, women and men for commercial ends 
raise health and ethical concerns that justify their prohibition.”  […] we worry that the case (through the “Agreed 
Statement of Fact”) will entrench the erroneous view that reimbursement is currently legal.  If this happens, then 
the police will not charge, and crown attorneys will not prosecute, those who provide reimbursements to women 
for their eggs or for surrogacy (as long as they are careful in their record-keeping).  This could happen despite the 
fact that any reimbursement is illegal under the AHRA until s12 comes into force.  Furthermore, given that there is 
no official Health Canada policy (that we know of), there is no guidance as to what specific expenses might be 
permissible reimbursements” [emphasis added]. 
52 Françoise Baylis & Jocelyn Downie, “Transnational Trade in Human Eggs: Law, Policy and (In)Action in 
Canada”(2013) 41:1 J Law Med Ethics 224 at  232 [Baylis & Downie, “Transnational Trade in Human Eggs”]; 
Françoise Baylis, Jocelyn Downie & Dave Snow, “Fake it Till you Make it: Policymaking and Assisted Human 
Reproduction in Canada” (2014) 36:6 JOGC 510 at 511-512 [Baylis, Downie & Snow, “Fake it Till you Make it”];  
Alison Motluk, “The Human Egg Trade: How Canada’s Fertility Laws Are Failing Donors, Doctors, and Patients,” 
The Walrus (April 2010), online:  <http://thewalrus.ca/the-human-egg-trade/> [Motluk, “The Human Egg Trade”] 
53Baylis, Downie & Snow “Fake it Till you Make it”, supra note 52 at 512 
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Court’s decision in 2010 had nothing to do with Health Canada’s failure to promptly regulate, 
albeit claims that it did.54  
While Professors Baylis & Downie are of the opinion that reimbursements are illegal because 
section 12 is not in force, Drummond & Cohen55 argue: "[all eight justices of the Supreme Court 
in the Reference case56 held the view that] while the AHRA may seek to criminalize the 
commercialization of reproductive activities, it does not seek to prohibit the reimbursement of 
actual expenditures.  In light of these positions, [we] respectfully disagree with Downie and 
Baylis’s analysis […] although section 12 of the act is not currently in force, it remains relevant 
for the purposes of understanding the scheme of the act as a whole."57  According to Drummond 
& Cohen, Health Canada’s policy is available online.58  I visited the said site in April and May 
of 2015 and again in September 2015.59  Although surrogacy was presented as an option for 
couples alongside egg donation, there was nothing on the page regarding a federal 
reimbursement policy or specific reimbursement regulations.  There was however a rubric 
stating the following: “Under the Assisted Human Reproduction Act, you cannot buy (or 
advertise to buy) sperm or eggs from a donor or a person acting on behalf of a donor.  You also 
cannot buy (or advertise to buy) the services of a surrogate.  You can reimburse a donor or 
surrogate for actual expenses they have related to the donation or pregnancy.”60  The site was 
no longer available when I tried to visit it in September.  However, on another site, Health 
Canada has posted more comprehensive information regarding which transactions constitute 
reimbursements versus the ones that are disguised payments.61   
                                                            
54 Baylis & Downie, “A Tragedy in Five Acts”, supra note 9 at 190,192, 194, 199 
55 Professor Susan G. Drummond teaches at Osgoode Hall Law School.  She specializes in the areas of legal 
anthropology, comparative law, civil law, family law, as well as wills and estates; Sara R. Cohen is a lawyer and 
partner at D2Law LLP in Toronto.  She is also the founder of Fertility Law Canada.  Her practice is dedicated to 
fertility law.   
56 Reference re AHRA, supra note 1; See part 1.1, above 
57 Susan G. Drummond & Sara R. Cohen, “Eloquent (In) Action: Enforcement and Prosecutorial Restraint in the 
Transnational Trade in Human Eggs as Deep Ambivalence about the Law”(2014) 26:2 CJWL 240 at 212 
[Drummond & Cohen, “Eloquent (In)Action”] 
58Ibid at 211, n 17; “Using Donors or Surrogates” (2 April 2013) at Government of Canada online: 
<http://www.healthycanadians.gc.ca/health-sante/pregnancy-grossesse/donor-donneur-eng.php> (last visited on 
May 15th, 2015) [Gov of Can Online, “Donors or Surrogates”] 
59 Ibid 
60 Gov of Can Online, “Donors or Surrogates”, supra note 58 
61 “Prohibitions Related to Surrogacy” in “Payment to Surrogate Mothers” at Health Canada online: 
<http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/brgtherap/legislation/reprod/surrogacy-substitution-eng.php> (last viewed May 
15th 2015) [Health Canada Online, “Prohibitions Related to Surrogacy”]: “A surrogate mother can be repaid for 
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1.2.3 The Future: Killing the Prohibition? 
Criminalization in the area of reproductive science has been criticized for being too strict in an 
area that is constantly changing and requires flexible and adaptable regulations.62  It has also 
been accused of driving certain practices underground63 and it has been argued that it should be 
“reserved for areas in which there is a strong social consensus.”64  The use of absolute criminal 
prohibitions has also been criticized of not balancing individual autonomy with the intrinsic 
risks that come with using reproductive technology.65  Others have highlighted the ambiguities 
of the criminal prohibitions in the AHRA, particularly the interplay of sections 7 (purchase of 
gametes), 12 (reimbursements) and 61 (penalty for contravening section 7) and have generally 
raised questions regarding the stability of the prohibitions as policy.66 
Furthermore, despite that the AHRA stipulates that it aims to make women’s health and well-
being a priority,67 its prohibitive approach on commercialization has been criticized for ignoring 
empirical evidence on women’s actual motivations and experiences as surrogates.68 In 
Revisiting The Handmaid's Tale: Feminist Theory Meets Empirical Research on Surrogate 
                                                            
out-of-pocket costs directly related to her pregnancy and usually a receipt is needed. Examples include costs for: 
maternity clothes, travel for medical appointments, and medications.  A surrogate mother may also be repaid for 
loss of work wages if a doctor certifies, in writing, that bed rest is necessary for her health and/or the health of the 
embryo or fetus.  Indirect and disguised payments are illegal under the AHR Act. They could include paying a 
surrogate mother's: mortgage credit card bills or school tuition.”  
62 Canadian Bar Association, National Health Law and Family Law Sections, “Submission on Draft Legislation on 
Assisted Human Reproduction” (2002) 10:2 Health L.R. 25 ; Timothy Caulfield, “Clones, Controversy and 
Criminal Law” (2001) 39:2 Alta. L. Rev. 335; Angela Campbell, “A Place for Criminal Law in the Regulation of 
Reproductive Technologies” (2002) 10 Health LJ at 86 [Campbell, “A Place for Criminal Law”] 
63 Alison Harvison Young & Angela Wasunna, “Wrestling with the Limits of Law” (1998) 6 Health L.J. 239;  
Healy, supra note 21; Cattapan, supra note 13 at 206 
64 Campbell, “A Place for Criminal Law”, supra note 62 at 80 
65 Downie & Flood, “Canadian Health Law 2011”, supra note 8 at 383  
66 Drummond & Cohen, “Eloquent (In)Action”, supra note 57 at 207, 210, 213-214: “[…] the criminal prohibitions 
contained in sections 5-7 and 9 were conceded by the prime challenger, the Attorney General of Québec, to be 
validly enacted pursuant to the federal criminal law power. As a result, the Supreme Court of Canada never 
scrutinized these prohibitions for their constitutional soundness.  Can these criminal prohibitions, having avoided 
judicial scrutiny and now standing exposed in the ploughed field of the AHRA, be regarded as stable social policy?” 
67 Supra, note 4, ss 2(c) (f) 
68 Karen Busby & Delaney Vun, "Revisiting The Handmaid's Tale: Feminist Theory Meets Empirical 
Research on Surrogate Mothers" (2010) 26:1 Can J Fam L 13 [Busby & Vun, “The Handmaid’s Tale”] 
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Mothers" Professor Karen Busby69 and Delaney Vun,70 argue that, at the time the AHRA was 
drafted, empirical evidence from the USA and Britain did not suggest surrogates felt exploited 
or psychologically vulnerable.71  However, the Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies based its analysis on the feminist current72 in the USA and Canada at the time and 
decided commercial surrogacy should be prohibited because of the potential it could exploit 
women’s emotional, physical and economical vulnerabilities.73  In Law’s Suppositions about 
Surrogacy against the Backdrop of Social Science,74 Angela Campbell reviews the above-
mentioned feminist perspectives on the issue, including the more recent claims made by Québec 
scholars Louise Langevin and Marie-France Bureau.75  While she agrees that the legislator did 
not account for surrogate’s experiences at the time the AHRA was enacted and these real life 
experiences can be enriching to legal discourse, she refrains from taking a stance on whether 
the AHRAs prohibition should be maintained, arguing instead that amendments should depend 
on what the legislator’s objectives are.76  
                                                            
69 Professor Busby is the director of the University of Manitoba Centre for Human Rights Research Initiative, her 
research and teaching interests include constitutional law, in particular human rights and equality law, civil 
procedure and administrative law.  Where equality law is concerned, Professor Busby’s research has focused on 
the discriminatory impacts of laws regulating sex, gender, sexuality and violence.   
70 Delaney Vun is a lawyer at Fillmore Riley, in Winnipeg, Manitoba.  She practises primarily in the areas of 
corporate, commercial, real estate, condominium, and wills and estates law. 
71 Busby & Vun, “The Handmaid’s Tale”, supra note 68 at 16, 40 
72 Ibid at 16, n 6 (For the list of feminists who argued against commercialized surrogacy in the USA and Canada) 
73 Ibid at 16, 40 
74 Supra note 26 
75 Louise Langevin, “Réponse jurisprudentielle à la pratique des mères porteuses au Québec : Une difficile 
réconciliation” (2010) 26:1 Can J Fam L 171 [Langevin, "Réponse jurisprudentielle"] (Louise Langevin is a 
Professor at the University of Laval Faculty of Law, her areas of interest include Feminist theory, women's rights, 
discrimination, sexual harassment, contract law, tort law, violence against women and human rights.  She maintains 
that surrogacy practice has the potential to exploit women whether it is commercial or altruistic but calls for strictly 
regulating the practice instead of prohibiting it); Marie-France Bureau & Édith Guilhermont, “Maternité, gestation 
et liberté: Réflexions sur la prohibition de la gestation pour autrui en droit Québecois” (2011) 4:2 McGill JL & 
Health 43 [Bureau& Guilhermont, "Maternité, Gestation et Liberté"] (Marie-France Bureau is a professor at the 
University of Sherbrooke, her areas of interest include Family Law, Rights and Freedoms, the History of Law, 
Jurilinguisitics, Comparative Law and Health Law and Policy.  Edith Guilhermont holds a doctorate in private law 
and criminal sciences from the University of Perpignan (2006).  She is a lecturer at the Université de Sherbrooke 
faculty of law since 2008.  The authors argue for a liberal stance on surrogacy in Québec.  For more about their 
article see part 5.3, below)  
76 Campbell, “Law’s Suppositions”, supra note 26 at 34-35: “This article refrains from taking a blunt normative 
stance, and it does not direct federal or provincial lawmakers to revisit the law in this area. Instead, it offers insight 
into the way in which legal and political discussions about surrogacy at the federal and provincial levels, 
particularly in Quebec, fail to reflect the motivations and experiences of women who choose to become surrogates. 
Whether this observation offers a basis for legal social realities, this article may substantiate their reform In contrast, 
if these laws pursue some other objective-for example, protecting the integrity and dignity of children conceived 
by surrogacy, or communicating that the practice is morally flawed-the discussion here would not necessarily yield 
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Erin Nelson points to the fact that, despite making claims about the importance of human dignity 
and human rights, the AHRA does not place importance on reproductive autonomy.  She 
criticizes the fact that women’s health and well-being are treated as a “uniform, neatly calculable 
quantity77” which does not distinguish the multifaceted needs of women involved in ARTs.78  
In her view “the [AHRAs] declaration about women’s health and well-being adopts a potentially 
paternalistic stance, as an oversight body could conceivably take the view that women’s health 
and well-being is best safeguarded by a restrictive regulatory approach, and thereby harm the 
health and well-being of infertile women under the guise of protecting those very interests.”79   
In reality, according to Alana Cattapan,80 the AHRA’s ban on commercial reproductive 
practices has been detrimental to women’s interests, despite the intentions to make women’s 
health a priority:  the AHRA’s prohibition on commercial egg donation has not protected women 
from exploitation and/or the risks of experimental procedures conducted without informed 
consent.81  Indeed, where the Royal Commission’s argument on preventing exploitation is 
concerned, banning pay for eggs does not remove the possibility that women feel compelled to 
donate by non-pecuniary factors such as family and social pressure.  The same arguments have 
been made by Louise Langevin and Rakhi Ruparelia,82 where surrogacy is concerned.  
Furthermore, the physiological harms and risks associated with egg donation for which the 
Royal Commission expressed concern have not been eliminated with the ban on 
commercialization.  Rather, they have been “pushed away from public scrutiny.”83  
                                                            
a call for amendments to existing surrogacy rules. This paper reform will depend on the goal of our surrogacy laws. 
If such laws aim to mirror” 
77 Nelson, supra note 5 at 261; About Erin Nelson see supra, note 48  
78 Ibid at 261: “An approach that serves the needs and interests of some women in their own health and well-being 
might leave the needs of others unmet. The well-being of an infertile woman might be best fostered by facilitating 
unrestricted access to all ARTs, while that of a potential egg-donor might demand a more restricted approach.” 
79 Ibid at 262 
80 Alana Cattapan online <http://arcattapan.ca/> 
81 Cattapan, supra note 13 at 210-213 (On how the AHRA commercial prohibition fails egg donors) 
82 Langevin, “Réponse Jurisprudentielle”, supra note 75; Rakhi Ruparelia, “Giving Away the Gift of Life” (2007) 
23 Can. J. Fam. L. 11 (Rakhi Ruparelia is an associate professor at Faculty of Law of University of Ottawa.  Her 
research interests include torts, criminal law, critical race theory, and feminist legal theory) 
83 Cattapan, supra note 13 at 212-214: “Rather than have open and forthright relationships between egg donors, 
parents-to-be, doctors, and clinic staff, donors and intended parents have had to establish the terms of their 
agreements in an aura of illegality likely to discourage women from returning to the clinics where they donated 
when com- plications arise or unwilling to speak out if and when any mistreatment occurs.49 Experts in this field 
have suggested that left to the unregulated grey market, donors are more likely to experience harm by going without 
the support services they need.” 
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Several scholars like Downie & Baylis, Erin Nelson and Drummond & Cohen, recognize that 
Canadians are involved in the transnational egg trade.84  The fact of the matter is, gamete donors 
are insufficient the country, so Canadians seek providers from other jurisdictions and they pay 
for the eggs: “the legality of using an out of country service to help commit an act that is illegal 
in this country isn’t quite so clear.”85  According to Drummond & Cohen, the activities referred 
to at section 7 AHRA should not be regulated by criminal law and “the thriving cross-border 
traffic suggests not that we extend Canadian law to events happening outside of our borders but, 
rather, that we rethink domestically the import of this traffic.”86 Downie & Baylis don’t suggest 
removing the commercial prohibition; instead, they argue the AHRA should be more tightly 
enforced and suggest that the federal government should promote national self-sufficiency in 
order to counteract the transnational market’s potential attractions.87   
Their argument for self-sufficiency is that Canada should find ways to promote the increase of 
altruistic egg supply in the country, all the while finding strategies to decrease the demand for 
eggs.  The scholars’ aim is to reduce and ultimately eliminate the involvement of Canadians in 
the commercialization of human eggs and transnational trade on human reproductive materials.  
They cite a few strategies which could help increase the supply of oocytes in Canada: (1) the 
legal uncertainty surrounding egg donation reimbursements can act as a deterrent for potential 
egg donators. Clarifying what is legally reimbursable pursuant to sections 7 and 12 AHRA 
would encourage women who otherwise would not donate. (2) Clearer provincial parentage laws 
protecting the interests of egg donors.  Indeed, the fact that the rules vary from province to 
province and are not always clear leaves room for uncertainty where parental rights and 
responsibilities are concerned.  (3) They also suggest paying more attention to egg providers’ 
long-term health and well-being, notably, by creating professional guidelines or laws that ensure 
women have access to their medical record, obtain proper follow up, which is not yet the case.88 
(4) Lastly, providing education about egg donation to the public.  The scholars also look at 
                                                            
84 Nelson, supra note 5 at 298; Baylis & Downie, “Transnational Trade in Human Eggs”, supra note 52 ; Françoise 
Baylis & Jocelyn Downie, “Achieving National Altruistic Self-Sufficiency in Human Eggs for Third Party 
Reproduction in Canada, (2014) 7:2 Int J Fem Approaches Bioeth 164 [ Baylis &Downie, “National Altruistic Self-
Sufficiency”]; Drummond& Cohen, “Eloquent (In)Action”, supra note 57 at 220 
85 Motluk, “The Human Egg Trade”, supra note 52;  Nelson, supra note 5 at 298 
86 Drummond & Cohen, “Eloquent (In)Action”, supra note 57 at 228  
87 Baylis & Downie, “Transnational Trade in Human Eggs”, supra note 52; Baylis & Downie, “National Altruistic 
Self-Sufficiency”, supra note 84 
88 Baylis & Downie, “National Altruistic Self-Sufficiency”, supra note 84 at 171-177 
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strategies to decrease the demand for oocytes in the country.  They suggest creating “(1) 
programs and policies to prevent some types of social infertility, as well as programs and 
policies to prevent (and, where possible, treat) medical infertility; (2) support for child-free 
living, as well as support for alternative ways of family making (e.g., adoption); (3) public 
awareness campaigns on the harms of transitional trade in eggs; (4) and a firm commitment to 
enforcement of the AHR Act prohibition on the purchase of eggs.”89 
In Angela Campbell’s view, despite the fact that criminal legislation does take more time to 
change, a term for legislative review of the AHRA can be implemented.90  She also notes that 
administrative bodies are not accountable to the public, whereas the Parliament is.  She argues 
that the values at stake in reproductive science are important enough to warrant a prohibitive 
framework because the impacts extends beyond the users and providers and that such a 
framework is useful insofar as it conveys a powerful social message.91   
On her part, Roxanne Mykitiuk92 highlights how health care governance is being privatized in 
Canada, due to the impact of globalization, particularly in the areas of genetics and assisted 
reproduction.  She argues that Canada’s role in health care is shifting from a protective model 
to a regulatory one, whose aim is to foster the biotech industry and self-regulation.  In other 
words, the government is transferring its responsibility for public health to private industries 
and in the process, we are changing our definition of health and disease: "Health Canada 
acknowledges that its regulatory system is shifting away from a model where assessments are 
made in- house towards one, which it calls a “networked” model, including universities and 
industry […] and the "Canadian state’s autonomy in relation to international trade and the 
demands of multinational companies is shrinking […] Health is increasingly being regulated 
as a commodity rather than as a public good, and health care as a business rather than as a public 
service."93 
                                                            
89 Ibid at 171, 177-180 
90 Campbell “A Place for Criminal Law”, supra note 62 at 87 
91 Ibid at 96-99 
92 Roxanne Mykitiuk is an assistant professor of law at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.  She teaches 
in the areas of disability law, bioethics, health law and family law. 
93 Roxanne Mykitiuk, “The New Genetics in the Post Keynesian State” (The Gender of Genetic Futures: The 
Canadian Biotechnology Strategy, Women and Health Proceedings of a National Strategic Workshop held at York 
University, February 11-12, 2000 ), available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1745124 [Mykitiuk, “ The New 
Genetics”] 
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It should be noted that, on June 2nd, 2014, Mr. Dean Del Mastro introduced Bill C-607, An Act 
to Amend the Assisted Human Reproduction Act, on June 2nd, 2014.  Essentially, his proposition 
is to amend the AHRA in order to allow paid surrogacy contracts and services.  According to 
him, it is hypocritical for Canada to recognize commercial surrogacy agreements which have 
been concluded abroad, while prohibiting the practice on Canadian territory.  In his opinion, the 
bill he proposes would be helpful to Canadian families.94 
In sum, while the constitutional conflict regarding the AHRA has created a space for scholars 
to question the systemic features of surrogacy and artificial reproduction’s prohibitive policy, it 
has also left a regulatory vacuum in the hands of the provinces, which I turn to next. 
2. The Regulation of Artificial Reproduction Technologies in Canadian Provinces 
As I have examined above, the regulation of assisted reproduction falls within the scope of 
provincial jurisdiction, except for the commercial prohibition sanctioned by the AHRA.  Besides 
Québec, who legislated on the matter in 2010, Canadian provinces do not have a comprehensive 
regulatory framework specific to the practice of and research in assisted reproduction.95  Some 
scholars do not believe most provinces will spend time and money for a public debate on 
something that “will be relevant to such a narrow group of practioners.”96  However, some are 
optimistic that governments and the professions’ regulators will cooperate in order to create a 
legal framework.97  Indeed, the Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada (SOGC) 
and the Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society (CFAS) have issued joint policy statements 
on ethical issues in assisted reproduction.98  As pointed out by Erin Nelson, the said joint policy 
                                                            
94 House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl , 2nd Sess, No 094 (2 June 2014) at 1355 (Hon Dean Del Mastro): “This 
bill is very important. As I started researching this, I had personal experience with the issue.  Very good friends of 
mine went through challenges as a result of not being able to conceive children, and today they have a wonderful 
family.  Thousands of Canadian families struggle in this regard today, and sections 61, 62, and 63 of the Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act prohibit payment to a surrogate mother or payment for services related to surrogacy.  At 
the same time, there is real hypocrisy, as we recognize these contracts when Canadians venture across the border 
to the United States or elsewhere around the world.  This is a pro-family bill. It would help families to have children 
of their own, to have their own families.  I hope the bill finds support in all quarters of this House. It is time we 
moved to put these changes in place” [emphasis added] 
95 Juliet Guichon, Ian Mitchell & Christopher Doig “Assisted Human Reproduction in Common Law Canada after 
the Supreme Court of Canada Reference: Moving beyond Regulation by Colleges of Physicians and Surgeons” 
(2013) 25:2 CJWL at 323 [Guichon et al.] 
96 Nelson, supra note 5 at 259; Downie & Flood, “Canadian Health Law 2011”, supra note 8 at 334 
97 Nelson, supra note 5 at 259; “Canadian Health Law 2011”, supra note 8 at 334 
98 Nelson, supra note 5 at 260   
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only covers certain aspects of assisted reproduction; surrogacy is one of the issues covered, as 
well as the medical and genetic screening of sperm, oocyte and embryo providers.99  While the 
SOGCs guidelines are available free of charge to the public online,100 on the CFAS website, the 
clinical practice guidelines are only accessible to members.101  In Alberta and Saskatchewan, 
the College of Physicians and Surgeons (CPSA & CPSS) established medical practice 
guidelines to oversee the practice of ARTs.102   
Erin Nelson examined at the current regulatory void in Canada from the angle of women’s 
reproductive autonomy.  She acknowledges feminist concerns about reproductive technologies, 
namely the fact that they “were introduced into clinical practice without ever being subjected to 
comprehensive safety and efficacy studies.”103  In her opinion, reproductive autonomy requires 
striking a balance between protecting women and encouraging their autonomy.104  She argues 
that despite the fact the AHRA statement of principles asserts women’s health and well-being 
as important and requiring protection,105 the legislation attributes little importance to individual 
choice in reproductive decision making and it “prioritizes the interests of potential children over 
those of actual women.”106   As such, the professor maintains that AHRA “adopts a potentially 
paternalistic stance.”107  She claims that it is not realistic to leave research and clinical practice 
of ART unregulated by the state, that, whether it is private or public, regulation is inevitable: 
there will always a gatekeeper of sorts controlling access to reproductive technologies and 
reproductive autonomy will be affected regardless of which type of regulatory model is 
                                                            
99 “Joint Policy Statement: Ethical Issues in Assisted Reproduction” (1999) 21 Journal of Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology Canada at 1, 3-12, 39-41, Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society online: 
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100 “Clinical Practice Guidelines”, The Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada online: 
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101 “Clinical Practice Guidelines”, The Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society online:  
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102 Guichon et al., supra note 95 at 317 
103 Nelson, supra note 5 at 263 
104 Ibid at 261-263 
105 AHRA, supra note 4, s 2 (c):  while all persons are affected by these technologies, women more than men are 
directly and significantly affected by their application and the health and well-being of women must be protected 
in the application of these technologies 
106 Nelson, supra note 5 at 262 
107 Nelson, supra note 5 at 262 
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implemented.108  Setting aside the question of whether the state should regulate morality, Nelson 
claims that ARTs treatments have public implications as well and that state regulation has its 
benefits, such as: quality control, public knowledge, accountability and data collection.109  
Nelson is not a proponent of the self-regulatory model which places exclusive regulatory power 
in the hands of medical professionals.  In her opinion, besides constituting a fragmented 
approach, this type of model would clearly incur potential conflicts of interests and leave too 
much power in the hands of the few.110  As for public regulation, Nelson points out that the 
choice lies between direct government control or indirect control through an independent body.  
Her stance leans toward the latter, while recognizing that finding a proper balance between the 
body’s accountability and transparency and accounting for public opinion is central.111  Basing 
her analysis on the UK and Australian regulatory models, the professor argues that a combined 
“professional and public approach is not only the most practical means of accomplishing 
thoughtful and appropriate regulation of ARTs, it also seems the most likely contender for a 
regulatory model that will properly respect reproductive autonomy.”112   
Juliet Guichon113 & al., have also maintained that professional guidelines are not sufficient, 
mainly because of the potential conflict of interest doctors could face114 and because the colleges 
have not really set up firm guidelines on values, as was suggested by the Royal Commission on 
New Reproductive Technologies:115  
[S]elf-regulation is necessary but not sufficient: many of the policy decisions are social, 
economic and ethical rather than medical, and a regulating body reflecting other perspectives 
is needed […] [f]ailure to create legislation or to establish a [regulatory body] is, in fact, a 
policy—and one that would not be in the best interest of Canadians in the long term.  In the 
absence of social policy in this area, the market will decide what is used and what is 
available.116   
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Guichon suggests common law provinces could use Québec’s legal framework as a model 
because it has a strong value statement and is equipped with clear enforcement measures.117  In 
Québec, assisted reproduction is regulated by the Act respecting clinical and research activities 
relating to assisted procreation118 (APA) (and associated regulation119).  Essentially, the Act 
seeks to ensure the quality practice of assisted reproduction, consistent with safety and ethical 
standards.120  It defines assisted procreation activities as follows:  
[A]ny support given to procreation by medical or pharmaceutical techniques or laboratory 
manipulation, whether clinical, to create a human embryo, or in the field of research, to 
improve clinical procedures or acquire new knowledge. 
The following activities are targeted in particular: the use of pharmaceutical procedures to 
stimulate the ovaries; the removal, treatment, in vitro manipulation and conservation of 
human gametes; artificial insemination with a spouse's or a donor's sperm; preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis; embryo conservation; embryo transfer in women. 
However, the surgical procedures to restore normal reproductive functions in a woman or a 
man are not targeted.121 
Since August 2010, pursuant to the APA, all women of childbearing age from Québec have been 
admissible to the province’s assisted procreation program, which was covered by public health 
care for up to three IVF cycles122.  The APA does not preclude surrogates from benefiting from 
the program but it is silent regarding the handling of surrogacy cases.  So, in practice, based on 
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122 Québec, Health and Welfare Commissioner, Summary Advisory on Assisted Reproduction in Québec (June 
2014) at 14 [Québec Summary Advisory Report 2014]: “Unlike most other provinces and countries that provide 
publically funded ART procedures or treatments, very few criteria limiting access to the program have been defined 
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69 c) 2); APR, supra note 119, s 9; Regulation respecting the application of the Health Insurance Act , CQLR c A-
29, r. 5, ss 34.3-34.6; Québec, Programme Québecois de procréation assistée, online : 
<http://www.sante.gouv.qc.ca/programmes-et-mesures-daide/programme-quebecois-de-procreation-
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their internal guidelines, certain fertility clinics have refused surrogates, whereas others have 
not123.  Section 9 of the APA provides that the Minister of Health and Social Services can bring 
the matter before a competent body, such as the Health and Welfare Commissioner, to request 
an opinion if a matter poses fundamental social or ethical questions for society.124   
In November 2014, the Minister of Health and Social Services presented Bill n°20 An Act to 
enact the Act to promote access to family medicine and specialized medicine services and to 
amend various legislative provisions relating to assisted procreation,125 which removed public 
health insurance coverage for assisted reproductive services, except for artificial insemination.  
The amendments made to the APA by Bill 20 do not include anything that is surrogate-
specific126.  Initially, the Bill set age requirements for in vitro fertilization (18-42 years)127 but 
social controversy on the issue led the minister to amend the requirements, choosing instead to 
leave it to medical practioners to decide whether a woman’s age is medically appropriate for 
assisted procreation.128  The Bill does provide that those forming the parental project and who 
risk compromising the security or the development of the future child, must be subjected to 
psychosocial evaluation.129  The parental project is a concept that was coined in 2002 and 
appears in the Civil Code of Quebec’s130 (CCQ) chapter on the filiation (parentage) of children 
born of assisted reproduction.131  I examine provincial parentage laws as they relate to surrogacy 
in the next section. 
3.  Parentage Laws and Surrogacy Arrangements in Canadian Provinces          
As we speak, provincial family law frameworks regarding parentage are not always coherent 
with one another and courts have played a particularly prominent role in the development of 
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parentage policy in the context of surrogacy arrangements.132  Indeed, the existing parentage 
rules relevant to ARTs and surrogacy are sparse and their application is murky.133  Some 
jurisdictions only have parentage rules relating to gamete providers, others for surrogates as 
well.134  Moreover, the enforceability of surrogacy arrangements varies from province to 
province.  Most provinces do not have parentage laws applicable specifically to surrogacy 
arrangements and that is why parentage issues in this area are mainly left to the courts.135   
In Manitoba, where the Vital Statistics Acts136 provides for same-sex parents situations, there is 
no legislation specifically targeting surrogacy and litigation has not been progressive in the 
area.137  The Child Status Act138 in Prince Edward Island precludes surrogacy by stating that 
birth mother is the mother, regardless of whether she is the genetic one.139  In Ontario, there is 
no legislation respecting parentage in surrogacy cases, but surrogacy occurs and it remains to 
the discretion of family law courts whether to make a parentage declaration or not.140  
Saskatchewan’s legislation does not recognize parentage for surrogacy cases but, in 2011, a 
court granted two gay men parentage.  The surrogate was not genetically tied to the child.141  In 
New Brunswick there is no parentage legislation specific to surrogacy.  A declaration for 
parentage was allowed by the Court of the Queen’s Bench in 2010,142 the child was genetically 
tied to the intended parents who were heterosexual.143  Another declaration of parentage was 
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made just recently in M (M.A.) v M (T.A.),144 where the Court of the Queen’s Bench considered 
the Family Services Act145, and the Children's Law Reform Act146 in its analysis.   
To date, five provinces have parentage legislation pertaining to surrogacy specifically:  
Newfoundland (and Labrador), Alberta, Nova-Scotia, British Colombia and Québec.  In 
Newfoundland (and Labrador), pursuant to section 5(6) of the Vital Statistics Act,147 a Court 
order must be issued under the Adoption Act148 or the Children’s Law Act149 in order for the 
registrar to inscribe intended parents.  The order can be sought before birth.150  In Alberta, 
surrogacy contracts are unenforceable.  The assumption is that the child’s parents are the 
surrogate and genetic father.  The Alberta Family Law Act (AFLA)151 permits parentage transfer, 
for which an application must be made within 30 days of the child’s birth (declaration of 
parentage), so long as at least one of the intended parents is genetically related to the child.  The 
Pre-birth surrogate agreement consent to the transfer cannot be used by surrogate as a post-birth 
consent but it can be used as consent by a non-genetic parent.  Because the parentage transfer 
occurs post-birth, it is not considered a contract, which would be unenforceable.152  In Nova-
Scotia, pursuant to section 5 (2) of the Birth Registration Regulations,153 a court “may make a 
declaratory order with respect to the parentage of the child if all of the following apply: (a) the 
surrogacy arrangement was initiated by the intended parents; (b) the surrogacy arrangement was 
planned before conception; (c) the woman who is to carry and give birth to the child does not 
intend to be the child’s parent; (d) the intended parents intend to be the child’s parents; (e) one 
of the intended parents has a genetic link to the child”.  Section 5(2) c) suggests that if a surrogate 
wants to keep the child, she can.154   
                                                            
144 2015 NBQB 145 
145 S.N.B. 1980, c. F-2.2 
146 R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12 
147 SNL 2009, c V-6.01 
148 SNL 2013, c A-3.1 
149 RSNL 1990, c C-13 
150 Snow, "Creeping Judicialization", supra note 132 at 14-15 
151 Family Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5 
152 Ibid, ss 7, 8.1, 8.2; Snow, "Creeping Judicialization", supra note 132 at 11-12; Nelson, supra note5 at 339-341 
153 N.S. Reg. 390/2007 
154 Snow, "Creeping Judicialization", supra note 132 at 16 
24 
 
In Rypkema,155 which was the first parentage case in the context of a surrogacy agreement in 
British Colombia, the Director of Vital Statistics had refused to register the genetic mother as 
the birth mother.  The genetic parents petitioned the Supreme Court of British Columbia 
requesting a declaration of parentage in favour of the intended parents.  The court found that, in 
as much as courts can make a declaration of paternity, they also have jurisdiction to make a 
declaration of maternity156 and it granted the application for a declaration of parentage in favour 
of the intended parents.  The Rypkema case was later applied by the British Colombia Supreme 
Court in N. (B.A.) v. H. (J.).157  In this case, the intended parents, the surrogate and the egg donor 
petitioned the court for a declaration of parentage in favour of the intended parents of twins 
which were conceived in vitro with an egg donor’s ovum.  Although nothing in the Vital 
Statistics Act158 provided for parentage in the case of surrogacy agreements at the time,159 the 
agency had developed particular guidelines which, upon evidence provided to the court, had 
been respected by the petitioners.160  Given that and given the reasons in the Rypkema case, the 
judge granted the application.  These two cases were the cornerstone of the legislative 
amendments brought to the British Colombia Family Law Act (BCFLA) 161 in 2011.162 
Pursuant to the BCFLA, surrogacy contracts are valid and they can be used as evidence in court 
if a dispute arises post-birth.163  The intended parents are the parents, provided a pre-birth 
agreement was formalized in writing and that the surrogate relinquished her parentage rights 
therein.  Immediate post- birth parental registration is permitted, without having to go to court.  
The province permits parentage transfer to more than two parents when a surrogate is involved, 
unlike in Alberta where it is restricted to two.164  Indeed, in February 2014, Della Wolf Kangro 
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Wiley Richards, became the first baby in British Colombia with three parents on her birth 
certificate: a lesbian couple and their male friend.165   
In Québec, the CCQ provides the general rules respecting parentage (filiation).  In its Book II, 
entitled “The Family”, at Title II, the code currently provides three types of filiation: filiation 
by blood,166 filiation of children born by assisted procreation167 and adoption.168  Article 522 
provides that “all children whose filiation is established have the same rights and obligations, 
regardless of their circumstances of birth.”  In the next sections I take a general look at each of 
type of filiation instituted by the CCQ in order to situate surrogacy and assisted procreation 
within the province’s existing filiation framework. 
3.1 The Code Civil du Québec on Filiation, Assisted Procreation and Surrogacy 
3.1.1 Filiation by Blood  
Filiation by blood is regulated at articles 523-537 CCQ.  The first section of Chapter I169 defines 
and establishes paternal and maternal filiation and section 2 regulates actions that can be taken 
to contest or claim filiation.170  Generally speaking, filiation is established by the act of birth,171 
or if there is no act of birth,172 by uninterrupted possession of status.173  The constitutive 
elements of the latter were developed by jurisprudence.174  Indeed, it is notable to mention that 
despite the title “filiation by blood,” the genetic links with the child is not the sole element 
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considered in establishing filiation pursuant to these rules.  The will to be a parent (volonté 
individuelle) is also considered.  In other words, even when a person is not related to the child 
by blood, signing a declaration of birth,175 or satisfying the possession of status criteria are 
factors that work towards establishing filiation.176  Generally, filiation by blood applies to 
situations where children have been conceived naturally, or by way of homologous assisted 
procreation.177  For reasons we will see below, filiation by blood has also been interpreted by 
legal scholars to apply in the context of surrogacy arrangements.  
3.1.2 The Filiation of Children born from Assisted Procreation: Surrogacy Excluded 
i- Assisted Procreation: the Parental Project 
The filiation of children born of assisted procreation is regulated by articles 538 to 542 CCQ.  
Pursuant to 538 CCQ, a parental project involving assisted procreation “exists from the moment 
a person alone decides or spouses by mutual consent decide, in order to have a child, to resort 
to the genetic material of a person who is not party to the parental project178.”  The article was 
introduced with the enacting of the Act instituting civil unions and establishing new rules of 
filiation in 2002.179  For 538 CCQ to take application, two elements need to be satisfied: (1) a 
person alone or spouses mutually consent to have a child using (2) the genetic material of 
another person who is not part of their parental project.  Indeed, 538 CCQ generally does not 
recognize a filiation between the genetic contributor and the child, except in the case provided 
for at article 538.2 CCQ, where contribution is by way of sexual intercourse.180  Furthermore, 
the article only applies to heterologous assisted procreation.  In other words, the filiation of a 
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child born from heterosexual partners who conceived through artificial insemination using their 
own gametes (homologous assisted procreation) is not covered by 538 CCQ but rather, it is 
regulated by articles 523-537 CCQ (filiation by blood), even if medical assistance was necessary 
in conceiving.181  However, the situation in which lesbian couples (married or in a civil union) 
or single heterosexual women that choose a sperm donor who willingly relinquish their filiation 
to the child,182 is covered by article 538 and it is considered assisted procreation, whether 
medical intervention was necessary or not.183  Although bimaternal filiation is possible pursuant 
to 538 CCQ, bipaternal filiation is not.  I take a look at the reasons why in the following 
section.184   
ii- No Contracts for Wombs: Article 541 of the Code Civil du Québec 
Pursuant to article 541 CCQ, “any agreement whereby a woman undertakes to procreate or carry 
a child for another person is absolutely null.”185  Article 541 CCQ is located in the chapter of 
the code which regulates the filiation of children born of assisted procreation,186 and it is a public 
order rule which dictates the general interest of society.  What does absolute nullity mean in the 
context of a surrogacy contract?   
In May 2002, during the parliamentary debate regarding Bill no 84, An Act instituting civil 
unions and establishing new rules of filiation,187 the enacting of article 541 CCQ was not 
contentious among the members of parliament: rather, it was expressed that 541CCQ was the 
recovery of a pre-existent article, whose substance everyone had agreed on.188  Back in 1993, 
                                                            
181 Roy Comments on 538 CCQ, supra note 177; Adoption 12464, 2012 QCCQ 20039 [Adoption 12464]; Adoption 
10329, 2010 QCCQ 18645 ; Adoption 10330, 2010 QCCQ 17819 ; Adoption 10539, 2010 QCCQ 21132; Adoption 
09185, 2009 QCCQ 8703 [Adoption 09185]; Protection de la jeunesse 084475, 2008 QCCQ 13902; Droit de la 
famille 151172, supra note 134; Droit de la famille 141951, 2014 QCCS 3811; S.M. c. St.G., 2006 QCCS 2376; 
L.O. v. S.J., 2006 QCCS 302; F. P. c. P. C., 2005 CanLII 5637; A. D. c. Québec (Administrative Tribunal), 2004 
CanLII 42983 (QC CS); P.-O. C. c. J.-F. L., 2004 CanLII 40524 (QC CS); Droit de la famille 07528, 2007 QCCA 
36; Droit de la famille 07527, 2007 QCCA 362  
182Roy Comments on 538 CCQ, supra note 177 at 4-5 
183 Arts 538.2, 538.3, 538.4, 539.1 CCQ; Roy Report, supra note 176 at 23; Roy Comments on 538CCQ, supra 
note 177 at 2-3; Michelle Giroux, "Le recours controversé a l’adoption pour établir la filiation de l’enfant né d’une 
mère porteuse : entre ordre public contractuel et l’intérêt de l’enfant" (2011) 70 R du B 509 at 531-532 [Giroux] 
184 Roy Report, supra note 176 at 23; Roy Comments on 538CCQ, supra note 177 at 4 
185 Toute convention par laquelle une femme s'engage à procréer ou à porter un enfant pour le compte d'autrui est 
nulle de nullité absolue [official translation] 
186 In Book II, Title II, Chapter 1.1, Arts 538-542 CCQ 
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the Minister of Justice stated that the purpose of 541 CCQ was prohibiting the establishment of 
a child’s filiation via a contract:  
This new article clearly establishes the nullity of procreation or gestation agreements by which 
a person commits to another to generate or carry a child and the absolute nature of such 
invalidity, whether these agreements are made gratuitously or for consideration.  Since these 
agreements are invalid, the parties will not be able to rely on them, nor request their execution.  
It has been deemed contrary to public order to allow the child's parentage to be determined 
by an agreement.  Said agreements are deemed to never have existed and parentage shall be 
established according to the modes of proof provided above.189  
 
Therefore, the Minister’s comments appear incoherent insofar as the institution of pre-birth 
parental projects has been allowed since 2002.190  Professors Michèle Giroux and Benoit 
Moore,191 as well as the Commission de l’éthique, de la science et de la technologie, interpret 
the Minister’s comments on 541 CCQ as meaning that the maternal and paternal filiation of a 
child cannot be established via a surrogacy contract but rather, by the act of birth, as provided 
by article 523 CCQ,192 and that according to Québec law, maternal filiation is, in principle, 
attributed to the woman who gives birth (mater semper certa est).193  In other words, the chapter 
of the code which regulates filiation by blood194 applies to surrogacy cases: pursuant to those 
rules, the woman giving birth is deemed the mother and is the one that should appear on the 
attestation and declaration of birth.195   
                                                            
Le Président (M. Dion): Adopté. Alors, on passe à l'article 541. M. le ministre.M. Bégin: Est-ce qu'il y a un 
amendement? Non. Alors:«541. Toute convention par laquelle une femme s'engage à procréer ou à porter un enfant 
pour le compte d'autrui est nulle de nullité absolue.»Il ne s'agit pas d'un nouveau texte, il s'agit de la reprise d'un 
texte qui est déjà existant. Et je pense que tout le monde partage ce point de vue.Mme Lamquin-Éthier: Nous 
partageons.  M. Gautrin: Je pourrais faire toutes sortes de...Mme Lamquin-Éthier: Non.  Tu te retiens.  Tu en 
meurs d'envie, mais tu demeures coi.  Le Président (M. Dion): Alors, l'article 541 est-il adopté? M. Bégin: Adopté. 
189 Québec, Ministère de la Justice, "Commentaires du Ministre de la Justice: Le Code civil du Québec: Un 
mouvement de société", Tome 1 (Québec: Publications du Québec, 1993) at 327 [my translation] 
190 Article 538 CCQ; Giroux, supra note 183 at 532; Benoit Moore “Maternité de Substitution et filiation en droit 
Québecois” in Mélanges en l’honneur de Camille Jauffret-Spinosi (Paris : Editions Dalloz) 2013  at 864 [Moore] 
191 Michèle Giroux is a professor at the Civil Law Section of the Faculty of Law of the University of Ottawa, where 
she teaches family law, bioethics and public health law.  She is currently focusing her research on issues related to 
assisted human reproduction, including the right to know one’s origins and surrogacy.  She has been a member of 
the Quebec Bar since 1989.  Benoit Moore is a professor at the Faculty of Law of Université de Montréal, where 
he teachers obligations.  He is the holder of the Chaire Jean-Louis Beaudoin en droit civil.  
192 Art 523 CCQ: “paternal filiation and maternal filiation are proved by the act of birth, regardless of the 
circumstances of the child's birth. In the absence of an act of birth, uninterrupted possession of status is sufficient.” 
193 The mater est quam gestatio demonstrat and mater sempre certa est principles; Giroux, supra note 183 at 522; 
Bureau & Guilhermont, "Maternité, Gestation et Liberté, supra note 75 at 49; Moore, supra note 190 at 867-868 
194 Arts 523-538 CCQ 
195 Arts 111-114 CCQ 
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Nothing in the rules on the filiation of children born of assisted procreation196 explicitly permits 
the transfer of filiation from a surrogate mother to an intended mother or an intended gay father.  
Thus, the parental project under 538 CCQ was not enacted with the purpose to include surrogate 
arrangements.  Because surrogacy contracts are deemed unenforceable,197 couples engaging in 
surrogacy agreements have not been considered as forming a parental project pursuant to 538 
CCQ.   The result is that the filiation of children born from surrogacy agreements has been 
contentious in the province.198 However, the adoption of children born from surrogacy 
agreements has been allowed by the Court of Appeal of Québec which, in 2014, held that the 
child’s best interests (l’intérêt de l’enfant) should take precedence over the general interests of 
society (l’ordre public).199  The decision was followed by one case200 so far and distinguished 
by another.201   
If 541 CCQ did not exist, the enforceability of surrogacy contracts might have been debated 
within a different perspective in Québec courts202.  What they have had to examine so far, is 
whether the filiation of children born from surrogate agreements is transferable to the intended 
parent after birth, through adoption, despite 541CCQ.  I will examine the two main cases in 
Québec on the issue but first, I would like to draw particular attention to Family Law 
Exceptionalism (FLE) and its counterpart Up Against Family Law Exceptionalism as important 
schools of thought for the discourse on surrogacy and ARTs in Québec.  In my opinion, these 
theoretical frameworks are relevant to the abovementioned Québec adoption cases.  Indeed, 
adoption jurisprudence has formed the basis of the debate in Québec’s civil law on surrogacy to 
date.  
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4. Family Law Exceptionalism 
4.1 A Short History 
In her 1983, The Family and the Market, A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,203 Frances 
Olsen204 looks at market and family ideologies in the nineteenth and twentieth century as well 
as their relationship to women and feminism in the United States.  Essentially, she questions the 
premise on which social reforms for women have been built by deconstructing the popular 
understanding of the market/family divide.  In her opinion, the dichotomy should be transcended 
if it is to benefit society.  She re-examines the premise that family is a private issue and the 
market is a public one.  She argues that both family and market are private insofar as they are 
both part of civil society, in opposition to the state, which is public.205  With that in mind, she 
compares the arguments of the proponents as well as the critics of the laissez-faire 
(noninterventionist) ideology respecting family and the market.206  Among these, Olsen 
highlights Robert Hale’s argument from his 1923 article, Coercion and Distribution in a 
Supposedly Noncoercive State.207  In a nutshell, his argument highlighted the fallaciousness of 
laissez-faire ideology insofar as the “systems advocated by professed upholders of laissez-faire 
were in reality permeated with coercive restrictions of individual freedom [and] government 
neutrality was an impossibility.”208  Furthering her reflection, Olsen draws on feminist literature 
and John Dawson’s work on undue influence law from the mid twentieth century209 to 
substantiate the argument that the ideal of individual freedom was present in both family and 
market but that whether laissez-faire applied to either sphere, the state is never a neutral agent.  
Thus, freedom of choice was (is) really freedom to coerce, both in market relations and in family 
                                                            
203 Frances E. Olsen, “The Family and the Market, A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform”(1983) 96: 7 Harv L 
Rev 1497 [Olsen] 
204 Professor Frances Elisabeth Olsen teaches feminist legal theory, dissidence & law, family law, and torts at 
UCLA and is an important member of the school of feminist legal theory.  
205 Olsen, supra note 203 at 1501 
206 Ibid at 1501-1511 
207 (1923) 8 Polit Sci Q 470  
208 Olsen, supra note 203 at 1508 
209 John Dawson, “Economic Duress - An Essay in Perspective” (1947) 45 Mich. L. Rev. 253 at 266 cited in Olsen, 
supra note 203 at 1511:  “On the one hand, doctrines of undue influence were attempting to "free" the individual 
by regulating the pressures that restricted individual choice; on the other hand, theories of economic individualism 
aimed at an entirely different kind of freedom, a freedom of the "market" from external regulation.  It was not yet 
fully recognized that the freedom of the "market" was essentially a freedom of individuals and groups to coerce 
one another, with the power to coerce reinforced by agencies of the state itself.” 
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relations:  “The parallel [of the work about undue influence law] with nineteenth century family 
law is striking.  Family law doctrine aimed at "freeing" the individual members of a family from 
external regulation.  Feminists argued, however, that this freedom was essentially a freedom of 
husbands to coerce wives, “with the power to coerce reinforced by agencies of the state itself.”210 
Janet Halley211 and Kerry Rittich212 also draw from Robert Hale’s 1923 Coercion and 
Distribution in a Supposedly Noncoercive State to build their framework on what they call the 
foreground and background rules in family law.213  The scholars illustrate how the 
market/family distinction partook in the creation of family law (domestic relations) as an 
exceptional field in the United States.214  “The construction of the legal order to render the 
family and its law distinctive, special, other, exceptional” is what they call Family Law 
Exceptionalism (FLE).215  The scholars seek to reveal the distributive effects which exist within 
marital relationships as well as “between its members and the rest of the world.”216 Halley and 
her colleagues have called their project Up Against Family Law Exceptionalism.217  While 
Halley’s material delves deep into the historical roots of the market/family divide to reveal how 
family law formed and became an exceptional field in the USA,218 Rittich’s work places the 
family in the context of the global economy and development.219   
In What is Family Law, A Genealogy, Part I220 Halley takes a particular look at how classical 
legal thinkers redefined marriage in the middle of the nineteenth century, a transformation which 
                                                            
210 Olsen, supra note 203 at 1512 
211 Janet Halley is the Royal Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.  Her interests include: family law, 
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213 Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, “Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary 
Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism” (2010) 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 753 at 761 [Halley&Rittich]. 
214 Halley & Rittich, supra note 213; Janet Halley, “What is Family Law, A Genealogy, Part I” (2011) 23 Yale J.L. 
& Human 1 at 3 [Halley, “A Genealogy Part I”]; Janet Halley, “What is Family Law, A Genealogy Part II” (2011) 
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217 Ibid at 753 
218 Halley, “A Genealogy, Part I”, supra note 214; Halley, “A Genealogy Part II”, supra note 214 
219 Kerry Rittich, “Families on the Edge, Governing Home and Work in a Globalized Economy” (2010) 88 
N.C.L. Rev. 1527;  Kerry Rittich,  “Black Sites: Locating the Family and Family Law in Development” (2010) 
58 Am. J. Comp. L. 1023. 
220 Halley, “A Genealogy, Part I”, supra note 214 
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caused the birth of the modern legal family.  In the late nineteenth century, the locus of 
production shifted away from the household, distinguished spheres began to take form for men 
(the world) and women (the home).221  Marriage gradually ceased being defined as contract: 
“This double transformation-of the law of husband and wife into the law of marriage, and of 
marriage from contract to status, marked the separation of the law of familial intimacy from the 
law of productive labor.”222  According to Halley, the market/family distinction that resulted 
remains “a latent but structural element of the legal curriculum and the legal order” today.  She 
argues that the drive to systemize and structure the law stemmed from German legal thought 
and spread on a global scale through the advent of colonialism and global capitalism.223  
Particularly, drawing from Ducan Kennedy’s work in, Savigny’s Family/Patrimony Distinction 
and Its Place in the Global Genealogy of Classical Legal Thought,224 Halley examines how 
                                                            
221 Olsen, supra note 203 at 1499, 1501: “In the early nineteenth century, as men's work was largely removed to 
the factory while women's work remained primarily in the home, there came to be a sharp dichotomy between 
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celebrated as the reward for which men should be willing to suffer in the earthly world of work.  The family and 
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the world of commerce and industry. The home was said to provide a haven from the anxieties of modern life - "a 
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destroy." 
222 Halley, “A Genealogy Part I”, supra note 214 at 2-3: “Contract, quasi-contract, and tort became the law of 
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[Kennedy]; Fernanda G. Nicola, “Family Law Exceptionalism in Comparative Law” (2010) 58:4 Am. J. Comp. L 
777. [Nicola] 
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Frederich Carl von Savigny’s family/patrimony distinction,225 or what she and Rittich call “The 
Savignian Pattern”226 influenced the status/contract distinction in American law.227   
Savigny, an elite German jurist and professor, was an important figure in Classical Legal 
Thought, as well as a proponent of the German Historical School.  He lived from 1779 to 
1861.228  According to him, the law found its origins in an organic and unconscious process 
driven by the people (Volksgeist) but he also espoused the idea of the law as systemic.229  In 
System of Modern and Roman Law, Savigny draws a distinction between potentialities (the 
market) and the family, basing himself on the dual nature of human beings: according to him, 
humans are both complete and incomplete.  Men are completed by their relationship with the 
greater whole (women and children), in a cycle of reciprocal necessity.230  Market relationships 
were different as they were marked by self-sufficiency, each individual being a whole in himself.  
He also drew a distinction between relations that are necessary (natural) and ones that were 
arbitrary.  Simply put, the latter attribute was associated market relations because, according to 
him, they are not required naturally, whereas family relations are organic.231  That being said, 
Savigny’s conception of private law marked a distinction between market relations and family 
relations.   
                                                            
225 Ibid  
226 Halley, “A Genealogy Part I”, supra note 214 at 70; Halley & Rittich, supra note 213 at 757, 770: “The 
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4.2 “De-Exceptionalizing Family Law”: Looking Beyond the Market/Family Divide 
Halley & Rittich draw on the Savignian Pattern232 to describe FLE’s normative and descriptive 
(lexical) manifestation in liberalized societies’ legal scholarship and academia.233  Essentially, 
their aim is to show that, in certain cases, deconstructing FLE, or “de-exceptionalizing family 
law”234 in an effort to put the contract law/family law duality “back into contiguity”235, to place 
the family in the market context,236 can be “socially beneficial for any human persons, groups, 
causes or ideas.”237  They suggest family law should reconnect with areas of the law that have 
traditionally related to the market.  Their premise is that “while the liberal legal order's market 
is patently and shamelessly distributive, market/family ideology masks the distributive functions 
of the household much as it masks those same functions in the market.” 238 Drawing on Robert 
Hales work,239 the scholars distinguish between what they call “foreground” (Family Law 1 or 
FL1) and “background rules” (FL2 to FL4240) of family law241.  As they put it, “Family Law 1-
FL1-is what you will find in a modern family law code, course, bar exam, or casebook.  It 
comprises marriage and its alternatives: divorce, parental status, and parental rights and duties; 
in some countries it includes inheritance and in others, for interesting reasons, it does not.”242  
Background rules are the ones which, prima facie, have no connection with family law but can 
have a permeative effect on family nonetheless.243  The authors suggest the existence of a 
feedback loop between the background and foreground: 
[I]f you wanted to understand how law contributes to the ways in which actual family and 
household life is led by actual people, you would never stop [at FL1]. You would immediately 
look for the explicit family-targeted provisions peppered throughout substantive legal regimes 
that seem to have no primary commitment to maintaining the distinctiveness of the family-
regimes ranging from tax law to immigration law to bankruptcy law.244 
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The authors also highlight the fact that “significant parts of the legal order in which family life 
is worked out are designed and enforced by non-state entities”245 and these norms constitute 
background rules affecting family dynamics.   
Jill Elaine Hasday246 also analysed the family/market distinction.  She argues that FLE manifests 
itself through court decisions as well as legal scholarship’s perception and depiction of family 
law as separate from the market.  She cites the refusal to enforce interspousal domestic services 
contracts as well as the refusal to recognize human capital as community property in divorce 
cases as examples.  Indeed, according to her, jurisprudence in the United States is replete with 
cases where courts refuse to recognize human capital as community property, based on the 
argument that marriage is not a commercial partnership.247  Hasday highlights that the 
market/family narrative contradicts reality, which is that courts have enforced numerous 
economic agreements made before and during marriage, which were geared toward managing 
the distribution of property and assets: prenuptial and postnuptial agreements.248  She also cites 
other economic agreements within the family, for example “express or implied contracts 
between siblings for domestic services”, which the courts have normally enforced, as well as 
cases where courts have compelled economic transactions within families.249 
4.3 The Localist Narrative 
Whereas localist approaches to family law stress the local nature of family, Halley and Rittich 
remind readers that the international realm also has an influence on shaping the family.  Indeed, 
when it comes to infertility for example, they highlight the fact the phenomenon has caused 
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family to become increasingly transnational market-driven unit.250  Hasday examines the localist 
narrative251 in the USA and argues it is an impediment to coherent policy-making:  
Narratives grounded on the assumption of family law’s exceptionalism significantly overstate 
family law’s separation from ordinarily applicable legal principles, divert the attention of 
lawmakers and jurists, and misshape the decisions they make.  The narratives encourage 
reliance on categorical generalizations about family law’s supposed differentness, rather than 
focused analysis of specific policy choices.252 
 
According to her, FLE acts as a premise on which family is strongly construed as a local field 
of the law (i.e. state regulated) in the USA.  She claims that the localist narrative has contributed 
to concealing the existence of federal family law and also, that it has been selectively applied to 
certain fields of federal jurisdiction, to the exclusion of others.  She employs examples from the 
judiciary253 as well as at the legislative254 levels which support her theory that localism has huge 
weight among scholars, judges and lawmakers in the USA, all the while, in actuality, federal 
laws which are relevant to family issues abound:255 “[…] the localist story about family law 
simply misdescribes the field, masking the scope and even the existence of federal family 
law.”256  She also reveals how, despite claims that it does not want to interfere with family law, 
the Supreme Court of the United States has, through its constitutional decisions and through its 
creation of family federal common law.257  Ultimately, her aim is to illustrate that the localist 
narrative can and should be transcended.258  
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The localist narrative Hasday refers to is also present in comparative family law scholarship, 
particularly where harmonization issues are concerned.259  FLE was present in twentieth century 
comparative law.  In the first half of the century, in their search for universal rules, comparative 
lawyers formed two competing schools of thought: social-purpose functionalism and positive-
sociology functionalism.  Social-purpose functionalists were skeptic about the possibility of 
harmonizing family law because in their opinion, it was the product of local culture and morals 
(localist narrative).  Therefore, they focused on harmonizing market rules, which to them, were 
more likely to converge due to their scientific and objective nature.260  While recognizing the 
market/family divide, positive-sociology functionalists did not cast aside family law.  Instead, 
they examined its pluralities within a social science framework.261  Specifically, after World 
War II, human rights and gender equality caused thinkers to analyze the family from an 
international perspective and encourage harmonization goals within comparative law 
projects.262  The question of harmonizing family law is still present in scholarship today.263  In 
Europe for example, the issue has divided thinkers in two camps: the ones who argue that family 
law is not harmonizable throughout Europe due to its intrinsically cultural and local nature, 
whereas others see common cultural elements in families across Europe as grounds for 
harmonization.264 
5. Family Law Exceptionalism in Québec’s Legal Discourse on Surrogacy 
In my opinion, FLE has been predominant in civil law discourse on surrogacy: first of all, up to 
date, Québec civil law scholarship has analysed surrogacy arrangements mainly from the point 
of view of the province’s adoption jurisprudence and filiation rules.265  Second, despite generally 
recognizing that family realities are changing,266 civil thought in the province has not really 
bridged the gaps between the CCQ and other legislative frameworks and/or non-state rules 
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which are directly or indirectly involved in surrogacy arrangements, such as the province’s law 
on assisted reproduction267.  Thirdly, according to civil legal scholarship in Québec, the issue 
for women revolves around a narrow definition of autonomy: that of consent.  Not only is the 
definition of autonomy tightly circumscribed to a legal definition but the reality of assisted 
reproduction and the medical definition of consent are barely accounted for268.   
5.1 Québec’s Adoption Framework in Short 
The Civil Code269 and the Youth Protection Act (YPA)270 regulate matters pertaining to adoption 
in Québec.  The Court of Québec (Youth Division) and the Director of Youth protection are 
both involved in the institution of adoption in the province.271  Full adoption (adoption plénière) 
is the only type of adoption available.272  As opposed to simple adoption, which does not result 
in the disappearance of the original parentage link, full adoption, breaks parentage 
                                                            
267 Alain Roy,  “Le nouveau cadre juridique de la procréation assistée en droit québécois ou l’œuvre inachevée d’un 
législateur trop pressé” (2005) 23 L’Observatoire de la Génétique online www. ircm.qc.ca/bioethique/obsgenetique 
[Roy, "Œuvre inachevée d’un législateur"]: “Curieusement, le législateur n’a pas modifié les dispositions relatives 
aux contrats de mère porteuse, lesquels demeurent toujours illicites.  Ainsi, aux termes de l’article 541 C.c.Q., 
«[t]oute convention par laquelle une femme s’engage à procréer ou à porter un enfant pour le compte d’autrui est 
nulle de nullité absolue». […] Nul besoin d’être devin pour en prédire l’abrogation à plus ou moins court terme. 
En effet, en premier lieu, il est possible que les couples gais, qui ne peuvent avoir d’enfants que par l’intermédiaire 
d’un jugement d’adoption, se considèrent lésés par rapport aux couples de lesbiennes et cherchent à faire tomber 
l’interdiction en invoquant le droit à l’égalité garanti par l’article 15(1) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés 
(12).  Qui plus est, la nouvelle Loi [fédérale] concernant la procréation assistée et la recherche connexe (7) servira 
sans doute de point d’appui à cette abrogation dans la mesure où elle n’interdit nullement le recours aux mères 
porteuses mais ne fait qu’en prohiber la rétribution.”  
268 Ibid: “[Les dispositions de Loi instituant l’union civile et établissant de nouvelles règles de filiation] ont été 
adoptées dans un contexte orienté par les aspirations égalitaires des couples de même sexe.  Pourtant, au-delà de 
l’homoparenté, la procréation assistée soulève des enjeux sociaux extrêmement importants sur lesquels le 
législateur québécois ne s’est pas donné le recul nécessaire.  La procréation assistée constitue une problématique 
en soi, qui aurait mérité un débat élargi, où l’ensemble des questions éthiques et juridiques susceptibles d’en résulter 
auraient pu être abordées.  Pensons notamment à la finalité de l’institution: la procréation assistée aurait-elle dû 
demeurer une alternative mise à la disposition des couples infertiles seulement ou fallait-il vraiment, comme le 
législateur québécois l’a fait, l’ériger en une véritable option? Et que dire du couple hétérosexuel fertile qui voudra 
s’en prévaloir afin de «bonifier» le bagage génétique d’un enfant et des risques de marchandages auxquels la 
filiation se voit désormais exposée, dans un contexte de procréation ‘amicalement assistée’?”  
269 Arts 543-582 CCQ 
270 Youth Protection Act, CQLR c P-34.1, ss 32(g) (h); 71-72; 95.0.1; 132 (f); 135.1; 135.1.1, 135.1.2 [YPA] 
271 Arts 37,432-442 CCP; Courts of Justice Act, CQLR, c T-16, art 83(4); Alain Roy, Droit de l'adoption : adoption 
interne et internationale, 2e éd., (Montréal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2010) at paras 6-12 online at : 
<http://edoctrine.caij.qc.ca/wilson-et-lafleur-livres/18/2018864029>  [Roy, "Droit de l’adoption"] 
272 Cited in Roy, "Droit de l'adoption", supra note 271 at para 16;  Québec, Ministre de la Santé et des Services 
sociaux et au ministre de la Justice, Pour une adoption québécoise à la mesure de chaque enfant, rapport du groupe 
de travail sur le régime québécois de l’adoption, presided by Carmen Lavallée (March 30th, 2007) at 77-92 
[Lavallée Report]. 
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definitively.273  Adoption is also closed in Québec (adoption fermée), meaning that both 
adopting and biological parents do not disclose their identities to one another.274  There are 
scholars in Québec that have not only questioned the province’s monolithic framework, they 
have also argued for children’s right to have knowledge of their biological origins (both in the 
adoption context and in cases where gamete providers are involved).275 
Pursuant to article 543 CCQ, adoption can only take place in the interest of the child and on the 
conditions prescribed by law.  The interest of the child is measured in concreto (meaning in 
relevance to the adoption procedure) and on a case by case basis.276  The Court hearing the 
adoption case is normally expected to examine the interests of the child not only in the present 
but for the future as well.277  It should be noted that, according to Alain Roy, scholars in Québec 
have agreed that the interest of the child in concreto is a principle of interpretation and is not 
meant to supersede the conditions prescribed by law in adoption cases.278  Québec adoption 
courts279 have had to weigh the child’s interests in concreto against the public order rule 
                                                            
273 Roy, "Droit de l'adoption", supra note 271;  Lavallée Report, supra note 272 at 78 
274 Roy, "Droit de l'adoption", supra note 271 at paras 14-15 
275 Roy, "Droit de l'adoption", supra note 271 at para 16; Lavallée Report, supra note 272 at 77-92; Michèle Giroux, 
"Le droit fondamental de connaître ses origines biologiques", in Tara Collins, Rachel Grondin & al., Rights of the 
Child. Proceedings of the International Conference (Montréal : Wilson & Lafleur, 2008) at 353 -390 [Giroux, 
"Rights of the Child Conference"]; Giroux, supra note 183 at 524; Marie-France Bureau, Edith Guilhermont, "Le 
droit de connaître ses origines : chronique d’une réforme annoncée" (2014) 73 R du B 597 [Bureau& Guilhermont, 
"Droit aux origines"] 
276 Roy, "Droit de l'adoption", supra note 271 at para 17,  
277 Ibid at para 17 
278 Ibid at para 18: “The interest of the child in concreto alone cannot justify adopting him.  As stated in Article 
543 CCQ, adoption can only take place in the child's interest and conditions provided by law.  With these 
conditions, the legislature closely regulates the adoption process so as to prevent any diversion.  The ‘conditions 
provided for by law’ cannot be set aside under the pretext that the adoption is in the interest of the child who is the 
object of the adoption procedure. […] Subordinating the conditions of the law to the child's interest would be to 
remove the legal safeguards underlying the adoption process. However, these guarantees were specifically 
established to protect all against abuses of all kinds.  The child which is the object of the adoption procedure is not 
the sole beneficiary of these conditions; it is rather children as a whole (or the principle of the child's interest in 
abstracto) that justify their existence” [my translation]; Jean Pineau & Marie Pratte, “La famille” (Montréal, 
Éditions Thémis, 2006) at 713; Carmen Lavallée, "L’enfant, ses familles et les institutions de l’adoption. Regards 
sur le droit français et le droit québécois" (Montréal:Wilson & Lafleur, 2005) at 412 : "Il est toutefois nécessaire 
de rappeler que l’intérêt concret constitue un élément d’interprétation et qu’il ne peut, à ce titre, contredire une 
règle de droit […]. L’intérêt concret de l’enfant n’est pas une norme de droit autonome en soi, elle est une règle 
d’interprétation qui suppose la légalité du processus" cited in Roy, "Droit de l'adoption" supra note 271 at para 18, 
n 126 
279 Adoption 1445, supra note 198;  Adoption 1549, supra note 198; Adoption  1342, 2013 QCCQ 4585; Adoption 
12464, 2012 QCCQ 20039;  Adoption 10329, 2010 QCCQ 18645; Adoption 10330, 2010 QCCQ 17819; 
Adoption 10539, 2010 QCCQ 21132; Adoption 09367, 2009 QCCQ 16815; Adoption 09558, 2009 QCCQ 20292; 
Adoption 09184, 2009 QCCQ 9058; Adoption 09185, 2009 QCCQ 8703; Adoption 091, supra note 198; Adoption 
07219, 2007 QCCQ 21504;  
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encapsulated by article 541 CCQ in cases where surrogates were involved.  Next I look at how 
two important cases in the province to date dealt with the issue. 
5.1.1 The Court of Québec: Surrogacy Agreements as Offending Public Order 
In Adoption 091,280 a Court of Québec case, Judge DuBois refused to grant the application for 
the adoption of a child that was the fruit of a surrogacy agreement.  He was asked to determine 
whether the consent for adoption was valid.  According to Judge DuBois, the consent was 
vitiated because it was part of a plan which was illegal, and thus, pursuant to 543 (1) CCQ, it 
should not be allowed because adoption can only take place “in the conditions prescribed by 
law”:  
With respect for the contrary opinion, the Court considers that the conditions prescribed by 
law extend far beyond formal, procedural respect for the consent to adoption given by the 
father in the particular context of a specific parental project revealed by the evidence. 
Admittedly, in the present case, no one will dispute that the father, the only declared parent, 
could legitimately sign a special written consent before two witnesses in favour of the 
adoption of his child by his spouse with whom he has cohabited for over six years (art. 555 
C.C.Q.).  Unless one chooses to wear blinders, however, it is not possible to dissociate the 
question of the validity of this consent (Exhibit R-2) from the preceding steps concocted 
by this couple in carrying out their parental project.  The consent was vitiated because it 
formed part and parcel of an illegal undertaking and was contrary to public order.  This is not 
a matter of procedural law, but of substantive law […] The evidence shows that this consent 
(Exhibit R-2) forms part of a whole.  It is merely the logical continuation of the same carefully 
planned parental project, in short, a colourable way of giving effect to this contractual 
agreement “by creating legal consequences to something that is prohibited by law.281 
 
I have meant to emphasize on the judge’s choice of words in his analysis of the effects of 543 
CCQ as it is not clear what he is referring to when he says “[…] all the steps chronologically 
following the decision to recruit a surrogate mother, in contempt of existing laws and in the 
                                                            
280 Supra, note 198 
281 Adoption 091, supra note 198 at paras 55- 59: "Avec respect pour l'opinion contraire, le Tribunal estime que les 
conditions prévues par la loi vont bien au-delà du respect formel et procédural du consentement à l'adoption ici 
effectué par le père dans le contexte particulier d'un projet parental concret révélé par la preuve.  Certes, dans la 
présente affaire, personne ne contestera que le père, seul parent déclaré, pouvait légitimement signer comme prévu 
un consentement spécial, par écrit et devant deux témoins, en faveur de l'adoption de son enfant par sa conjointe 
avec qui il partage sa vie depuis plus de six ans (article 555 C.c.Q.).  À moins de choisir de porter des œillères, il 
n'est toutefois pas possible de dissocier la question de la validité de ce consentement (pièce R-2) des étapes 
précédentes concoctées dans la réalisation du projet parental de ce couple.  Ce consentement est vicié parce qu'il 
est partie prenante à la démarche illégale et contraire à l'ordre public.  On ne parle pas de droit procédural, mais de 
droit substantif […] La preuve montre que ce consentement (pièce R-2) fait partie d'un tout.  Il n'est que la suite 
logique et prévue de ce même projet parental soigneusement planifié bref, une manière détournée de donner effet 
à cette entente contractuelle en faisant produire des conséquences juridiques à ce qui est prohibé par la loi" [official 
translation][emphasis added].  
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margins of the law [all the] steps conceived and carried out illegally would finally lead to a legal 
result, thanks to the convenient use of the all-purpose criterion of the best interests of the child.” 
282  I wonder whether: (1) he is asserting that surrogacy contracts are illegal, as he does indeed 
use the words “illegal” and “prohibited by law” when referring to such undertakings283 or 
whether (2) he is referring to the intentional omission of the surrogate mother’s name in the 
birth declaration, or whether (3) he considers the “payment for inconvenience and expenses”284 
as contrary to sections 6 (1) AHRA285 and 135.1, 135.1.3286 of the Youth Protection Act 
(YPA)287 or 541 CCQ or (4) all of the above.  Section 135.1 YPA provides that “whether the 
placement or the adoption takes place in Québec or elsewhere and whether or not the child is 
domiciled in Québec, no person may (a) give, receive or offer or agree to give or receive, directly 
or indirectly, a payment or a benefit either for giving or obtaining a consent to adoption, for 
finding a placement or contributing to a placement with a view to adoption or for obtaining the 
adoption of a child”. 
Judge DuBois’ reasons can be construed to mean that consent to adoption which is given in 
circumstances contrary to article 541 CCQ invalidates the said consent, thus interpreting the 
effects of 541 CCQ as extended to affect the child’s filiation.288  Professor Michèle Giroux does 
not agree with Judge Dubois’s reasons in Adoption 091289.  In her opinion, article 543CCQ 
should be read to mean only conditions of the law prescribed by the rules pertaining to 
adoption.290  She suggests that Judge DuBois’ reasons are relevant insofar as, in the case at bar, 
                                                            
282 Adoption 091, supra note 198 at paras 63, 66 
283 Ibid at paras 52, 59 
284 Ibid at para 48 
285 Ibid  
286 YPA, supra note 270 , s 135.1.3: "Every person who contravenes a provision of any of sections 135.1, 135.1.1 
and 135.1.2 is guilty of an offence and is liable (a) to a fine of $10,000 to $100,000 in the case of a natural person 
or to a fine of $25,000 to $200,000 in the case of a legal person, for a contravention of paragraph a or b of section 
135.1 or a contravention of section 135.1.1 or 135.1.2; (b) to a fine of $2,500 to $7,000 for a contravention of 
paragraph c of section 135.1." 
287 Supra, note 270 
288 Giroux, supra note 183 at 528-529; Moore, supra note 190 at 871 
289 Giroux, supra note 183 at 535-538 
290 Ibid at 528, 537: “Le juge DuBois estime en effet «que les conditions prévues par la loi vont bien au-delà du 
respect formel et procédural du consentement à l’adoption [...] ».  Elles exigent que le processus ayant mené à 
l’adoption respecte les exigences de l’ordre public et des « lois existantes […] Selon le Juge DuBois, on ne peut « 
ériger une cloison étanche entre les articles du Code civil du Québec traitant de l’adoption (articles 543 et suivants 
C.c.Q.) et ceux traitant de la filiation des enfants nés d’une procréation assistée (articles 538 et suivants C.c.Q. [...] 
Contrairement à ce que décide le juge DuBois, l’article 543 C.c.Q. ne devrait donc pas être lu de façon à englober 
des exigences législatives autres que celles se rapportant directement à l’adoption.  Le premier alinéa de l’article 
42 
 
the parent’s bad faith and the absence of the surrogate’s name on the declaration of birth is a 
violation of the child’s right to know one’s parents pursuant to section 7 of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child.291  Benoit Moore’s opinion is similar to Giroux’s insofar as he too 
distinguishes between the rules of contractual obligations and the rules of adoption.  He argues 
that the nullity of surrogacy contract should not affect adoption, that the interests of the child 
should prevail292.  The DuBois decision was followed in two cases to date.293   
Indeed, Adoption 12464, in 2012, Judge Wilhelmy of the Court of Québec ruled against a 
placement order for adoption.  In the judge’s opinion, allowing the placement order would mean 
allowing the intended parents to get away with circumventing the CCQ rules on adoption: the 
surrogate mother’s special consent for adoption294 was vitiated according to the court, because 
the intended parents infringed section 135.1 YPA.295  In the second case, Adoption 1549, in 
2015, Judge Thibault of the Court of Quebec ruled against a placement order for adoption on 
grounds similar to those in Adoption 091, despite the existence of the Court of Appeal precedent 
which considered the interests of the child as predominant factor in its analysis and ruling.296  
The court distinguished the facts in the case at bar from the ones in Adoption 1445.297  Indeed, 
                                                            
543 C.c.Q. se lit ainsi : « L’adoption ne peut avoir lieu que dans l’intérêt de l’enfant et aux conditions prévues par 
la loi ».  Le terme conditions réfère sans aucun doute à celles de l’adoption. Or, celles-ci sont exprimées au chapitre 
du Code civil sur l’adoption que complète la Loi sur la protection de la jeunesse.” 
291 The Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, Treaty Series, vol. 1577 (entered in to force 2 
September 1990); Giroux, supra note 183 at 524, n 41 
292 Moore, supra note 190 at 873: “le droit […] doit bien cibler l’objectif qu’il recherché.  Refuser l’adoption de 
l’enfant revient à faire peser sur l’enfant le comportement de ces parents.  Si détournement de l’adoption il y a, 
c’est le fait des parents et non des enfants.  La sanction doit se limiter à eux et c’est pourquoi, l’intérêt de l’enfant 
exige que l’adoption soit dissocié de la nullité du contrat” 
293 Adoption 1549, supra note 198; Adoption 12464, supra note 181 
294 Art 555 CCQ: “Consent to adoption may be general or special; special consent may be given only in favour of 
an ascendant of the child, a relative in the collateral line to the third degree or the spouse of that ascendant or 
relative; it may also be given in favour of the spouse of the father or mother.  However, in the case of de facto 
spouses, they must have been cohabiting for at least three years.” 
295 At paras 25, 62: "le tribunal doit conclure que 7 900 $ ont été versés à madame C et 2 000 $ à la « donneuse 
d'ovule », à titre de rémunération […] Le consentement spécial donné par la mère inscrite au certificat de naissance 
de l'enfant, madame c’est devenu l’instrument par lequel le père et son épouse ont contourné les prohibitions 
législatives existantes, et fait partie d’une démarche illégale et contraire à l’ordre public, visant à faire produire de 
façon détournée des conséquences juridiques à ce qui est prohibé par la loi et les autorités compétentes pourront 
mettre en œuvre les dispositions pénales applicables, si elles le jugent approprié." 
296 Adoption 1445, supra note 198 
297Adoption 1549, supra note 198 at paras 17-18 : "Dans cette décision, la Cour d'appel réfère à plusieurs jugements 
qui ont été prononcés par les tribunaux depuis 2007 sur le sujet.  À l'exception de l'affaire Adoption – 091où la 
filiation maternelle de l'enfant n'était pas établie, l'ensemble des décisions citées par la Cour d'appel présentent 
sensiblement la même trame factuelle, c'est-à-dire que la mère porteuse ou la mère génétique est reconnue comme 
mère sur le certificat de naissance de l'enfant et donne un consentement spécial à l'adoption en faveur du conjoint 
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because of the absence of the surrogate’s name on the declaration of birth and because surrogacy 
contracts are void pursuant to 541 CCQ, Judge Thibault reasoned that “the surrogate may not 
be compelled to execute the agreement made with the intended parents and give them the child.  
The child's parentage is to be determined according to general rules of filiation and the child has 
as mother, the woman who gave birth and whose name should have been declared to the Director 
of Vital Statistics.”298 
Part of the ambiguity surrounding surrogacy contracts in Québec may reside in the fact that 
altruistic surrogacy is legitimized by Canadian federal law, thus creating confusion between 
illegality and absolute nullity in Québec.299  Indeed, the AHRA does not criminalize the 
woman’s intention to ‘abandon’ the child she carries to term300.  In the Court of Appeal case 
Adoption 1445,301 Judge Morissette considers it important to note that the trial judge erred in 
finding that the surrogate was remunerated for her work, because the evidence simply suggested 
she was reimbursed for costs.  According to him, it is important to highlight this, given the 
prohibitions at provisions 6 AHRA and 135.1 YPA.  However, he emphasizes that “it is the task 
of the competent authorities to see to the sanction of illegal acts under the AHRA, not that of 
the court hearing the application for the order of placement of the child”302. In the next section, 
I turn to the Court of Appeal’s decision more specifically. 
5.1.2 The Court of Appeal: Adoption Procedures as Immune to Surrogacy Agreements 
In Adoption 1445,303 the Court of Appeal of Québec had to review a decision in virtue of which 
the Québec Court (Youth Division) denied an application for an order of placement for adoption 
                                                            
ou de la conjointe du père.  La décision de la Cour d'appel est rendue dans une situation de fait différente de celle 
soumise au Tribunal." 
298 Adoption 1549, supra note 198 at para 26: "N'oublions pas que l'article 541 du Code civil du Québec déclare 
nulle les conventions de gestation. En conséquence, la mère porteuse ne peut être contrainte d'exécuter la 
convention intervenue avec les parents d'intention et leur remettre l'enfant. La filiation de l'enfant doit être 
déterminée selon les règles générales de filiation et l'enfant a comme mère la femme qui lui a donné naissance et 
dont le nom devrait avoir été déclaré au directeur de l'état civil. Elle peut exécuter volontairement la convention et 
donner un consentement valide à l'adoption ou non". 
299 Adoption 1445 supra note 198 at para 59 (Judge Morissette cites the Commission de l’éthique de la science et 
de la technologie’s comments) 
300 See part 1.2.1, above 
301 Supra note 198 
302 Ibid at para 68 
303 Supra note 198 
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based on the same arguments as Judge DuBois in Adoption 091.304  The facts at hand were 
slightly different from the Adoption 091 case.  Woman “A” could not have children.  As a last 
resort, and as suggested by her doctor, she and her partner have a child “X” with the help of 
surrogate “C” and an egg donor.  In this case, the intended parents had also paid the surrogate.  
According to the Court of Québec, they thus infringed section 135.1 of the YPA.305 
While the Québec Court used the reasoning employed by Judge DuBois in Adoption 091 and 
refused to authorize the adoption, the Court of Appeal differed.  According to Judge Morissette’s 
reasons, the couple did not infringe section 135.1 of the YPA because the evidence did not show 
that they gave the surrogate mother “consideration” or “remuneration” within the meaning of 
section 6 AHRA but rather, reimbursed the surrogate for the expenses incurred:  
On the other hand, it is true that under paragraph 135.1(a) of the YPA, to "give, receive or 
offer or agree to give or receive, directly or indirectly, a payment or a benefit either for giving 
or obtaining a consent to adoption" constitutes an offence punishable by a heavy fine under 
section 135.1.3 of the same statute. But these are penal provisions that should be interpreted 
accordingly, and the preposition "for" has a causal connotation.  Unless we extrapolate from 
clues that amount to vague presumptions of fact at most, there is nothing in the evidence heard 
at trial (and especially, nothing in the testimony of the appellant, B or C) justifying an 
assumption or, a fortiori, a finding that payment was offered, given or received for giving or 
obtaining a consent to adoption.306 
 
Furthermore, the judge noted that based on the legislator’s structural choices regarding article 
541 CCQ location, more specifically the fact that the article was never placed in Chapter II 
(“Adoption”) of Title II of Book II of the Civil Code, means that it did not constitute a “condition 
prescribed by law” within the meaning of article 543 CCQ.307  He raised the fact that section 
607 of the CCQ, which later became the current 555 CCQ,308 was not modified to prohibit the 
                                                            
304 Ibid 
305 Supra note 198 
306 Adoption 1445, supra note 198 at para 25: "[I]l est vrai qu’aux termes du paragraphe 135.1 a) de la LPJ « donner, 
recevoir, offrir ou accepter de donner ou de recevoir… un paiement… pour donner ou obtenir un consentement à 
l’adoption » constitue une infraction punissable d’une lourde amende en vertu de l’article 135.1.3 de la même loi. 
Mais il s’agit ici de dispositions pénales qui doivent s’interpréter en conséquence et la préposition pour est revêtue 
d’une connotation causale. Or, sauf par extrapolation et à partir d’indices ayant valeur, tout au plus, de vagues 
présomptions de fait, rien dans la preuve entendue en première instance (et surtout, rien dans les témoignages de 
l’appelante, de B et de C) ne permet de supposer, ni a fortiori de conclure, qu’un paiement ait été offert, donné ou 
reçu pour donner ou obtenir un consentement à l’adoption." 
307 Ibid at paras 70 
308 Supra note at 294 
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adoption of surrogate children.309  After giving an overview of the pertinent case law and citing 
doctrine, the judge stated that he agreed with Judge Tremblay’s ruling in Adoption 09185310 and 
held that article 541 CCQ’s ambit does not extend to affect the establishment of filiation through 
adoption.  In the Court’s opinion, a surrogacy contract is null (invalid) insofar as its enforcement 
is not possible by any of the parties to the agreement.311  In this case, enforcement was not an 
issue: the surrogate mother C did not intend on keeping the child and the intended parents 
wanted child X at birth.  In other words, the court distinguished between the direct effects 
(binding nature) and the indirect effects (in this case, the adoption of child X by woman A) of 
the surrogacy contract.312  The application for the order of placement of the child was granted.  
In a recent judgment, in Droit de la famille 151172,313 the Superior Court followed the Court of 
Appeal’s reasoning.314  I look at that judgment in more detail in the next section. 
5.2 The Case of The Child’s Interests v. Public Order 
In the debate surrounding surrogacy agreements, scholars and judges alike have viewed the 
matter by opposing the principle of the child’s best interests in adoption against the public order 
considerations which are implicitly enshrined in article 541 CCQ315.  As such, dichotomy 
                                                            
309 Adoption 1445, supra note 198 at para 58 
310 Adoption 09185, supra note 181 
311 Adoption 1445, supra note 198 at paras 52, 54: "La notion d’ordre public a certes un champ d’application 
nécessaire dans ce domaine : ainsi, la marchandisation ou chosification de la personne humaine est une tendance à 
laquelle le droit doit résister.  Mais invoquer cette notion d’ordre public venue du droit des obligations dans le 
contexte précis d’un dossier comme celui-ci lui prête une portée qu’elle n’a pas – elle n’a pas ce caractère souverain 
et péremptoire. Et elle ne peut servir à contrecarrer la volonté de parents adoptifs qui, avec transparence et dans le 
respect des lois sur l’adoption, ont voulu avoir recours aux ressources de la science médicale pour que soit procréé 
un enfant, leur enfant, et qu’il lui soit donné une famille. À mon sens, voilà aujourd’hui l’état des choses et du 
droit." [emphasis added]  
312 Adoption 1445, supra note 198 at para 61 
313 Supra note 134 
314 Droit de la famille 151172, supra note 134 at para 111: "La Cour d'appel dans l'affaire Adoption - 1445 et de 
nombreuses autres autorités doctrinales citées préalablement établissent que des conventions de mère porteuse sont 
conclues non seulement au Québec, mais aussi à l'étranger par des citoyens canadiens. S'il est clair qu'un tribunal 
ne pourrait donner effet à une telle convention en vertu de l'article 541 C.c.Q., un tribunal peut intervenir afin de 
statuer sur la filiation des enfants nés à la suite de ces conventions". 
315 Giroux, supra note 183 at 531: “On considère généralement que l’objet de cette entente contrevient à l’ordre 
public de direction, puisqu’il serait contraire à certaines valeurs sociales, jugées fondamentales.  Portant à la fois 
sur le corps de l’enfant et sur celui de la mère porteuse, qui met à la disposition d’autrui ses «fonctions 
reproductrices», l’entente se heurterait notamment au principe de l’indisponibilité du corps humain.  Elle porterait 
aussi atteinte au principe de l’indisponibilité de l’état des personnes, la mère porteuse renonçant de façon anticipée 
à sa qualité et à ses droits de mère et les parties ayant comme objectif de manipuler l’état de l’enfant en fonction 
de leurs désirs.” 
46 
 
persists in civil law discourse on surrogacy.  Indeed, Jean Pineau & Marie Pratte316, Giroux317 
and Moore318 have stated that the interests of the child should take precedence over public order, 
a reasoning which is in line with the approach taken by Judge Morissette in Adoption 1445.319  
Others, like Professor Alain Roy,320 have sometimes placed more weight on public order 
considerations321. 
In this debate, taking a distance from the FLE framework is particularly relevant, as it is what 
has created the splintered view on the matter in the first place.  In my opinion, public order and 
children’s interests do not need to be mutually exclusive views, especially where assisted 
reproduction and surrogacy are concerned.  Pineau & Pratte’s analyses are circumstantial in 
approach, which is practical given that most surrogacy cases in Québec have been examined in 
                                                            
316 Marie Pratte is a professor of law at the Université d’Ottawa.  Her research interests include family law, 
children’s law, and human rights.  Jean Pineau is a retired law professor (l’Université Laval, l’Université de 
Montréal).  He was one of four members of the committee tasked with reforming the Quebec Civil Code. 
317 Supra, note 183; Professor Giroux is cited by Judge Morissette in Adoption 1445, supra note 198 at para 63: 
"L’absence de lien maternel à l’acte de naissance nous semble, comme nous l’avons indiqué plus haut, une 
différence digne de mention. Comme le droit civil québécois ne reconnaît que l’adoption plénière, cette dernière 
mettant fin à la filiation d’origine (art. 577 C.c.Q.), prononcer l’adoption dans ce contexte empêche techniquement 
l’enfant de rechercher ses origines. Le jugement Dubois a pour effet de ne pas priver l’enfant de ce droit. Le juge 
aurait-il été plus enclin à prononcer l’adoption si la mère porteuse avait déclaré sa maternité à l’égard de l’enfant? 
Difficile à dire, car il insiste surtout sur l’illicéité de la convention pour justifier sa décision et sur ce point, nous 
différons d’opinion. Il reste que dans les autres décisions où la mère porteuse a déclaré sa maternité, l’adoption a 
par la suite été prononcée. Cela incitera peut-être (du moins nous voulons bien le croire) les mères porteuses à 
déclarer leur maternité et à ne pas ‘frauder la loi’". 
318 Supra, note 190; Professor Moore is cited by Judge Morissette in Adoption 1445, supra note 198 at para 60: 
"Refuser l’adoption de l’enfant revient à faire peser sur l’enfant le comportement des parents.  Si détournement de 
l’adoption il y a, c’est le fait des parents et non celui des enfants.  La sanction doit se limiter à eux et c’est pourquoi, 
l’intérêt de l’enfant exige que l’adoption soit dissociée de la nullité du contrat." 
319 Adoption 1445, supra note 198 at para 52   
320 Alain Roy is a professor at the Faculty of Law at University of Montreal and Associate Researcher at the Chair 
of Notaries.  He focuses his research and teaching activities in the areas of family law (patrimonial and pecuniary), 
children's rights and youth protection. 
321 Adoption 1445, supra note 198 at para 57: "[…] [I]l nous paraît difficile d’admettre que l’on puisse contourner 
la règle de l’article 541 C.c.Q. au moyen de l’adoption, règle qui, est-il utile de le souligner, repose sur des 
considérations d’ordre public qui n’ont rien d’anodin. Comme l’écrit la professeure Giroux : « [c]’est la 
commercialisation de la pratique et les valeurs en jeu – protection de la femme contre l’exploitation, refus de 
chosification de l’enfant et plus globalement, l’intérêt général de la société – qui forcent les législateurs à 
intervenir ».  On ne saurait non plus se rabattre sur le principe du meilleur intérêt de l’enfant pour se soustraire à la 
prohibition législative et justifier l’adoption. L’adoption, rappelons-le, ne peut avoir lieu que dans l’intérêt de 
l’enfant et aux conditions prévues par la loi. Avec respect pour l’opinion contraire, nous ne pouvons admettre 
l’interprétation suivant laquelle ces conditions ne renvoient qu’aux seules règles matérielles et procédurales 
contenues au chapitre de l’adoption. À notre avis, elles renvoient plutôt à l’ensemble des dispositions à travers 
lesquelles le législateur exprime son attachement à des valeurs qu’il croit justifiées par l’intérêt des enfants en 
général. En ce sens, on ne peut croire qu’un projet d’adoption qui repose sur un montage que le droit ne reconnaît 
pas pour les raisons susmentionnées ne respecte pas les conditions de la loi et ne peut en conséquence être accueilli 
par le tribunal." 
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the context of adoption.  However, their analysis tightly circumscribes the angle of approach on 
the issue: not only does it look at it a posteori, i.e. once the child is already born, but it also fails 
to recognize that the interests of the child in abstracto have much in common with other 
principles underpinning public order and the general interest of our society322.  
What is also interesting to note, is that the said principles are drawn from separate legal fields: 
family law on the one hand (children’s interests) and the theory of obligations on the other 
(public order).  Indeed, it seems the refusal to validate surrogacy contracts encapsuled at 541 
CCQ stems from the legislator’s refusal to accept contracts on filiation as well as contracts on 
the human body (the principle of non-availability of the human body).323  This dichotomy 
between family law principles on the one hand and obligations on the other (i.e. private versus 
public) can be traced back to Savigny’s dualistic vision of contracts and family law.324  Surely, 
avoiding the objectification of women and children is a principle that can work in line with 
children’s best interests.  In the case of surrogacy-born kids, the dichotomy has worked to 
complicate their interests by making their filiation uncertain in adoption cases.325   
In the recent Superior Court decision326 which follows the reasons of Judge Morissette in 
Adoption 1445, the question at bar was whether the recognition of a decision rendered in 
Pennsylvania would be contrary to public order pursuant to article 3155 CCQ.327  The article 
provides that “a decision rendered outside Québec is recognized and, where applicable, declared 
enforceable by the Québec authority, except in the following cases: […] (5) the outcome of a 
                                                            
322 Pineau & Pratte are cited by Judge Morissette in Adoption 1445, supra note 198 at para 52: "Un enfant est né; 
un couple a voulu sa naissance et est à l’origine de sa conception; sa mère biologique, par ailleurs, l’a mis au monde 
dans le but de l’abandonner. Quel objectif doit-on poursuivre? Protéger l’intérêt de l’enfant en cause en permettant 
la consécration juridique d’un lien affectif? Ou imposer à cet enfant, au nom du respect de l’ordre public et de la 
logique juridique, une vie écartelée entre son véritable père, une mère qui le rejette, et une autre personne qui agit 
comme deuxième parent sans en avoir le statut?  Ne doit-on pas, dans cette situation, préférer la protection de 
l’intérêt immédiat de l’enfant plutôt que le respect de l’intérêt général? Il faut, selon nous, tolérer le recours à 
l’adoption en faveur de la conjointe du père, dans la mesure où, évidemment, la mère porteuse y aura consenti. 
Pourrait-elle donner un consentement spécial? L’article 555 C.c.Q. ne prévoit évidemment pas spécifiquement cette 
hypothèse et il n’a certainement pas été rédigé pour régler cette situation. Il permet néanmoins un consentement 
spécial en faveur du conjoint du père ou de la mère de l’enfant; si donc la paternité est établie en faveur de l’homme 
qui espérait recueillir cet enfant, la mère porteuse pourrait, selon la lettre de la loi, donner un consentement spécial 
en faveur du conjoint ou de la conjointe du père. Il faut, nous semble-t-il, et cela dans l’intérêt de l’enfant, privilégier 
cette interprétation, même si, pourtant, cette possibilité favorise le détournement de la loi." 
323 See part 3.1.2 at n 189, above; Moore, supra note 190 at 863 
324 See part 4.1, above 
325 See parts 3.1 and 5, above  
326 Droit de la famille 151172, supra note 134 
327 Ibid at para 24 
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foreign decision is manifestly inconsistent with public order as understood in international 
relations.”  The Court of Common Pleas of Adams County in Pennsylvania, USA, had declared 
the applicants as child X’s parents.  The applicants appeared on the child’s American birth 
certificate.  The surrogate mother was an American citizen.  One applicant was a Québec citizen 
and the other was a permanent resident.  In response to the prosecutor’s argument that the 
applicants should have petitioned the Québec Court in order to obtain an order of placement for 
adoption, the Court affirmed that “it is difficult to conclude that [obtaining special consent to 
adoption] is the only legal way to recognize the filiation of a child born to an agreement 
surrogate mother, while many neighbouring jurisdictions of Quebec provide for the issuance of 
a parentage declaration, either before birth or immediately after328”.  The Court also refused the 
prosecutor’s argument that filiation cannot be subject to contracts in Québec.  The judge argued 
that the parental project at article 538CCQ329 allows contracts on filiation.  The applicants 
request for recognition of the American decision was granted,330 as the judge did not deem it to 
be contrary to public order.331  Although the proceedings in this case took place outside 
Québec’s adoption courts, public order remained a decisive concept in the analysis and the 
importance of the interests of the child as principle was reaffirmed.  However, the Court 
outrightly rejects the argument that filiation matters cannot be contractual ones, thereby possibly 
opening up a door to breaking the family/contract divide in Québec.   
Professor Marie-France Bureau332 and Edith Guilhermont’s333 have looked at the issue of 
surrogacy outside the adoption context.  They adopt a critical approach to the public order rule 
at 541 CCQ, from a liberal point of view334.  However, as I will show in the next section, their 
view is also nested in an FLE perspective.   
                                                            
328 Supra note 134 at para 107 
329 Supra, note 178; For more on 538 CCQ also see above, part 3.1.2 
330 Droit de la famille 151172, supra note 134 at paras 124-128 
331 Ibid at para 112 
332 Supra, note 75 
333 Ibid 
334 See part 1.2.3, above  
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5.3 A Look Outside the Adoption Box: Reproductive Autonomy at the Intersection of 
Liberal Feminism and FLE in Québec 
The unavailability of the human body is the concept which discourages the commercialization 
of the human body, its elements or its products.  The commercialization of surrogacy practice 
is prohibited by the AHRA in Canada but surrogacy arrangements per se are not.335  In Québec, 
article 541CCQ has sometimes been labelled as a prohibition by scholars and judges alike336, 
although, strictly speaking, it is not comparable to the criminal prohibition in the AHRA.337  
Rather, it is a refusal to legally recognize contracts on surrogacy.338  Scholars who disagree with 
article 541 CCQ, do so because they consider that it ultimately acts against the interests of the 
newborn child by rendering filiation uncertain339 and it also lends to a perceived victimization 
of the surrogate.340   
According to Professor Marie-France Bureau and Edith Guilhermont, what a woman chooses to 
do with her body is a private matter, not a public one.  In their opinion, the concept of human 
dignity has been applied in too prohibitive a fashion, instead of encouraging individual 
liberties.341  They argue that the intention of parties to a surrogacy contract is not 
commercialization because the money is divested in the parental project.342  Moreover, in line 
with what Barbara Katz Rothman343 would call an “economic ideology,”344 they argue that 
compensation can enhance female autonomy: in their opinion, attaching a fee to reproductive 
capacities can lend to society’s valuing ‘feminine tasks’.345  At the same time, they argue that 
                                                            
335 See part 1.2.1 above; AHRA, supra note 2, ss 5, 6(5) 
336 See parts 5 to 5.1.2, above 
337 Moore, supra note 190 at 862; AHRA, supra note 2, ss 6(1)-(4) 
338 Moore, supra note 190 at 863 
339 Bureau & Guilhermont, "Maternité, Gestation, Liberté", supra note 75 at 52-54,58; Moore, supra note 190 
Giroux, supra note 183 
340 Bureau & Guilhermont, "Maternité, Gestation, Liberté", supra note 75 at 67-69; Moore, supra note 190; Giroux, 
supra note 183 
341 Bureau & Guilhermont, "Maternité, Gestation, Liberté", supra note 75 at 74-76 
342 Ibid at 68 
343 Barbara Katz Rothman is a professor of Sociology at the City University of New York, she is published in both 
popular and scholarly circles and her topics are interdisciplinary and international 
<http://www.barbarakatzrothman.com/> 
344 Barbara Katz Rothman, Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in a Patriarchal Society (New York: 
W.W. Norton& Company, Inc., 1989) at 51 [Rothman] 
345 Bureau &Guilhermont, "Maternité, Gestation, Liberté", supra note 75 at 69-70 
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exploitation should be curtailed by regulation.346  They do not, however, propose a regulatory 
framework.347  
I agree with the scholars that surrogates should be heard, in order to concretely understand their 
justifications for acting as surrogates, before making assumptions that they are being 
exploited.348  I also agree that the legislative foundations of 541 CCQ in Québec are ideological 
but I do not agree that they should be discarded completely.349  For example, in my view, the 
authors go too far when they state that the mater semper certa est principle is irrelevant.350  It is 
still a reality for women who give birth without ARTs and/or a third party, despite the fact that 
families are changing, mater semper certa est remains relevant and I would not discard the 
principle outright.  As a matter of fact, the principle according to which the birth mother is the 
mother by law is not abandoned but is rather reinforced throughout the Roy Report’s 
recommendations.351  Specifically, with respect to surrogacy arrangements, the committee has 
recommended that the surrogate maintain the right to change her mind and keep the child once 
he/she is born.352  The committee goes so far as to suggest a surrogate cannot relinquish this 
right up until the child is born, making it a public order rule.353  
Second, the scholars’ conception of an autonomous reproductive woman is incomplete.  Indeed, 
their perspective is grounded on the experiences of those women who have been pregnant before 
becoming surrogates and who claim that they love being pregnant.354  Second, their arguments 
about reproductive autonomy revolve around the surrogate’s reality, discounting for the infertile 
woman and the egg provider.   
Third, their analysis is “symmetrically flawed”355 insofar as it keeps the discourse of autonomy 
within the “private versus public” dichotomy.  Indeed, they view the contractual notion of 
                                                            
346 Bureau &Guilhermont, "Maternité, Gestation, Liberté", supra note 75 at 69-70 
347 Ibid at 69-70 
348 Ibid at 71 
349 Ibid at 45 
350 Ibid at 52-54 
351 Roy Report, supra note 176 at 144, 159 
352 Ibid at 175-176: “Comme le prévoit la première orientation retenue, la mère porteuse pourra, après 
l’accouchement, décider de garder l’enfant malgré les termes du projet parental convenu. Le simple fait pour elle 
de ne pas signer la déclaration de naissance commune fera présumer de sa décision de garder l’enfant. » 
353 Ibid at156-158, 170-171, 175, 178, 183-184, 188; See part 5.4 below 
354 Bureau & Guilhermont, "Maternité, Gestation, Liberté", supra note 75 at 45, 50, 69-70 
355 Jean L. Cohen, “Regulating Intimacy, A New Legal Paradigm” (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004) 
at 196 
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consent as the key to female reproductive autonomy and make no account for Québec’s 
legislative framework on ARTs or other norms in examining the issue.  The legislation on ARTs 
in Québec does not prohibit women from using ARTs or being surrogates, rather, it has 
encouraged it through public funding of ARTs for the past 5 years.356  In reality, the practice of 
surrogacy has resulted in murky statements by courts in adoption procedures where children’s 
filiation is concerned.357  Children’s best interests have been examined by scholarship and the 
Court of Appeal of Québec has ruled in favour of their interests.  Therefore, there is a gap in 
Québec between ARTs regulation and family law and the disappointment, in my view, is that 
civil law scholarship does not provide a comprehensive account of the situation.   
Paradoxically therefore, Bureau & Guilhermont argue for the liberalization of surrogacy 
practice in a society where ARTs techniques are up and running.358  They state that what a 
woman chooses to do with her body is a private matter.  However, insofar as there is nothing 
stopping women from using ARTs to become surrogates in Québec, we do not see how their 
argument contributes to the advancement of the issue.  This choice the authors are referring to, 
is not limited to and should not solely be examined as consent within the “private versus public 
dichotomy”, but it should also be examined in the context of the women’s relationship with the 
medical system and the biotech industry.  In the case of surrogacy, going beyond family law 
framework and offering a wider perspective on the notion of consent would be beneficial to 
women’s reproductive autonomy, specifically where women’s long-term reproductive health is 
concerned and where competing transnational commercial interests are a reality.  Even though 
the province of Québec has publicly funded ARTs in the past 5 years, the enactment of Bill 
20,359 has removed public coverage of IVF treatments and this raises questions as to who will 
absorb the cost for ARTs in surrogacy agreements360.  Clearly, artificial reproduction does not 
appear to be a medically necessary361 treatment in the eyes of the government of Québec at this 
point in time and this contextual element is crucial to women’s reproductive autonomy. 
                                                            
356 See part 2, above and part 7.2, below for more information on assisted reproduction in Québec 
357 See parts 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, above  
358 Bureau & Guilhermont, "Maternité, Gestation, Liberté", supra note 75 at 48 
359 See part 2, above and part 7.2, below for more about Bill 20 
360 See Minister Gaétan Barette’s comments below, at part 7.2 
361 See sections 7.1 for more on medical necessity 
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I do recognize that legal scholars might have felt re-examining the exploitation versus autonomy 
debate necessary, but I think it is quite clear at this point in time, that in certain instances 
surrogacy may be exploitative and in other cases it may not be.  Arguing about it won’t change 
the reality of it.  And it is not a black and white reality.  Attempting to stand for autonomy in 
the absolute or against exploitation in the absolute is not very practical, in my opinion.  Professor 
Louise Langevin362 has a more nuanced approach as she recognizes that the practice of 
surrogacy in society, whether commercial or altruistic, can be both a source of power for certain 
women, as it can be a source of exploitation for others.363  Assuming the legal community is 
aware of these polarities and their respective consequences, preventing the objectification and 
exploitation of women and children is an ideal that should not be forgotten by the law and the 
same can be said for women’s autonomy.  So, in my opinion, the question is: is the law really 
doing women or anyone a favour by interpreting the legal issue solely from family law/adoption 
perspective?  Second, how and to which degree can the law in Québec intervene to keep the 
abovementioned ideals in balance? 
In my opinion, civil scholarly and jurisprudential discourse in Québec has provided a 
fragmented theoretical framework for surrogacy and assisted reproduction to date.  Much of it 
has focused on the debate between protecting children’s interests, versus the general interests of 
society (public order rule at 541 CCQ).  The courts have looked at the issue within the adoption 
context: the Court of Appeal has recently privileged children’s interests on the issue but the 
scope of this decision seems unclear.  Moreover, the notion of consent, when briefly examined 
by scholarship was analyzed from an FLE perspective and fails to account for the multifaceted 
dynamics of surrogacy and assisted reproduction.  The Roy Report364, which was issued in June 
2015, examines the issue from a more comprehensive perspective, where filiation is concerned.  
However, the nexus with the international and biomedical aspects of surrogacy (ARTs) remains 
quite poorly explored. 
                                                            
362 Supra, note 75 
363 Langevin, "Réponse jurisprudentielle", supra note 75 at 194, 197-198 
364 Québec, Ministère de la justice, Pour un droit de la famille adapté aux nouvelles réalités conjugales et 
familiales by the Comité consultatif sur le droit de la famille (June 2015) [Roy Report] 
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5.4 The Roy Report 
5.4.1 Distinct and Protective Rules for Surrogate Assisted Procreation 
In June of this year, in a report to the minister of Justice of Québec,365 jurists under the 
presidency of Professor Alain Roy have suggested an altogether new framework which would 
officially recognize the filiation of children born from surrogacy arrangements, while 
distinguishing between different types of parental projects in the CCQ chapter dedicated to 
filiation rules.  Essentially, according to the committee’s recommended framework, the 
subsection governing third party assisted procreation (currently 538 CCQ) should be distinct 
from the one on surrogate assisted reproduction.366  Moreover, unlike third party assisted 
reproduction, reproduction with medical assistance, whereby the gametes of the parents are 
used,367 would still be governed by the same filiation rules as natural reproduction by blood 
(currently 523 CCQ-537 CCQ)368.   
Whereas no formal conditions are currently required by parties in order to prove third party 
assisted reproduction and none should be implemented according to the committee369, a 
protective approach has been recommended for surrogate assisted reproduction, for children and 
surrogates’ best interests.370  Indeed, women and children are presumed the vulnerable ones in 
the framework recommended by the committee; in fact, they are referred to as “vulnerable 
persons” in the report,371  It appears the aim of this protective approach is to preserve surrogates’ 
dignity and protect their right to change their minds in the event they choose to keep the child.372  
However, the committee does not consider that a woman who has never given birth would be 
particularly different or more vulnerable as a surrogate than one who has.373  
                                                            
365 Roy Report, supra note 176 
366 Ibid at 156, 157 
367 Ibid at 155 
368 See above, parts 3.1 for an overview of the current rules on filiation in Québec 
369 Roy Report, supra note 176 at 157-158 
370 Ibid at 170, 178 (Two channels have been suggested by the committee to establish a child’s filiation under a 
surrogate assisted reproduction framework: the notarial act en minute or the judicial route) 
371 Ibid at 183, 188 
372 Ibid at 171 
373 Roy Report, supra note 176 at 183-184 
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5.4.2 Mater Semper Certa Est 
Mater semper certa est is reinforced throughout the committee’s recommendations.374  
Specifically, with respect to surrogacy arrangements, the committee recommends that the 
surrogate maintain the right to change her mind and keep the child once he/she is born.375  The 
committee goes so far as to suggest a surrogate should not be obliged to relinquish this right up 
until the child is born, making it a public order rule.376  On another note, the committee considers 
parental responsibility primordial: it recommends that intended parents who abandon the 
parental project and refuse the newborn should be liable to compensate the surrogate, as well as 
pay an obligation of support to the other intended parent (if he or she keeps the child) or whoever 
chooses to adopt the child.377   
5.4.3 Genetics and Biparentality 
The committee makes it clear that, rather than genetics, pre-birth intent to be a parent is what 
matters in establishing filiation of children born from assisted reproduction.  Indeed, according 
to its recommendations, intended parents using surrogate assisted procreation should not be 
obliged to contribute their gametes, according to the committee.  Moreover, pursuant to the 
committee’s recommendations, being a genetic contributor is not a sufficient ground to claim 
filiation and the committee suggests prohibiting the recourse to such claims.  It also stresses the 
importance of pre-birth intent among the parties involved and suggests that intended parents 
should be required to obtain the gamete contributor’s informed consent prior to engaging in the 
act of creating a child with third party assistance.  Moreover, biparentality would remain the 
rule, as it has been up to date. 
In light of all of the above, it appears that the public order concern at 541 CCQ is not entirely 
without merit, whether for the interests of child or to counter the objectification of human bodies 
                                                            
374 Roy Report, supra note 176 at 144, 159 
375Ibid at 175-176: “Comme le prévoit la première orientation retenue, la mère porteuse pourra, après 
l’accouchement, décider de garder l’enfant malgré les termes du projet parental convenu. Le simple fait pour elle 
de ne pas signer la déclaration de naissance commune fera présumer de sa décision de garder l’enfant." 
376 Ibid at 175 
377Ibid at 177: "Le Comité n’entend pas pour autant exonérer les parents d’intention de toute forme de 
responsabilité. Bien au contraire, tout parent d’intention qui refusera de donner suite au projet parental sera tenu à 
une obligation alimentaire à l’égard de l’enfant et devra réparer le préjudice occasionné à la mère porteuse, 
indépendamment de la filiation qui pourrait par ailleurs lui avoir été attribuée en vertu des règles relatives à la 
procréation naturelle"; The Conseil du statut de la femme has adopted the same opinion, see below, part 7.2  
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and reproduction.  In my view, the Roy report reflects those concerns.  However, it remains that 
autonomy in the medical context, as well as individuals’ relationship with the medical system 
and the booming transnational reality of the reproductive market, have not been explored 
comprehensively.  There is also a failure to account for the multiple female realities involved in 
ARTs, such as the infertile woman and the egg donor.  That is why, in the next section, I look 
at Relational Theory.  I think it can really contribute by enrich the legal discourse on surrogacy 
and artificial reproduction in Québec and Canada where the liberal conceptions of choice and 
autonomy are concerns in a multi-institutional, multi-player context.  
6.  Relational Theory  
A pivotal concept in the discourse about surrogacy arrangements is autonomy.  Tightly related 
to the concept of autonomy is the concept of freedom.  In the 1970s, radical feminists like 
Canadian born Shulamith Firestone, maintained that biology was the root cause of the sex class 
system discrimination and argued that through man’s control of nature, humanity could free 
itself of inequality.378  Similarly, in Simone de Beauvoir’s theory of women’s self-
determination, the body is perceived as enemy as she “wants to be like man […] and sees no 
other possibility but to establish dominance of the head within the female body.”379  Thus, for 
certain feminists, controlling pregnancy generally became a means to autonomy and freedom: 
reproductive technology, through contraception and abortion,380 became an important symbol 
for women’s emancipation.381   
Professor of sociology and ecofeminist382 Maria Mies is the founder of the Women and 
Development Programme at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, Netherlands and has 
                                                            
378 Philippe Deschamps, L’Utérus, la technique et l’amour, l’enfant de l’ectogenèse (Paris:Presses Universitaires 
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be Answered? (1992) 68 Ind. L. J. 205 at 211-212 [Lieber]; Maria Mies &Vandana Shiva, Ecofeminism, (Halifax: 
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379 Mies & Shiva, supra, note 378 at 224-226: “[Beauvoir] maintains the dualistic and hierarchical split between 
life and freedom/self-determination, between nature and culture, between spirit and matter.  She maintains 
alienation from the body, especially from the female body which, according to her, hinders self-determination 
(transcendence).  Our body is our enemy.  Thus, she does not question this split, European man’s project, 
particularly since the Enlightenment, as the prerequisite for freedom and emancipation ” 
380 Nelson, supra, note 5 at 32 
381 Lieber, supra note 378 at 205 
382 Mies & Shiva, supra note 378 at 6, 13: “Ecofeminism […] grew out of various social movements-the feminist, 
peace and the ecology movements- in the late 1970s and 1980s.  Though the term was first used by Francoise 
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been active in the women's movement and in women's studies since the late 1960s.  According 
to Mies, feminists who see reproductive technologies as a means to women’s emancipation 
today are sustaining the same view as Firestone and Beauvoir.  She invites her readers to think 
critically about the relationship between body, mind and autonomy, the fundamental symbol of 
emancipation and freedom for feminists, as it is applied to women in the context of reproductive 
technologies.383  Her analysis reveals feminism’s involvement in splitting women’s selves from 
their very own bodies.384  
In the same vein, Professor Barbara Katz Rothman’s385 describes “motherhood as the embodied 
challenge to liberal philosophy.”  According to her, liberal society cannot deal with motherhood.  
Liberal society’s facets (capitalism, the economic and technology ideologies) work against the 
interests of mothers insofar as women’s reproductive capacities are perceived as resources in 
the world-machine.386  The analyses afforded by Rothman and Mies are important insofar as 
they highlight the flipside of liberal claims for reproductive autonomy, revealing its 
complications and imperfections, leading us to a more comprehensive view of autonomy and 
questioning how much of it or which facets of it are really helpful in empowering women: “our 
bodies may be ours, but given the ideology of patriarchy and capitalism, the bodies of mothers 
are not highly valued.”387   
The concept of autonomy is important in feminist theory and has been a pivotal one in 
reproductive discourse.  In my opinion, where surrogacy and artificial reproduction are 
                                                            
D’Eaubonne it became popular only in the context of numerous protests and activities against environmental 
destruction[…]An ecofeminist perspective propounds the need from a new cosmology and a new anthropology 
which recognizes that life in nature (which includes human beings) is maintained by means of cooperation, and 
mutual care and love.  Only in this way can we be enabled to respect and preserve the diversity of all life forms, 
including their cultural expressions, as true sources of our well-being and happiness[…] This effort to create a 
holistic, all-life embracing cosmology and anthropology, must necessarily imply a concept of freedom different 
from that used since the Enlightenment […] This involves rejecting the notion that Man’s freedom and happiness 
depend on an ongoing process of emancipation from nature, on independence from, and dominance over natural 
processes by power of reason and rationality” 
383 Mies & Shiva, supra note 378 at 227 
384 Ibid: "[O]ur female nature is more and more seen as a handicap from which bio-technical experts must liberate 
us, either through pro- or anti-natalist technology […] women's liberation becomes the result of technical 
progress and no longer means the transformation of patriarchal man-woman relations […] quick technical fixes 
have freed men more than ever from responsibility for the consequences of sexual intercourse and have imposed 
on women a new determination by other, a new heteronomy […]" 
385 Supra, note 343; For more on Rothman’s views see part 7.4, below 
386 Rothman, supra note 344 at 48-61 
387 Rothman, supra note 344 at 73 
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concerned, Québec civil law has not examined the notion as comprehensively as it could.  
Relational theorists have sought to expand the liberalist understanding of autonomy by 
examining it in the context of human relationships.  The next section will focus on contributions 
from contemporary feminist scholars Jennifer Nedelsky,388 Susan Sherwin,389 Susan Dodds390 
and Christine Koggel.391 
6.1 On Autonomy and the Law 
6.1.1 Nedelsky on Autonomy and Rights 
In my opinion, Professor Jennifer Nedelsky has contributed to bridging the mind/body, 
culture/nature dichotomies which are brought to light by Maria Mies, as well as in 
contextualizing autonomy within the power dynamics outlined by Barbara Katz Rothman392.  
Indeed, by deeply questioning the political and legal western conceptions of autonomy and the 
human legal subject, I find that Nedelsky’s work has been helpful in addressing the limits 
inherent to the liberal rights discourse which has been applied to legal thought on surrogacy and 
assisted reproduction in Quebec.  
According to Professor Nedelsky, feminism has an equivocated relationship with liberalism: on 
the one hand it demands selfhood for women and on the other, it rejects individual rights 
language and assumptions.393  In her view, the relationship between rights and democracy has 
been one of tension that needs redefining394 and constitutionalism should work to balance the 
tension between individual rights and democracy, not simply protect the former from the 
                                                            
388 Professor Nedelsky teaches at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law.  Her research and publications have 
focused on feminist theory, theories of judgment, american constitutional history and interpretation, and 
comparative constitutionalism. 
389 Susan Sherwin is a University Research Professor Emerita at Dalhousie University and a Fellow of the Royal 
Society of Canada.  She researches and teaches feminist theory and health ethics, and is interested in the intersection 
of these two fields. 
390 Susan Dodds is a professor of philosophy, the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and the Deputy Provost at the 
University of Tasmania, Australia.  Her research explores the intersections of ethics, political philosophy, moral 
psychology, feminist theory and public policy. 
391 Christine Koggel is a professor of philosophy and a graduate supervisor at Carleton University.  She was the 
Harvey Wexler Professor of Philosophy and Co-Director of the Center for International Studies Bryn Mawr 
College.  Her main research and teaching interests are in the areas of moral theory, practical ethics, feminism, and 
social and political theory. Her most recent research is in the area of development ethics. 
392 Supra, note 343; See above, at part 6 and below, at part 7.4 for more on Rothman’s view 
393 Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities” (1989) 1 Yale J.L. & 
Feminism 7 at 8 [Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy”] 
394Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Rights as Relationship” (1993) 1:1 Rev Const Stud 1.at 4 [Nedelsky, 
“Reconceiving Rights”] 
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latter.395  She also rejects the pure democracy critique: democracy is not the sole value in our 
society nor should it be.396  According to her, the mutability of values needs to be recognized.397  
She affirms that feminism must retain autonomy as a value, while rejecting the liberal definition 
of it.  She also rightfully points out that combining self-determination and social construction 
has been a problem common to communitarians and feminists.398  In her opinion, feminists must 
find their own language, definition of autonomy.399   
To Nedelsky, autonomy is relational and essentially it means finding one’s own law.  As such, 
the concept should be rescued from ‘the confines of liberalism’:400 “the idea that there are 
commands that one recognizes as one’s own, requirements that constrain one’s life, but come 
from the meaning or purpose of that life, captures the basic connection between law and 
freedom-which is perhaps the essence of the concept of autonomy.”401  Indeed, she draws a 
parallel between our perception of rights and autonomy, that autonomy is seen as synonymous 
with independence, or separation.  According to her, it is relationship, not separation that makes 
autonomy possible.  With this shift in focus, interdependence becomes central in politics.402  In 
other words, by viewing rights as relational, “the problem of individualism is radically 
transformed.”403   
The vision of autonomous individual as isolated, the idea of separation or “erecting a wall” is a 
pathology according to her:  she argues that the dichotomy between autonomy and the 
collectivity is grounded in the concept of property which “literally and figuratively provides the 
necessary walls.”404  She argues that North American political tradition has “identified freedom 
                                                            
395 Ibid at 4, 5, 8 
396 Ibid at 6 
397 Ibid at 4 
398 Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy”, supra note 393 at 8 
399 Ibid at 8,12 
400 Ibid at 11 
401 Ibid  
402 Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Rights”, supra note 394 at 8: “The whole conception of the relation between the 
individual and the collective shift: we recognize that the collective is a source of autonomy as well as a threat to it 
[…] the constitutional protection of autonomy is then no longer an effort to carve out a sphere into which the 
collective cannot intrude, but a means of structuring the relations between individuals and the sources of collective 
power so that autonomy is fostered rather than undermined. The first thing to note in this reformulation is that it 
becomes clear that the relation between autonomy and democracy is not simply one of threat and tension- just as 
the relation between autonomy and the collective is not simply a matter of threat. Autonomy means literally self-
governance and thus requires the capacity to participate in collective as well as individual governance.” 
403 Ibid at 14 
404 Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy”, supra note 393 at 12 
59 
 
and autonomy with the private sphere [bounded by property], and posed them in opposition to 
the public sphere of state power.”405  The illusion in liberal theory’s dichotomies of 
“state/individual,” “public/private,” “politics/market,” is in associating freedom and autonomy 
with the “individual”, “private”, “market” part of the dichotomy:406 “Because reality has never 
corresponded to these neat oppositional categories, there is no need to choose between them.  
Freeing ourselves from misleading categories and false choices opens the possibility for 
individual autonomy in the context of collectivity”407  Interestingly, instead of property as a 
symbol of autonomy, Nedelsky suggests childrearing.   
6.1.2 Property Law and Reproductive Technology  
In fact, Professor Nedelsky argues that the law of property is not an appropriate legal category 
for dealing with reproductive technology, or what she calls new forms of potential life.408  She 
outlines how complex the choosing of a legal category is and argues that examining the choice 
from the rights as relationships framework enables us deal with the normative conflicts which 
are brought about by the advent of reproductive technology,409 as it “facilitate(s) the task of 
                                                            
405 Ibid at 15-17 
406 Ibid at 18 
407 Ibid at 19 
408 Jennifer Nedelsky, “Property in Potential Life?” (1993) 6 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 343 at 343 [Nedelsky, 
“Property in Life”] 
409 Nedelsky, “Property in Life”, supra note 408 at 344: “There is no one concept, such as property, which is 
intrinsically appropriate or inappropriate.  The choice must be based on judgements about the probable 
consequences of different concepts and there are various ways of framing those judgments […]The underlying 
problem of choosing a legal category is thus twofold: first we must determine the norms and objectives we think 
are primary and then we must make judgements about the category(ies) which will best foster them […] And the 
problem lies not only in choosing among conflicting normative positions, but in predicting the consequences of 
different legal regimes.” 
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prediction.”410  She outlines the dual nature of the conflict among feminists411 but also the ways 
in which other normative approaches conflict.412   
Ultimately, the property framework as a model for issues respecting reproductive technology 
can be used as a means to foster the value of autonomy but also, on the other hand, as a means 
to foster exploitative and destructive relationships.413  Nedelsky points to this dilemma 
specifically where women and children are concerned:  There are those who advance property 
as a model for new forms of potential life because they argue it will foster women’s autonomy 
by allowing them to market their bodies and body products and those who argue that 
commodifying women’s bodies and body products will exacerbate the socio-economic 
problems and alienation women already face respecting their bodies.414  Moreover, she asserts 
that property as a framework risks sharpening the focus on children as designable and acquirable 
commodities.  In Nedelsky’s opinion, the autonomy which is sought within the context of 
uncontrolled markets is “inevitably an unequal autonomy”415 and, the choosing of a legal 
                                                            
410 Ibid at 345 
411 Nedelsky, “Property in Life”, supra note 408 at 344: “The answer to [which framework is most appropriate] 
will affect some of the most basic concerns of feminism: the objectification of women; the economic exploitation 
of women; the denigration of human reproduction and the treatment of women as "baby-making machines"; 
women's alienation from their bodies; the commodification and destruction of human values. On the positive side 
there are the issues of empowerment of women, genuine autonomy for women, equality, respect and priority for 
children and the nurture they require. This paper offers a means of determining whether property is the optimal 
legal concept for meeting these concerns and fostering these values”; also at p. 346-348: “The standard argument 
is that autonomy will be enhanced for two groups of women: (1) women seeking to use NRTs to have children 
genetically related to them or their spouses and sometimes to carry and give birth to children; and (2) women who 
might want to provide what the first group of women want, for either altruistic or financial reasons. There is the 
conventional "market" argument that clear property entitlements are necessary for a flourishing market in 
"reproductive material," which would maximize opportunities for poor women and resources for "demanders" (the 
economistic term for the first group) […] However, feminism embraces forms of autonomy which are much less 
oriented to the market. For example, there is a set of pressing problems raised by NRTs that fall under the heading 
of medicalization…From another perspective, however, treating a woman's body and/or potential life as property 
would exacerbate the oppression women are already subject to-in particular, their exploitation, the commodification 
and objectification of their bodies, and their own alienation from their bodies…The fear, of course, is that by 
treating potential life as property, women will be treated even more as "baby-making machines.” 
412 Ibid at 346: people from normative perspectives in direct opposition to one another advocate the notion that 
women have a form of property in their bodies—in ways that may readily be applied to ownership of stages of 
potential life. 
413 Ibid at 346: “Of course, competing claims of property as the engine of exploitation and property as the vehicle 
for autonomy are found throughout debates over property. Which claim is more persuasive, and the ways the claims 
may be linked, must be examined in the context of the particular form of property at issue. My arguments here do 
not dispose of this dispute for property in general. Rather they show the kinds of questions, the kinds of inquiry 
into patterns of relationship, that will help resolve it.” 
414 Ibid at 348-349 
415 Ibid at 350: "I think the short answer is that in a market economy where property is a primary means to autonomy, 
it is inevitably unequal autonomy.  Since people's economic resources will be unequal, the use they can make of 
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category to deal with the advent of reproductive technologies is really a question about core 
values.416 
The professor advances Rosalind Pollack Petchesky’s417 argument suggesting that the property 
paradigm can be redefined to benefit women: a conception of property that does not seek to 
advance commodification, exploitation or alienation.  However, this same argument is mitigated 
by the question as to which extent property is likely to actually take on a new meaning and 
whether or not it will encourage feminist values.418  Indeed, although Nedelsky concurs with 
Petchesky’s theory, she asserts that reconceiving property is a long up-hill battle that she is 
ready to climb in already existing areas of law where the framework is traditionally being 
applied.  However, she is sceptic about embarking on such an enterprise in new areas such as 
reproductive technology.419 
                                                            
property rights in their bodies or potential life will also be unequal.  There are good arguments to suggest that a 
property regime for potential life will actually exacerbate the inequalities to which women are already subject.  
Although poor women will have an additional resource to "market," they are likely to be paid at minimal rates, 
facilitating their exploitation by wealthy women and men […] The choice of property as a legal framework will 
entail a choice of a particular vision of autonomy, one which has inequality embedded in it". 
416 Nedelsky, “Property in Life”, supra note 408 at 351: “"[E]ven if it were conceded that treating potential life as 
property would enhance women's power, and even if one accepted the arguments that it would particularly enhance 
the power of the most disadvantaged women," those arguments alone cannot be dispositive. We must still ask 
whether it is worth acquiring what is treated as power in our society at the cost of other basic values. In addition to 
focusing on issues of commodification and alienation, feminists have asked us to reexamine our basic conceptions 
of power, autonomy, and liberty. The forms of power, autonomy, and liberty that would be promoted by property 
rights in potential life may not be the forms of those values that we actually want to promote” 
417 Rosalind Pollack Petchesky is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Hunter College, City University 
of New York and founder of the International Reproductive Rights Research Action Group 
418 Ibid at 352-353: "Rosalind Pollack Petchesky offers an especially compelling argument that claiming women's 
bodies as their property is a central tool in overcoming commodification, alienation and exploitation. She urges 
"rethinking the meanings of self-ownership and thereby pluralizing the meanings of property in a direction of 
permeability, interdependence, communality...it is imper- ative that feminists reclaim 'self-ownership' as a concept 
of privacy against arbitrary bodily usurpation [...] The question is what is the likelihood that vesting women33 with 
legal property rights in stages of potential life will foster the values she (and many other feminists) care about? 
What are the chances that it will mitigate rather than exacerbate the problems of alienation, commodification, and 
exploitation? [...] Petchesky herself acknowledges that all the prevailing norms work against her project: "Of 
course, in a world where the language of social need and common ownership is rapidly disappearing in the universal 
babel of the market, this [her project of redefining property] would mean practically turning the world upside 
down."  And the norms within the legal world are even clearer. The fact is that almost all the cases that courts have 
experience with, and past opinions they rely upon, treat property in the context of market transactions that 
presuppose economic inequality and take as starting presumptions exclusivity and unqualified alienability.  The 
framework within which they work is not the possible one Petchesky outlines, but the currently dominant one 
shaped by norms of economic inequality, commodification, an autonomy-market nexus, and individualistic 
conceptions ofrights and liberties." 
419Nedelsky, “Property in Life”, supra note 408 at 354, 355: “I think the underlying argument is that all we can 
know for sure at this stage is that we need the "space" to recreate meanings; we cannot know what the new meanings 
should look like until we have begun to dislodge the old […] in my own view, the potential benefits of, say, 
disrupting conventional images of women's maternal nature by creating a thriving market for women's property in 
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Using her rights as relationships framework, Nedelsky points to the main relationships which, 
in her opinion, should be kept in mind in advancing a legal framework for potential life: (1) 
“Relationships of respect and appreciation for children” (2) “Relationships of respect for women 
and honouring of their reproductive capacities and labour” (3) “Relations of equality, between 
people of all classes and backgrounds as well as between men and women” and (4) “We also 
need to pay attention to the conditions that foster people's capacity to form caring, responsible 
and intimate relationships with each other-as family members, friends, members of a 
community, and citizens of a state.”420  Regarding the relationships of respect for women, 
Nedelsky’s central concern is autonomy.  She claims that feminists generally agree that 
autonomy fosters respect for women but that the concept’s significance differs among them and 
that there exists a tension that could be dispelled if the focus shifted away from free market 
exchange as the driver of autonomy’s development and sustenance.421  Furthermore, she suggests 
that analyzing the free-market conception of autonomy can lead to a better understanding of the 
relationships it encourages as well as facilitate the choice of which relationships a given 
legislative framework should foster.422  Indeed, as Professor Nedelsky eloquently illustrates, the 
language of property sometimes “fails to capture what we actually care about” in certain 
situations423. 
                                                            
potential life seem highly speculative and intrinsically questionable. The potential damage seems far clearer, more 
likely, and seriously destructive.” 
420 Nedelsky, “Property in Life”, supra note 408 at 355 
421 Ibid at 356: “My general point has to do with autonomy.  Achieving respect and equality for women will require 
enhancing women's autonomy.  Almost all feminists agree on that.  But, as we have already seen, there are different 
visions of what autonomy consists in and what will promote it there often seems to be a tension between the desire 
to enhance individual women's scope for choice, control, or autonomy, on the one hand, and meeting collective 
goals such as equality for all women or optimal conditions for children, on the other. These tensions generally arise 
out of the vision of autonomy that underlies and emphasizes the exercise of autonomy through market exchange.  
If we shift our attention to what makes it possible for everyone's capacity for autonomy to flourish and develop, 
some of the tension will disappear or be recast. The kinds of relationships […] The tension arises in some instances 
because autonomy is simply postulated as a human faculty, and claims about the market as a suitable, or even 
crucial, vehicle for the exercise of autonomy proceed without inquiry into what actually makes human autonomy 
possible.” 
422 Ibid at 357: “My general claim is, then, that when we spell out the patterns of relationships entailed in a given 
conception of autonomy-such as the conventional autonomy market nexus-we will be much better able to evaluate 
the desirability or persuasiveness of that conception. Similarly, we can best assess which predictions of the 
consequences of legal rules or categories are more persuasive if we look to the particular relationships a legal 
regime is claimed to foster.” 
423 Ibid at 357-362:  Nedelsky relays cases where property was used as a category for potential life: In Del Zio v. 
Presbyterian Hospital, unreported, 74 Civ. 3588 (U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D.N.Y. April 12. 1978). 42, the hospital 
destroyed a culture without the knowledge and/or consent of the potential parents, so they sued for damages, 
63 
 
6.1.3 Nedelsky’s Multidimensional-Self:  A More Human Legal Subject 
Nedelsky not only questions the liberal conception of autonomy and property, but the very 
subject of these rights: the legal subject, the rational agent.  Her argument is that rights can be 
better understood with a fully embodied conception of the self.  She proposes the 
multidimensional self as a more appropriate conception than the rational agent conception 
which has been held by liberal political and legal discourse.424  She postulates that one of the 
reasons the rational agent has been useful in these areas is because it enables the expression of 
fundamental equality:425 “It may seem that people need a way to see each other not in terms of 
the obvious multitude of differences among them, but as equal rights bearers, and in that sense 
identical to and interchangeable with one another […] The abstracted self thus captures the core 
equality and identity of people as rights bearers.426”  However, Nedelsky probes deeper to 
illustrate that “protecting people and allowing them to thrive” as well as “institutionalizing core 
values of a society” requires the acknowledgement of a more complex conception of the self, 
                                                            
claiming the culture was their property.  Nedelsky highlights how emotional attachment is key and should not be 
overlooked : "The sense that the potential life they created (with the technical assistance of the hospital) "belongs" 
to them reflects, I think, the idea that the Del Zios did and should feel a sense of attachment to that potential life. It 
issued from their bodies, they cared deeply (presumably) about what happened to it, they hoped to be able to nurture 
it in Mrs. Del Zio's body so that it could develop into a baby, whom they would continue to nurture. To destroy the 
culture without their knowledge or consent was to violently disregard this sense of attachment. And to offer no 
legal protection against such disregard is to say that, as a society, we do not think it matters whether such attachment 
(as well as the risk, pain, and stress born of the hope for that attachment) is respected.  It probably makes sense to 
stipulate through legislation that such cultures cannot be destroyed without the consent of the couple involved in 
their creation 3 But the reason is not that they "own" the culture, but that we think that, as a society, we should 
honour and protect the sense of attachment they feel.  If we did not, we would show a failure to respect people in 
the feelings that both constitute part of their humanity and which we think are essential for an optimal society. 
Respect for such feeling is almost certainly necessary to the relations of respect and appreciation of children and 
respect and honouring of women's reproductive capacities[...] In each case, as with the Del Zio story, if we look 
closely at what is actually at stake, we will find that the analogies with property are superficial."  She also looks at 
York v. Jones 717 F.Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) and Davis v. Davis [1990] U.S.L.W. 2205 (Tenn. App.), reversing 
(1989) WL 14095 Tern.Cir.) 
424 Jennifer Nedelsky, “Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law” (Oxford University 
Press, 2012) at 159 [Nedelsky, “Law’s Relations”]: “My argument is that the prevailing stripped down image of 
the “rational agent” of both law and political theory is unnecessarily and destructively narrow. In particular, it 
neglects or obscures the affective, embodied, and relational nature of human self-hood. And the abstractness 
obscures the particularity.  An optimal language for legal and political discourse would direct our attention to these 
dimensions of our humanness […] the best language for autonomy is not independence, self-determination, or 
control—despite their common associations with autonomy. The language I propose is autonomy as part of the 
capacity for creative interaction—which includes the capacity for self-creation”. 
425 Ibid at 160 (By this, Nedelsky means “equal moral worth”): “Philosophers often use the term “equal moral 
worth” to capture this idea (meaning of inherently equal value, not equally moral in the sense of equally virtuous).  
I will use both “equal moral worth” and “inherent equality” to distinguish this fundamental equality from the 
(sometimes natural) inequalities of capacity as well as from practical inequalities in social relations.” 
426 Ibid at 160 
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one which is in accord with and does not undercut core values, autonomy being one such 
value.427  She postulates that although equal moral worth (here the “rational agent” is not to be 
confused with formal equality428) may comprise the first ground for our claims as right-
holders,429 this conception should be elaborated by taking into account substantive claims 
(human characteristics and context).430  According to the Professor, treating rational agency as 
a purely formal claim on which to base equality and rights claims is misleading.431 
Furthermore, she argues that the “rational agent” is a conception of self which ignores the 
body/mind relationship.432  The complexities of the body/mind relationship433 offer a conception 
of autonomy to Nedelsky and that is what she means when she refers to embodied autonomy: 
she uses our earthly material reality to rethink autonomy and conclude that it is essentially about 
constructive relationships (both large and small scale) not independence, separation or 
control:434 “Our selves are not just embodied in the sense of being encased in our bodies.  Our 
selves are fully embodied, in the sense that our bodies are constitutive, interactive dimensions 
of a whole. ”435   
                                                            
427 Nedelsky, “Law’s Relations,” supra note 424 at 160: “Neither objective can be optimally pursued if the stripped-
down picture of the individual is actually misleading in ways directly related to those values, such as the nature of 
autonomy and the conditions under which it can flourish.” 
428 Ibid at 161 
429 Ibid at 162 
430 Ibid at 162: “The starting point of formal equal moral worth is, thus, necessary, but not sufficient. The second 
component is attention both to actual human characteristics and to particular contexts in order to know what it 
would take to give effect to equal moral worth, to actually treat every person as inherently equal […] I think a 
central part of the problem in the tradition of liberal legalism has been the move to an intermediate step: the 
assertion of rational agency as that which constitutes our identity as equals and thus forms the basis for our claims 
as rights bearers”.  
431 Ibid at 162: “The treatment of rational agency as the core of equality and the foundation for rights claims has 
caused problems precisely because it is not a purely formal claim; it asserts certain properties as the ones relevant 
to rights while denying the significance of others. In particular, as many feminists have argued, it denies the 
relevance of our embodied nature, of emotion or affect and the differences and individual particularities that both 
our bodies and our feelings make manifest. The problem lies both with the conception of reason, as radically 
disconnected from the body and affect, and with the conception of agency or autonomy” 
432 Ibid at 162-163: “The core subject of the dominant legal and political theory is the rational agent—whose 
rationality and agency alone are what really matter, what entitle him or her to rights.  And neither rationality nor 
agency is conceptualized as integrally connected to the body or to affect.” 
433 Jennifer Nedelsky, “Meditations on Embodied Autonomy”, (1995) 2 Graven Images 159 at 159: “The 
complexity, paradoxes and tensions of the mind/body relationship reveal and illuminate analogous difficulties in 
conceptualizing human autonomy” [Nedelsky, “On Embodied Autonomy”]; Nedelsky, “Law’s Relations”, supra 
note 425 at  277-306;  
434 Nedelsky, “Law’s Relations”, supra note 425 at 299 
435 Ibid at 306 
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In her discussion about relinquishing control,436 Nedelsky draws on Susan Wendell’s work on 
bodily suffering.437  In her analysis, she refers to “attentiveness without resistance.”438  This 
“attentiveness without resistance” is very similar to the state of receptivity or mindfulness she 
refers to in her theory on judgement.  Nedelsky draws on Hannah Arendt’s theory of 
judgement.439  Arendt herself was influenced by Kant’s Critique of Judgement, wherein he 
examines aesthetic judgement and formulates the concept of enlarged mentality.440  Nedelsky 
argues that enlarged mentality requires relational autonomy441 and that it is this autonomy which 
makes judgement genuine.442  Moreover, in her opinion, receptivity (which is not mentioned in 
                                                            
436 Ibid at 277-306 
437 Nedelsky, “On Embodied Autonomy”, supra note 433 at 159 : “Susan Wendell reminds us that the feminist 
embrace of the body, the rejection of the mind-body split with its denigration of the female as body, has served an 
important function; but it has glorified the body as a site of pleasure and connection, without taking seriously the 
ways in which the body is a source of pain and incapacity”;  Nedelsky, “Law’s Relations”, supra note 424 at 285: 
“[Susan] Wendell wants feminists to not only face the inevitability of sickness and pain but also to think differently 
about the kind of control we can exercise over these phenomena.  We need to attend to the ways in which even 
positive approaches to responsibility for our health can lead to an oversimplified picture which has control at its 
center—with disturbing overtones of both infinite optimism and fault and failure.  Trying to figure out the optimal 
way of conceptualizing responsibility for our health is a way of exploring the seeming paradoxes of our autonomy 
as embodied beings who participate in creating ourselves and our world but control neither”  
438 Nedelsky, “Law’s Relations”, supra note 424 at 286 
439 Jennifer Nedelsky, “The Reciprocal Relation of Judgement and Autonomy: Walking in Another’s Shoes and 
Which Shoes to Walk In” in Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer J. Llewellyn, eds, Being Relational, Reflections on 
Relational Theory and Health Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012) [Nedelsky, “Judgement & Autonomy”]; Jennifer 
Nedelsky, “Receptivity and Judgement” (2011) 4:4 Ethics & Global Politics at 231-254; Jennifer Nedelsky, 
“Judgement, Diversity, and Relational Autonomy” in Ronald Beiner & Nedelsky, eds, Judgement, Imagination and 
Politics (Boston: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2001) 103 at 106: “Autonomous judgement requires 
attending to the perspectives of others” [Nedelsky, “Judgement, Diversity and Relational Autonomy”]. 
440 Nedelsky, “Judgement, Diversity and Relational Autonomy”, supra note 439 at 106: “What enables us to make 
judgments which are not merely idiosyncratic statements of preference, what puts us in a position to ‘woo the 
consent of others’, is our capacity for ‘enlarged thought’.” 
441 Ibid at 110: “On this account, taking the standpoints of actual others is not the antithesis of autonomous 
judgement, but its basic condition. This is a way of thinking about judgement as both inherently social and as 
autonomous-the kind of autonomy possible in the empirical, social realm.” 
442Nedelsky, “Judgement, Diversity and Relational Autonomy”, supra note 439 at 106-110: “Arendt shares the 
Kantian objective of seeing the link between the perspectives of others and judgement that is autonomous, that can 
transcend the inevitable limitations of one person’s experience, interests and inclinations […]The ability to think 
in the place of others makes it possible for us to liberate ourselves from the “subjective private conditions”, that is, 
as Arendt says “from the idiosyncrasies which naturally determine the outlook of each individual in his privacy 
and are legitimate as long as they are only privately held opinions, but which…lack all validity in the public realm.  
And this enlarged way of thinking, which as judgement knows how to transcend its own individual limitations, on 
the other hand cannot function in strict isolation or solitude; it needs the presence of others ‘in whose place’ it must 
think, whose perspectives it must take into consideration, and without whom it never has the opportunity to operate 
at all […] the process of enlarged mentality must not be confused with deference”; Nedelsky, “Receptivity and 
Judgement’ supra note 439 at 233: “For Arendt, judgment requires, or one might say entails, autonomy.  The very 
meaning of the term involves the exercise of autonomous judgment.  It is the capacity of each person to make her 
own judgments that can free one from the power of public opinion and enable her to form judgments and make 
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Arendt’s account of judgement), is necessary for the formation of enlarged mentality: “in order 
to take the perspective of another, one must be open to it, one must adopt a stance of receptivity.  
To exercise judgment, one must temporarily adopt the stance of non- judgment that 
characterizes receptivity.443”  According to Nedelsky, receptivity can come in many forms.  She 
discusses mindfulness as constituting one such form (mindfulness through meditation and 
mindfulness through the everyday awareness we place in our thoughts and actions).444  Besides 
highlighting the antithetical natures of judgment and mindfulness and illustrating how they 
intersect, Nedelsky imagines how they can be relevant to not only personal but political change 
as well.445  Indeed, instead of equating autonomy and responsibility with control, she espouses 
the idea that “what we have is a creative capacity to interact.”446 
The body, being the part of ourselves that challenges our autonomy, is the part which, according 
to Nedelsky, disturbs North American culture.447  From the abovementioned observations, 
Nedelsky posits two things: the first is that by denying these aspects of the self and 
misunderstanding the nature of reason and autonomy, the rights discourse is fallacious.448  
                                                            
good decisions even when the existing canon of concepts seems unable to capture the nature of a new phenomenon. 
(Arendt called this latter capacity ‘thinking without banisters.’) It is the autonomous nature of these capacities that 
make them genuine judgment, and it is this exercise of autonomy that provides the ‘freeing’ quality of true 
judgment.” 
443 Nedelsky, “Receptivity and Judgement”, supra note 439 at 233 
444 Ibid at 234 
445 Ibid at 235- 236: “[B]oth the exercise of Arendtian judgment and the practice of mindfulness enable the ability 
to perceive novelty and to respond creatively, again, unfiltered (or at least less filtered) by the habits of trying to fit 
everything into a routinized conceptual framework.  Freedom, creativity, and clear seeing and thinking are all linked 
to this capacity to recognize novelty and bring forth novel responses from ourselves.  From the perspective of both 
practices, transformation, whether personal or political, stops seeming like a mountain to scale with vast effort and 
resources, and appears more like an inevitability that requires attentive, receptive, responsible interaction […] the 
capacity for the enlarged mentality and judgment enables us to freely, creatively respond to the inevitably changing 
world around us […] this breaking free from misguided habits of thought that distort our perceptions, leads to and 
is part of a deeper freedom: mindfulness enables one to become ‘free from the prison of habitual mental affliction 
and suffering’.” 
446 Nedelsky, “Law’s Relations,” supra note 424 at 291 
447 Ibid at 163: “Our bodies pose a tacit threat to the dominant image of autonomy as independence, as being 
unilaterally in control of our lives. It is in part our embodiment that makes us inevitably and obviously dependent 
on others.  In sickness and death we are forced to recognize both our need for others and our ultimate lack of 
control. I think it is this dependency and inherent lack of control that, in North American culture, breeds a fear, 
distaste, and hostility to all things bodily. The visions of freedom from necessity, the ultimate image of autonomy, 
falter in the face of the sick or dying body.” 
448 Ibid at 164: “I want to point to a particular way of seeing this image as entailing a misunderstanding of reason, 
which, in turn, distorts the understanding of autonomy. Since the value of autonomy is so central to rights, and the 
rational agent is treated as the subject of rights, if we misunderstand the nature of reason and autonomy, it is unlikely 
that we will be able to develop an adequate conception of rights.” 
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Nedelsky draws on Antonio Damasio’s theory449 to show that emotion is indeed an important 
component of reasoning and autonomy.  The second is that the “rational agent” has been used 
“to exclude women and other subordinated groups who are associated with affect and the 
body.”450   
Thus, to Nedelsky, autonomy is a facet of creative interaction, together with attention, 
receptivity, and response, to name a few.451  Just as she distinguishes relational autonomy from 
independence,452 she prefers to use the term creative interaction or interactive self-creation 
rather than self-determination453 because it “offers a more helpful way of thinking about a wide 
variety of problems posed by the realities of our interdependence.”454  Indeed, noting the existing 
dilemma which exists between the realities of autonomy and interdependence within unequal 
power relations,455 she offers interactive self-creation as a concept that can facilitate reflection 
and action on the issue.456  As such, Nedelsky’s conception of autonomy, in its most basic as 
                                                            
449 Ibid at 165-166: “Damasio's work has intriguing implications for the feminist project of making the body an 
integral part of our conception of the self rather than a source of contingency, particularity, and difference—to be 
set aside when identifying the human essence that founds the contemporary commitment to equality and rights. 
After all, if the core capacities for reason and autonomous decision making cannot be well understood without their 
connection to affect and the body, it hardly seems appropriate that our conception of the self should exclude or 
ignore these components.  Once we bring in the body, we must confront difference.  The justification for leaving 
the body aside was to find some core commonality that was truly universal, unvaried and free of contingency.  If 
law, political theory, and institutional design fully incorporated a sense of human beings as embodied, it would be 
much harder to ignore bodily differences such as sex, age, and mental and physical abilities.” 
450 Ibid at 164 
451 Ibid at 166 
452 Ibid at 167: “Independence captures something about what we value in autonomy; it suggests that one can make 
one's life choices for oneself, free of the constraint or control that dependence on another can bring. The problem 
is that this vision of freedom misses the reality that the capacity for autonomy can only develop and thrive when 
fostered by constructive relationships[…] The capacity for autonomy can wither or thrive through one'slife, and 
those who value autonomy must not simply posit it as a human characteristic but also inquire into the conditions 
for its flourishing.  And we can only understand those conditions when we understand how relationships shape the 
development of our core capacities in ways that make interdependence a basic fact of life—throughout our lives; 
For more on the subject see: Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy”, supra note 393 
453 Nedelsky, “Law’s Relations” supra note 424 at 167 
454 Ibid at 168: “The problem with the term “self-determination” (and many conceptions of autonomy that deny or 
ignore its relational nature) is that it presumes or implies that the nature of our “selves” is entirely a matter of our 
choice. And, conversely, a common objection to “communitarian” thought is that it so overstates the constitutive 
nature of human embeddedness in community, that it leaves no room for choice, for genuine autonomy.” 
455 Ibid at 169: “How does one respect and promote both individual and community agency while acknowledging 
the power and constraints of the larger context?” 
456 Ibid: “The problem of understanding individual autonomy and responsibility in the context of oppressive power 
relations (which, as Sarah Hoagland reminds us, is the norm rather than the exception) is a matter of both strategic 
political action and reflection on the language, the concepts that can facilitate both understanding and action.  I 
think the concept of autonomy as part of a capacity for creative interaction offers a path for working through both 
the theoretical and practical debates.  At the theoretical level, the context of creative interaction highlights both the 
genuinely creative and inevitably interactive dimensions of all our exercises of autonomy.  It thus directs our 
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well as its relational sense, is a component of human creative potential.457  Moreover, according 
to her,  “the language of creative interaction […] invites inquiry into interaction with one's body 
as part of the process of self-creation [and] an approach to autonomy as part of the capacity for 
creative interaction of relational, embodied selves is well suited to the central problem of 
difference.”458   
Regarding diversity, Nedelsky asks herself whether “the multidimensional self and its capacity 
for creative interaction replace rational agency as the ground for equality.”459 She posits that 
applying the “rational disembodied agent” status to traditionally subordinated groups of society 
(women, working class and racialized people etc) is not as suitable as it seems.460  Indeed, the 
Professor asserts that the legal concept rejects components of our human selves (affect, body, 
relational) which do in fact exist and that these must “go somewhere else, in their attribution.461”  
If these cannot be recognized fully within a legal conception of self, then "no amount of 
‘inclusion’ in traditional rational agency will provide an adequate framework for rights or law: 
”462 
If rational agency is truly the basis for equal moral worth, then those who do not have it lose 
their equal status. The capacity for creative interaction is broader and more flexible. Certainly 
even newborns have it, and any state of impaired capacity allows for some form of creative 
interaction.  Nevertheless, there are variations within the actual capacities for creation as well 
as within the role of autonomy in those capacities that arise not only with age and infirmity 
but also with the conditions of people's lives. It is a basic part of my conception of autonomy 
that it is not static, that it requires constructive relationships, and that throughout one's life it 
can wither or thrive depending both on the kinds of initiatives one takes and on the conditions 
one finds oneself in. Given this variation, my conception of autonomy cannot be the core 
grounding of claims for rights: the core claim of equal moral worth does not vary; autonomy 
does. Autonomy as part of creative interaction is an improvement over traditional rational 
                                                            
attention to the constraining as well as enabling dimensions of circumstance without underplaying the core capacity 
for creation.” 
457 Ibid at 170: “Thus I intend a language that is true both to the miraculous (and ordinary) human capacity for 
creation and to its inherently relational and thus contingent qualities.  Conceptualized in these terms, as part of the 
capacity for creative interaction, autonomy is shaped by the structures of relations, including power relations with 
which any individual interacts, but it cannot be reduced to or deduced from those relations.”  
458 Ibid at 172: “This issue is best understood by contrasting my conception of autonomy with the traditional rational 
agency. By excising the body and affect from the essence of the rights-bearing self, the multiplicity of differences 
among people is removed as well. Conversely, when the conceptions of reason and autonomy have the body and 
affect integrated into them, the differences that both make manifest become central. The realities of differences in 
abilities and in emotional states—as well as the relational differences of power and status— are no longer presumed 
to be marginal to the issues of equal rights; they appear as integral to the full particularity of the subject of those 
rights.” 
459 Ibid at 186 
460 Ibid at 187 
461 Nedelsky, “Law’s Relations”, supra note 424 at 187 
462 Ibid at 187 
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agency in many ways. But both are substantive, empirical concepts whose variation among 
human beings means that neither can ground a universal claim of equality.463 
 
Furthermore, she goes on to show how the “relational dimension of the multidimensional self” 
can make an advantageous contribution to legal analysis in the area of responsibility and that it 
can “both improve and complicate legal analysis of responsibility.”464  Indeed, she asserts that 
the relational approach espouses a more complex notion of autonomy, thereby making the 
concept of responsibility more complex.465  Using battered women who kill their husbands as 
an example, Nedelsky illustrates how the contemporary liberal conception of autonomy has 
caused the legal system to inadequately respond to the issue of responsibility where the battered 
woman syndrome is concerned.466  She points to the fact that, besides certain exceptions, the 
common law presumes the existence of autonomy and agency, as judges don’t usually delve 
deep into what it means for an action to be “one’s own.”467  She does not mean to say that 
personal and legal responsibility are the same or should be.  In the case of the battered woman 
syndrome she suggests that despite there being a personal responsibility for a woman to leave 
or change a destructive relationship, a woman should not be held legally at fault for remaining 
in one and the issue of how autonomous she really was when killing her batterer becomes not 
                                                            
463 Ibid at 187, 188 
464 Nedelsky, “Law’s Relations”, supra note 424 at 173 
465 Ibid  
466 Ibid at 173, 175-183: “It is important to inquire carefully, not only prospectively into what will foster autonomy 
but also retrospectively into the kind of autonomy, say, a particular accused woman had and why. The difficult 
reality for everyone is that we cannot control all the circumstances that foster or undermine our creative capacities, 
even though we have a responsibility to optimize them […] While it seems to be the case that this expert testimony 
has made a difference in courts’ capacities to understand why a woman might stay in an abusive relationship, the 
danger has been that the accused woman then comes to be seen simply as a victim.  Her agency disappears, even if 
the facts are that she had made prior efforts to leave and had employed many strategies to protect herself and her 
children.  The passive, helpless victim is a stereotype available for casting the woman as not responsible for her 
situation or for her actions.  Indeed, there are interesting arguments that even the psychological experts who testify 
in court end up drawing on these stereotypes.” 
467 Nedelsky, “Law’s Relations” supra note 425 at 173-174: “To those sympathetic to a relational approach this 
picture of autonomy as contingent, shifting, and variable may look self-evident. But when we turn to the law, we 
can see a logic behind treating autonomy as a presumption, something to be ordinarily assumed as a characteristic 
of human actors.  It might appear that the law has to assume autonomy, because it is necessary for all forms of legal 
responsibility.  When a legal system is based on a conception of the person as a rational agent who can be held 
responsible for his actions, then justice and legitimacy seem to require a link between autonomy and responsibility 
[…] While legal analysis often uses the term “agency,” I think it is fair to say that it is actually autonomy and not 
just agency that the law usually presumes for the purposes of assigning responsibility […] the law recognizes 
exceptions to and constraints on autonomy, but unless one can show that one falls within one of the exceptions, 
autonomy will be assumed for the purposes of assigning responsibility.”  
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only one of degrees and circumstance468 but it leads one to question to which extent institutions 
and society are also responsible for the issue.469  Therefore, a relational approach to the battered 
woman syndrome poses two challenges, one being the law and the judiciary’s limited view on 
autonomy, another being society’s institutional failures where helping battered women is 
concerned.470 
6.1.4 Susan Sherwin: Distinguishing Autonomy and Agency 
Like Jennifer Nedelsky, Susan Sherwin has taken issue with the concept of autonomy being 
simplistically equated with individualism and independence and has advanced a definition 
which takes human interdependence and social context into account:471 “I reoriented my 
approach to autonomy in the 1990s and sought to develop a relational understanding of the 
concept […] I sought a way to retain the value of appeals to autonomy as a way of reducing 
oppression without accepting its baggage as a concept that sustains the ideals of 
individualism.”472   
                                                            
468 Ibid at 182:  "In the long run, I think cases such as these are best treated as cases where the degree of the 
impairment of autonomy should determine the degree of responsibility.”  
469 Nedelsky, “Law’s Relations” supra note 425 at at 181, 183-184: “As I have said, an approach to autonomy that 
looks to both the influence of personal relationships and societal structures is necessary to understanding the harm 
that battering does to autonomy and thus to determining the kind of responsibility that should be assigned to women 
who have killed their batterers […] But that there is a personal responsibility to try to leave or transform destructive 
relationships, but the exercise of that responsibility is so complex  and so dependent on circumstances and support 
beyond the control of the individual woman that the law should not (as Canadian law does not) try to assign any 
fault for being in a battering Relationship […] Battering is a social phenomenon (otherwise the courts would not 
have been able to recognize a battered women's syndrome) that has been sustained by patterns of behavior by 
police, prosecutors, judges, neighbors, friends, and family, which together constitute a long-standing failure to 
protect women from intimate partner violence (and, indeed, violence generally). It is possible for women to become 
enmeshed in abusive relationships only because of a wide set of institutions, behaviors, and beliefs that are beyond 
the control of any individual woman. The attention to the social structure of relationships keeps this larger 
framework in view and thus helps to make clear why, for legal purposes, there can be no individual responsibility 
for being in a battering relationship.” 
470 Ibid at 181: “In at least two different ways, a relational approach poses a major challenge.  Initially, I thought 
that most “battered women” cases were about impaired autonomy and that the reason the discussion of the 
reasonableness of the self-defence lacked clarity was that judges were ill-equipped to articulate conceptions of 
partial autonomy— as opposed to an on/off conception.  I now think, though, that in most of the leading cases the 
problem lies in the unwillingness to directly confront the external reality, the institutional failure that makes the 
woman's actions reasonable.  That is a different kind of challenge.” 
471 Susan Sherwin, “Relational Autonomy and Global Threats”, in Jocelyn Downie and Jennifer J. Llewellyn, eds, 
Being Relational, Reflections on Relational Theory and Health law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012) at 13-14 
[Sherwin, “Autonomy and Global Threats”]. 
472 Ibid at 15 
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For a long time, her approach focused on autonomy in the context of health and bioethics 
exclusively:473 “I sought to make central ways in which systemic patterns of oppression affect 
people’s experiences with respect to health matters and health care.”474  She introduced the 
distinction between the concepts of autonomy and agency.475  According to her, a person has 
agency insofar as she makes a rational choice, however, she is autonomous when provided with 
options that are not the result of systemic oppression, in other words, when “background 
conditions” are empowering and “meaningful options” are available.476   
I appreciate Sherwin’s distinction between agency and autonomy.  However, I find her 
definition of autonomy too narrow: both her definitions are based on the relations of the 
individual to the outside world.  Instead, I prefer Nedelsky’s because she exposes the inherent 
complexities of what it means to be a human being.  Her definition is dynamic and really 
highlights not only the individual’s relationship to the outside world, but with him/herself.  
Susan Dodds also developed a fuller view of autonomy, but it is not as comprehensive as 
Nedelsky’s, in my view.   
6.1.5 Susan Dodds: Accounting for “Autonomy Competency” 
Susan Dodds presents an account of the radical, liberal and cultural feminist theories and their 
contributions to the notion of autonomy in bioethics.477  She discusses how each theory in itself 
is not a sufficient to challenge the mainstream concept of autonomy in bioethics but that their 
complementarity can be useful.478  Dodds then takes a particular look at Suzan Sherwin’s theory 
                                                            
473 Ibid at 16 
474 Ibid  
475 Sherwin, “Autonomy and Global Threats,” supra note 471 at 17 
476 Ibid at 17-19 
477 Susan Dodds, “Choice and Control in Feminist Bioethics” in Mackenzie, Catriona & Natalie Stoljar, eds, 
Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self ( New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) 213 at 218-223 [Dodds]: “The liberal feminist approach is consistent with the bioethical 
focus on respecting autonomy through recognition of informed choice[…][It] assumes that health-care decision 
making occurs in a social vacuum […] Radical feminist contributions to bioethics demand an awareness of the 
effects of race, class, gender, ability and sexual orientation in the distribution of power in a context of medical care, 
rather than a narrow construed understanding of autonomous choice[…][it] however, contains some 
inconsistencies.  For example, the account of patriarchy that supports the radical feminist mistrust of medical 
technology is not similarly applied to governmental institutions that are called on to protect women […] The 
cultural feminists’ care focus gives us an awareness of the relationships between people and the ways these 
relationships are affected by health care” 
478 Ibid at 218, 222: “I think that each of these three approaches contributes to a general critique of the conception 
of autonomy found in bioethics […] At the same time, all three contain significant limitations because they fail to 
adequately challenge the equation of autonomy with informed consent, thus failing to draw women out of the 
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on relational autonomy which, in her opinion, offers a “more complex understanding of 
autonomy than the one described in mainstream bioethics literature”479.  Although she agrees 
with Susan Sherwin that the dominant conception of autonomy in bioethics does not account 
for the eradication of oppression,480 she argues that accounting for oppression or gender is not 
enough, that the ability to make rational choices is a limited description of autonomy, 
“autonomy competency”481 should be taken into account.482   
Although, as I mentioned previously, I find Sherwin’s definition of autonomy too narrow, I do 
find her public ethics project to be a noteworthy development.  Together with Catherine 
Koggel’s relational account on inequality, it constitutes an interesting framework from which to 
view assisted reproduction and surrogacy.  
6.2 Sherwin& Koggel: Global Public Ethics in a Power-Driven World                                                       
6.2.1 Susan Sherwin: Toward a Global Public Ethics  
Recently, Sherwin has undertaken the task of examining relational autonomy from a wider 
perspective,483 using it to create a new ethics project which she calls public ethics.484  In her 
opinion, traditional ethics systems are insufficient to tackle today’s global issues.485  She argues 
that ethical matters are interconnected and need to be taken into account at the intersection of 
various individuals as well as human organizations: “I claim that we need a new approach to 
ethics that is capable of discussing the interconnections of moral responsibilities for many 
different types of agents (that is, agents of many levels of human organization […] the ethics 
we need now must operate on multiple levels of human organization simultaneously486 […] an 
                                                            
tension between accepting a conception of autonomy understood as choice, independent of the etiology of the 
choice, or rejecting the value and significance of personal autonomy for women […] An adequate understanding 
of autonomy in health care will need to offer an alternative account of autonomy, one that incorporates the liberal, 
radical and cultural feminist critiques.”  
479 Dodds, supra note 477 at 223  
480 Ibid at 224 
481 Ibid at 226: “[A]n adequate understanding of autonomy in health care must not be restricted to an examination 
of the exercise of autonomy through choice but must also encompass and understanding of the ways in which 
autonomy is developed or, in Diana Meyers’ terms, the ways in which the array of ‘autonomy competencies’ are 
fostered, shaped and potentially thwarted.” 
482 Ibid at 225-228 
483 Sherwin, “Autonomy and Global Threats,” supra note 471 at 20-25 
484 Ibid at 23 
485 Ibid at 20-21 
486 Ibid at 21 
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“ethic of multi-layered responsibilities.”487  She also argues that ethicists should not be 
concerned so much with applying universal rules across various contexts but more with 
assigning specific responsibilities where they are actually needed.488 Sherwin sees a connection 
between public ethics and health care, whereby the latter is both a model and an example of the 
former.489 
She refers to Iris Marion Young490’s work on social connection theory (global markets and social 
injustice)491 as guidelines for her public ethics project.492  Young used sweat shops to illustrate 
the interwoven responsibilities involved in social structures, the complex background conditions 
within which various agents act on the global stage and she set four parameters to help determine 
when agents should take responsibility to change a given problematic: power, privilege, interest 
and collective ability.493  Sherwin does not elaborate but she asserts that she wants to widen her 
theory of relational autonomy so it encapsulates global social structural issues. 
6.2.2 Christine Koggel: Accounting for Power in Equality Analysis 
Christine Koggel maintains that relational theory offers a more comprehensive view for equality 
analysis than does Amartya Sen’s494 capabilities approach to equality analysis.495  She suggests 
                                                            
487 Ibid at 25 
488 Sherwin, “Autonomy and Global Threats,” supra note 471 at 21 
489 Ibid at 24: “[I]n public health, there are many levels of responsibility that are interrelated with responsibilities 
at other levels, including those of individuals.  Public health is, then, both an instance of, and a model for, what I 
have in mind for the complex, multi-layered responsibilities of public ethics.  In both arenas, there are moral 
responsibilities at every level of human organization regarding how we are to behave, individually and collectively.  
Ethics must help us learn to see these interconnections and provide guidance on the appropriate kinds of 
responsibility in complex cases.  The new ethics must provide guidance to agents at all levels of organization to 
help them to recognize and take up the appropriate responsibilities if we are to avoid worsening climate change, 
environmental degradation, growing poverty, threats of war or terrorism, a serious pandemic flu and so on.” 
490 Iris Marion Young was a political philosopher and a professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago  
491 Sherwin, “Autonomy and Global Threats,” supra note 471 at 218-223 
492 Ibid at 29-32 
493 Sherwin, “Autonomy and Global Threats,” supra note 471 at 29-30 
494 Amartya Sen is Thomas W. Lamont University Professor and Professor of Economics and Philosophy, at 
Harvard University.  His research has ranged over social choice theory, economic theory, ethics and political 
philosophy, welfare economics, theory of measurement, decision theory, development economics, public health, 
and gender studies. He has won the Nobel Prize in Economics. 
495 Christine M. Koggel, “A relational Approach to Equality: New Developments and Applications” in Jocelyn 
Downie & Jennifer J. Llewellyn, eds Being Relational-Reflections on relational theory and health law (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2012) at 66-70 [Koggel]; “Sen’s Capability Approach” online: The Internet Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy <http://www.iep.utm.edu/sen-cap/>:  “The Capability Approach was first articulated by the Indian 
economist and philosopher Amartya Sen in the 1980s, and remains most closely associated with him. It has been 
employed extensively in the context of human development, for example, by the United Nations Development 
Programme, as a broader, deeper alternative to narrowly economic metrics such as growth in GDP per capita.  Here 
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shifting the focus of equality analysis from the individual to relationships instead and that 
power’s role in personal, local, institutional, national, and global relationships needs to be 
accounted for.”496  Koggel’s perspective on equality and democracy challenges the liberal 
view.497  Her account is not strictly about income inequality, it stretches far wider than that to 
encompass the range of power dynamics involved in shaping one’s democratic voice as well.  
For example, she agrees with Amartya Sen that public participation in policy “is a crucial part 
of the exercise of democracy and responsible social choice”498 but highlights the fact that “Sen 
defends the importance of having a voice in public debate at the same time as he fails to 
acknowledge the very institutional norms and structures that bar some from having a say.”499  
More importantly, she goes on to state that “this lack of recognition reflects a failure to confront 
and question existing norms and structures that make some voices easy to ignore or hard to hear 
and understand.”500  
I find Koggel’s statement about democracy and inequality very significant in the context of 
assisted reproduction and surrogacy.  Indeed, the power that biotechnology and medicalisation 
have in 21st century’s popular culture and consciousness are overlooked by family law 
scholarship in Québec.  In the next section, I briefly look at what Ivan Illich, health sociologists 
and other scholars have to say about our relationship to medicine and technology.   
                                                            
‘poverty’ is understood as deprivation in the capability to live a good life, and ‘development’ is understood as 
capability expansion.” 
496 Koggel, supra note 495 at 68-69, 71: Sen’s account captures “the interconnectedness of kinds of inequalities 
and the need for a detailed, contextual account to capture them.  Its richness in providing an informational base that 
demands context-specific attention has implications for theory and for policy […] Yet […] Sen’s complex, 
contextual and integrated account of equality does not go far enough.  Its focus is still too exclusively on individuals 
and on the goal of enhancing their agency so that they can live lives that they have reason to value.  It does not 
delve sufficiently deep to question the actual relationships assumed by, and embedded in, institutions and structures 
or how these can entrench inequalities that are difficult to understand and to remove […] As broad as [Sen’s] 
account of inequalities is it does not cover those inequalities that are shaped by relationships (and the institutional 
norms embedded in them) that one is powerless to exit, challenge or change.” 
497 Ibid at 71, 76: “On a relational approach, liberal theory’s cherished notions of autonomy, justice, or equality are 
not relinquished, but, instead, they are reinterpreted […] mainstream liberal understandings of equality as having 
the opportunity to compete in a free market, to have property, and to have one’s negative rights of non-interference 
upheld are expectations and norms that are not universal-they are challenged in non-Western parts of the globe. 
We need to be able to understand the relationship of power that have allowed liberal assumptions about the virtues 
of the market and of capitalist structures to dominate conceptions of equality, justice, development, human rights 
and globalization itself.” 
498 Koggel, supra note 495 at 73 
499 Ibid at 74 
500 Ibid at 74 
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6.3 Weighing in Power: Medical Nemesis, Technology and Autonomy  
6.3.1 Medical Nemesis and Autonomy 
I chose to include this section because I think it speaks to how medical and biotechnical power 
is a crucial factor to weight in a relational analysis of autonomy in assisted reproduction and 
surrogacy.  One must keep in mind that when medical decisions are made regarding new 
technologies and procedures at an institutional level, these decisions are left into the hands of 
professionals and their institutions and that they hold a form of power that an individual’s 
consent and/or agency at a clinical or systemic level, can barely face up to.  Health sociologists 
recognize this.501  Another interesting point made in health sociology is that the medicalization 
of reproduction502 and childbirth strips away the human component of the experience, making 
it a medical and technical one instead.503  Just like Nedelsky points to the law’s limited view of 
its subject as a purely rational one,504 health sociologists also point to the fact that medicine fails 
to take the person, as a whole, into account.505  It has also been recognized that medical 
knowledge is not always value free:  medicine is not always used to benefit patients but its 
associated industries instead and vice-versa.506    
                                                            
501 Anne-Marie Barry& Chris Yuill, Understanding the Sociology of Health, An Introduction, 2nd ed (London: 
SAGE Publications Ltd, 2008) at 34-51 [Barry & Yuill] 
502 Ibid at 53-57: “Medicalisation is used to describe a tendency to explain behaviour and experiences in medical 
terms […] it is particularly helpful to think of medicalisation  as the way in which specific behaviours or conditions 
are given medical meanings and thus medical practice becomes the appropriate  vehicle  for their elimination and 
control. In this way, the apparently natural process of reproduction is defined as a medical condition requiring 
expert knowledge, treatment and intervention.  Prior to the widespread dominance of biomedicine, Oakley argues, 
the main healers in society were lay women. Childbirth occurred at home. There was no systematic medical care 
during pregnancy.  Institutions grouping pregnant and labouring women as ‘patients’ along with the sick did not 
exist. It was not until the eighteenth century that childbirth became increasingly technical and appropriated by male 
medical practitioners. The opportunity to study pregnancy and childbirth was facilitated by the use of hospitals to 
care for women […] [Reissman] suggests that this process of medicalisation resulted in a fundamental change to 
the nature of childbirth: “the meaning of childbirth for women was transformed from a human experience to a 
medical technical problem […] the problem of pregnancy management as [the doctor] has defined it, discounts the 
importance of the whole person […] an essential element of the concept of medicalisation can thus be understood 
as the transformation of human experiences into medical and technical one [where] personal and social implications 
of medical treatment are rarely considered.” 
503 Ibid at 53-60 
504 See part 6.1.3, above 
505 Ann Oakley, “From Walking Wombs to Test-tube Babies” in M Standworth, ed, Reproductive Technologies: 
Gender, Motherhood and Medecine (Cambridge: Polity, 1987) at 52 [Oakley]; Barry& Yuill, supra note 501 at 
57 
506 Barry& Yuill, supra note 501 at 35-51; Jerome P. Kassirer, On the Take: How Medecine’s Complicity with 
Big Business can Endanger Health (Oxford University Press, 2005) ; Jennie Jacobs Kronenfeld, ed, Technology, 
Communication, Disparities and Government Options in Health and Health Care Services, Research in the 
Sociology of Health Care, vol 32 (Emerald Books, 2014) 
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As Ivan Illich507 notoriously theorized, medicine can cause harm: both at a clinical and a cultural 
level.  Clinical iatrogenesis “literally means harm caused by doctors [and] in its most literal 
sense, […] the harmful consequences of medical intervention”508.  This phenomena is 
acknowledged by the medical profession.509  He defined cultural iatrogenesis as a social 
dependence on medicine as an institution.510  “According to Illich, this dependence is itself a 
form of sickness that undermines good health of autonomous human beings.”511  Indeed, 
medical nemesis is Illich’s concept for the idea that the institution of medicine perpetuates more 
medically-induced harm.512  Illich claimed that “people no longer take responsibility for their 
own health problems and the diagnosis of their symptoms […] that medical practice sponsors 
sickness […] reinforcing a morbid society that encourages people to become consumers of 
curative, preventative, industrial and environmental medicine. ”513 I view this statement as 
supportive of Nedelsky’s point about the importance of mind/body relationship: Western culture 
is too focused on the mind and up until recently, it has outright rejected the body as a source of 
intelligence for human beings.514  Indeed, Illich’s thought about individual autonomy and 
institutions contains features common to Nedelsky’s conception of autonomy and creativity, 
especially her account of the multifaceted self and creative interaction.515  By rejecting the body, 
western culture has lost touch with a part of our human selves and with nature.  In my view, 
albeit not directly, Nedelsky and Illich’s theories have a lot in common with ecofeminist thought 
regarding science and capitalism’s relationship with nature.516  Illich was an advocate for what 
                                                            
507 Ivan Illich was an Austrian philosopher and critic of modern western institutions and industrial productivity 
508 Barry & Yuill, supra note 501 at 37; Armstrong, David. Outline of Sociology as applied to Medecine, 5th ed 
(London: Arnold, 2003) at 134 [Armstrong] 
509 Armstrong, supra note 508 at 34 
510 Barry& Yuill, supra note 501 at 37: “Illich also uses the concept to draw our attention to our cultural dependence 
on medicine and medical practitioners, such that we do not seek alternative explanations or alternative remedies 
for ill health”; Armstrong, supra note 508 at 135 
511 Armstrong, supra note 508 at 135: “Increasing the quantity of health services creates more need and encourages 
greater use, which in turn is met by increasing resources […] a vicious circle of need generating demand and 
requiring yet more resources-which engenders more need-is created.” 
512 Barry& Yuill, supra note 501 at 38 
513 Barry& Yuill, supra note 501 at 37; Ivan Illich, “The Epidemics of Modern Medicine”, in N. Black & al. (eds), 
Health and Disease: A Reader (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1993) [Illich, “The Epidemics of 
Medicine”] 
514 Supra note 447  
515 See part 6.1.3, above  
516 See part 6.1, above; Jytte Nhanenge, Ecofeminism: Towards Integrating the Concerns of Women, Poor people, 
and Nature into Development (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2011) at 165-166, 174, 189: “Science 
in general, and the discipline of economics in particular, together with their manifestations in technology, have 
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he called conviviality, which he described as the opposite of industrial productivity, or the state 
of a mere consumer: “I intend it to mean autonomous and creative intercourse among persons, 
and the intercourse of persons with their environment; and this in contrast with the conditioned 
response of persons to the demands made upon them by others, and by a man-made 
environment.”517  In other words, he aspired to a society in which individuals were creative and 
autonomous enough to use institutional tools rather than be controlled by them.518  In his view, 
industrial productivity would eventually lead to a crisis characterized by human beings’ loss of 
the capacity to shape their own needs.519  He was clearly an ardent proponent of human creative 
potential and argued that liberation from industrial productivity and institutions was possible in 
a post-industrial convivial society.520  Although his philosophy has been criticized as utopic,521 
his ideas about creativity, autonomy and the spiraling negative effects of medical intervention 
should definitely be kept in mind by laymen, policy-makers and scholars alike in the context of 
decision-making about surrogacy and assisted reproduction technologies.  
6.3.2 Technology and Autonomy 
I would like to come back to Christine Koggel’s theory about inequality and power and the idea 
of democracy as having a voice.522  In light of what I just mentioned above, it is my view that 
                                                            
dominated and exploited women, Others, and nature […] It can be difficult clearly to perceive dualism and its 
domination in science.  The major reason is that society teaches people that science is a universal and objective 
knowledge system.  Modern societies have based all their social, educational, political, economic, and cultural 
institutions on science.  Hence, people have no non-dualised, non-dominating, and alternative knowledge system 
to compare with […] The new economic and scientific order, which emerged in the 16th and 17th century Europe, 
would have lasting consequences for women and nature. Its chief ideology was to connect women and nature with 
the concept of passivity, while men related to activity and control in production and reproduction. Hence, women 
and nature was to submit themselves to the control of experimental method and technological advance […] Western 
perception of reality, including their meaning-structure, their language use, and their definition of identity are all 
framed in relations to dualism, hierarchy, domination, and control.  Socialization has deeply integrated these values 
into the modern way of thinking.” 
517 Ivan Illich, Tools for Conviviality (1973) at 11 
518 Ivan Illich, La convivialité (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1973) at 43: "Une société conviviale est une société qui 
donne à l'homme la possibilité d'exercer l'action la plus autonome et la plus créative, à l'aide d'outils moins 
contrôlables par autrui"; Yao Assogba, “Ivan Illich: Essai de synthèse” (1979) 26 Critères 217 at 9 [Assogba]: 
"Donc, dans une société conviviale, l'homme contrôle l'outil, c'est-à-dire que l'individu a le plein droit d'utiliser 
uniquement l'outil dont il a besoin, pour produire seulement ce dont il a besoin.  Bref, dans la société conviviale, 
l'individu utilise l'outil pour satisfaire ses besoins tant comme producteur que comme utilisateur." 
519 Assogba, supra note 518 at 12: "L'homme n'est plus définissable en tant que tel parce qu'il  n'est plus capable 
de modeler ses propres besoins par l'emploi plus ou moins compétent des outils que lui fournit sa culture.  Il y a 
donc une crise." 
520 Ibid at 11-15 
521 Armstrong, supra note 508 at 137; Assogba, supra note 518 at 22-23 
522 See above, part 6.2.2 
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where surrogacy and assisted reproduction are concerned, medical, biotechnical and commercial 
institutions have the power to make decisions that will affect us all, whether we choose to use 
assisted reproduction technologies or not.  Indeed, biotechnology does not contribute to assisted 
reproduction needs exclusively.  That is why I think Illich’s thought is so relevant here: we 
should use institutional tools, not be controlled by them.523  In my view, as individuals, our 
power to decide to which extent biotechnology will take over our lives as an institution should 
not be so limited and a line needs to be drawn somewhere.  The question is, who will draw it 
and how?  Decision-making about policies on assisted reproduction should account for these 
issues, if they are to be truly democratic decisions.  Moreover, I think that at an individual level, 
one’s increased mind/body awareness could make for more autonomous and creative 
individuals, less dependent on the medical system or any system for that matter.    
Andrew Feenberg’s524 philosophy about the nature of our Selves and its relationship with 
technology (technology-society relationship) is relatable to Illich’s view on humans’ 
dependency on institutions, as well as Koggel’s view about power and democracy.  He argues: 
“What human beings are and will become is decided in the shape of our tools no less than in the 
action of statesmen and political movements.  The design of technology is thus an ontological 
decision fraught with political consequences.  The exclusion of the vast majority from 
participation in this decision is profoundly undemocratic.”525 
While the progress of biotechnology and its complicity with medical intervention can cause the 
doubts and questions I have raised above, it is also a chance for those who want to use their 
voice to do so.  Creating one’s own power, or as I like to look at it, finding one’s inner power, 
                                                            
523 Assogba, supra note 518 at 9  
524 Andrew Feenberg holds the Canada Research Chair in the Philosophy of Technology in the School of 
Communication at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver. His main interests are philosophy of technology, 
continental philosophy, critique of technology and science and technology studies. 
525Andrew Feenberg, Transforming Technology, A Critical Theory Revisited (Oxford University Press, 2002) at  3; 
Haim Harari, “Technology might endanger democracy”, Edge online  <http://www.edge.org/response-
detail/23835>; UNESCO “Science and Democracy, a Social Perspective” World Conference on Science, Hungary 
1999, online <http://www.unesco.org/science/wcs/abstracts/II_10_democracy.htm>, (last consulted on July 26th, 
2015): “Given the complexity of scientific knowledge and its rapid pace of change, science implies a growing 
asymmetry of knowledge between the experts and the general public, and between scientists and policy makers. 
This asymmetry creates a variety of problems both in the relations between professional experts and their clients, 
and in setting policy making priorities with regard to major areas, such as health, environment, energy, economic 
growth, social development.” 
79 
 
can cause meaningful social change.  I think this is what Illich meant when he imagined 
convivial reconstruction.”526  So in my view, his vision was not entirely Utopic.527  
6.4 Relational Theory and FLE: Enriching Legal Discourse on Surrogacy and Assisted 
Reproduction in Québec Civil Law 
Relational Theory can be such an enriching contribution to legal discourse on surrogacy and 
assisted procreation in Québec and Canada, especially in counterbalancing FLE.  Halley and 
Rittich’s Against FLE is not feminist per se but it recognizes that family law has evolved into 
an isolated field that needs reconnecting and needs to transcend certain dichotomies.  Ultimately, 
both theories encourage ideological relationships (holistic perspectives in law), but relational 
theorists are, in my opinion, more sensitive to the complexity of human nature and the realities 
of human relationships and the law.  This is significant where reproduction is concerned: in my 
view, there is nothing more intimate than one’s body as well as the relationships involved in 
conceiving another human being.   
As feminists, Sherwin and Nedelsky recognize the value of autonomy for women but also see 
the inherent limits that come with the atomistic liberal view.  In seeking to transcend traditional 
feminist dichotomies, (public versus private, man versus woman, state versus individual), 
relational autonomy generally forces thinkers and policymakers across disciplines to adopt a 
more holistic analytical framework: “[B]y analyzing the network of relationships in which one 
is situated we obtain a more coherent and accurate understanding of what can enhance but also 
hinder an agent’s capacity to make choices and determine the course of his or her life than if we  
understand agents as best  able to know and pursue their own interests free from the interference 
of others.”528  It also forces institutions to be more cognizant of our complexity as human beings.   
At a more systemic level, and this is also primordial in my opinion, Sherwin’s public ethics and 
Koggel’s relational account on equality compel lawmakers and jurists to examine surrogacy and 
assisted reproduction in an even wider context, to see the relationships that exist or that may 
exist between the practice and other areas of human organization and behaviour, for example: 
                                                            
526 Illich, “Tools for Conviviality,” supra note 517 at 11 
527 Ibid at 14: “A modern society bounded for convivial living, could generate a new flowering of surprises far 
beyond anyone’s imagination and hope.  I am not proposing a Utopia, but a procedure that provides each 
community with the choice of its unique social arrangements.” 
528 Koggel, supra note 495 at 71 
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the ever increasing role of technology in human behaviour and its relationship with the global 
economy, nature (the environment) and politics.   
7. Relationships in Surrogacy and Assisted Reproduction in Québec and Canada 
Surrogates are usually involved in at least two types of relationships: one is with intended 
parents, the other, with medical professionals and related institutions, such as the biotech and 
pharmaceutical industries.  Legal scholarship and jurisprudence in Québec, especially family 
law, has not looked at women’s relationship with the health care system, nor the lack of power 
individuals face in reproductive decision-making within the ARTs context, which in my view, 
are relevant considerations.  Professor Erin Nelson, who has published numerous articles in the 
area of health care, ethics and the law, 529 stresses the fact that “reproductive autonomy means 
different things to women and to men” and that women experience reproductive technologies 
differently than men do.530   
She suggests a woman-centered policy model which places women’s bodily integrity at the core 
of reproductive discourse and highlights the need to incorporate equality and social justice 
concerns into the policy’s conception of reproductive autonomy.531  Indeed, like the Relational 
Theorists, Professor Nelson exposes liberal theory’s “radically individualized agents”532 as 
antithetical to substantive equality and admits that the focus on autonomy tends to marginalize 
other important values.533  Nelson advocates a contextualized view of autonomy within liberal 
theory.534  In other words, policy makers should develop a contextualized conception of 
autonomy, one that completes the atomistic and abstract autonomy devised by traditional 
liberalism.  According to her, the chooser is not isolated from the context within which he/she 
makes his/her decision.535  As such, in her view, negative liberty (or choices without state 
interference) is not enough.  Similarly to Roxanne Mykitiuk, she notes the fact that, in healthcare 
settings, respecting autonomy is equated with obtaining informed consent, that it has come to 
mean giving the individual several health care choices and is essentially equated with a 
                                                            
529 About Erin Nelson see supra, note 48; See parts 1.2.2, 1.2.3 & 2, above for Nelson’s view on the regulation of 
assisted reproduction in Canada 
530 Nelson, supra note 5 at 66 
531 Ibid at 57,64, 67-69 
532 Ibid at 22 
533 Ibid at 21 
534 Ibid at 30 
535 Nelson, supra note 5 at 48 
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consumer choice: there has been a shift, especially in the USA, from a medical model to a 
business model in healthcare.536  She posits that reproductive autonomy requires looking beyond 
informed consent: it directs us explicitly to consider the social, institutional and policy contexts 
that play a role in shaping reproductive decisions.537   
Nelson’s framework remains a practical, non-essentialist, non-monolithic approach similar to 
relational ones:  while recognizing that women bear the costs of reproduction,538 her ambition 
is not determine whether ARTs are fundamentally right or wrong for women in general.539  
Instead, she recognizes that women’s autonomy is not absolute or atomistic, does not exist in a 
vacuum, nor is the exercise of such autonomy a purely independent act, cast from the reality of 
interrelatedness, society and its components: “Women make reproductive decisions within a 
network of relationships […] [their] ability to be autonomous in reproductive decision making 
depends on their level of reproductive health, as well as the accessibility of reproductive health 
services and the structure of the health care system.”540  In the following section, I briefly 
examine the surrogacy and assisted reproduction from a contextual and relational point of view: 
I take a look at the values which underlie the Canadian health care system as well as the 
intersecting realities of egg donors, surrogates and the infertile within the Canadian and Québec 
health care context. 
7.1 The Canadian Health Care System  
The health system is a well-established structure in social relations, it plays a strategic social 
and economic role in society and its activities have ramifications beyond the health sector as 
such.  The health care system comprises three distinct features: social, economic and 
political.541 [It] is not an autonomous structure: it is a social policy whose evolution is closely 
linked to economic and social development.  Therefore, to locate a national system of health 
compared to other national systems, one must understand the principles of government 
intervention associated with it.542 
                                                            
536 Ibid at 20, 21; Mykitiuk, supra note 92 
537 Ibid at 50 
538 Ibid at 57, 66, 68 
539 Ibid at 69 
540 Ibid at 56, 59   
541 Nicole F. Bernier, L’environnement politique de la santé, Théorie et pratique (Québec: Les Presses de 
l’Université de Laval, 2011).at 40-41 [Bernier]: “ Le Health-Care State tient compte du fait que le système de santé 
est une structure bien ancrée dans les rapports sociaux, qu’il joue un rôle social et économique stratégique dans la 
société, et que ses activités ont des ramifications bien au-delà du secteur de la santé en tant que tel.” 
542 Ibid at 57: “Le système de santé n’est pas une structure autonome: c’est une politique sociale dont l’évolution 
est associée étroitement au développement économique et social.  De ce fait, pour situer un système national de 
santé par rapport à d’autres systèmes nationaux, il faut connaitre les principes d’intervention gouvernementale qui 
lui sont associés.” 
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The principles underlying the Canadian Welfare State are based on the market ethos of 
individualism and self-sufficiency, similar to other Anglo-Saxon models543 like Australia, New-
Zealand, Great-Britain and the USA.544  The provinces have jurisdiction over health care 
administration, although not exclusively545.  Indeed, the Federal government has the power to 
fund provincial health care measures, incumbent upon the respect, by the given province, of the 
principles in the Canada Health Act546 (CHA) which are: public administration (i.e. insurance 
system for medically necessary care), universality (i.e. that all insured residents should hold the 
right to the same coverage in a given province), comprehensiveness (i.e. that all “medically 
necessary”547 acts should be covered by the province’s program), portability (i.e. coverage 
across provinces) and accessibility (i.e. not stopping people with limited means from using 
Medicare).548   
As a liberal structure, alongside providing basic public funding in particular instances, for those 
who are most vulnerable,549 Canada promotes the development of parallel and complimentary 
                                                            
543 Ibid at 58 
544 Ibid at 60 
545 Marchildon, Gregory P. & al., Les études de la Commission Romanow, vol 3: La gouvernance du système de 
santé canadien (Ottawa: Les Presses de l'Université d'Ottawa, 2004) at 33; Bernier, supra note 541 at 64, 66 
546 R.S.C., 1985, c. C-6 [CHA]; Colleen M. Flood, “Litigating Health Rights in Canada, A White Knight for 
Equity?”, in Flood, Colleen M. & Aeyal Gross, The Right to Health Care at the Public/Private Divide: A Global 
Comparative Study (Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 84 [Flood]: "The CHA has an in-built mechanism for 
enforcing the principle of accessibility, mandating dollar-for-dollar withholding of federal funding to provinces 
that allow extra billing or user fees.  For every dollar patients or private insurers are billed for medically necessary 
care, the federal government must withold a dollar from the transfer payment to the relevant province […] Drafted 
to protect a system of public health care originating in the 1960s, the CHA focuses entirely on health care delivered 
by physicians and in hospitals." 
547 Flood, supra note 546 at 79; Cathy Charles, & al. “Medical Necessity in Canadian Health Policy: Four Meanings 
and . . . a Funeral?” (1997) 75: 3 Milbank Q 365; “Medically Necessary, What is it and who decides?” (July 2002) 
Commission on the Future of Healthcare in Canada, online: 
<http://www.cfhifcass.ca/Libraries/Romonow_Commission_ENGLISH/Discussion_Paper_Medically_necessary
_What_is_and_who_decides.sflb.ashx>, last viewed on August 20th, 2015.  (“Medically necessary” is a concept 
found in the Canada Health Act but the CHA does not provide a precise legal definition, making its meaning rather 
complex and dynamic.) 
548 Bernier, supra note 541 at 66-67; Flood, supra note 546 at 84 
549 Bernier, supra note 541 at 59: Les programmes publics Canadiens et Québecois “ont été conçus non pas pour 
permettre aux individus de maintenir leur niveau de vie en cas de difficulté temporaires mais, plus modestement, 
pour leur fournir un soutien de base, une aide de dernier recours, lorsqu’ils se trouvent sans ressources.  Autrement 
dit, les programme publics canalisent les ressources pour venir en aide aux personnes déjà vulnérables, mais ne 
tentent pas de prévenir leur misère. ” 
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private systems.550  For example, since the Supreme Court ruling in Chaoulli,551 in 2005, dual 
health insurance coverage has become a possibility in Québec.552  After the Supreme Court’s 
decision, the province enacted legislation allowing patients to contract for insurance for elective 
knee, hip, and cataract surgery performed outside the public system (i.e. private specialized 
medical centers known as SMCs and specialized affiliated medical centers known as 
SMCAs).553  Ever since, many more doctors have opted out of the public system to work in 
SMCs.554  However, it appears that “the true state of commercial privatization of Québec’s 
healthcare system remains largely unknown.”555  Although generally speaking, Canadian 
provinces are said to take a liberal approach to health policy, Québec distinguishes itself in that 
its policies are closer to its European counterparts than to the USA.556  Considering the dynamic 
complexity of the health-care state’s sociological, economic and political objectives, it has been 
argued that it is not realistic to expect an optimal respect of the principles promoted by the 
CHA.557  Moreover, it is not clear what constitutes “medical necessity” according to the CHA 
in Canada: the term is used in the CHA but is not defined.558  For a medical act to fall under 
public coverage in Québec, it must be a medically necessary one.  When it is not, it “is largely 
left to the free market to determine who has access, leading to serious inequalities in access and 
quality of care […] these limits […] are compounded by disparities in the regulation of care 
across the private/public divide.  For reasons that are unclear, provincial regulators have mostly 
focused their attention on guarding patient safety within the realm of publicly financed care, 
making comparatively little effort to regulate privately financed care.”559 With the entering into 
                                                            
550 Ibid at 60 
551 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 SCR 791, 2005 SCC 35 
552 Bernier, supra note 541 at 70; Howard A., Palley,  Marie-Pascale Pomey & Owen B. Adams, The Political and 
Economic Sustainability of Health Care in Canada, Private-Sector Involvement in the Federal Provincial Health 
Care System (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2012) at 77-86 [Palley& al.] 
553 Palley &al., supra note 552 at 86 
554 Ibid at 87 
555 Ibid  
556 Bernier, supra note 541 at 62, 63 
557 Ibid at 50 
558 Supra, note 547; CHA, supra note 546 at s 2: “hospital services means any of the following services provided 
to in-patients or out-patients at a hospital, if the services are medically necessary for the purpose of 
maintaining health, preventing disease or diagnosing or treating an injury, illness or disability, namely [...]” [my 
emphasis] 
559 Flood, supra note 546 at 80-81 
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force of Bill 20, infertility treatments enter a grey zone in Québec, as they will no longer be fully 
covered by Medicare, except for artificial insemination and fertility preservation.560 
 
7.2 Québec’s Health Care Coverage and Assisted Reproduction Technologies 
 
It has been argued that the introduction of universal coverage for ARTs treatments in Québec in 
2010 was merely a political decision which essentially sought to create a public market for 
private clinics.561  Indeed, when universal coverage for infertility treatment was introduced in 
Québec, the decision was criticized by professional orders (gynaecologists & obstetricians) who 
argued that women’s health would be jeopardized because of the lack of resources and the risk 
of multiple pregnancies.562  The decision was also criticized for creating an additional burden 
on a health care system which already had a hard time meeting its basic objectives563.   
In November 2014, the Québec Minister of Health and Social Services presented Bill 20, which 
addresses access to health care, and proposes changes in the area of ARTs.564  Besides obtaining 
a lot of media coverage for stirring controversy among family doctors and specialists regarding 
its quota system and fines which were set to increase access to health care,565 the bill was also 
                                                            
560 See part 2, above 
561 Bernier, supra note 541 at 51 
562 "Procréation assistée gratuite, un choix irréfléchi", Le Soleil (14 July 2010), online: <http://www.lapresse.ca/le-
soleil>; Bernier, supra note 541 at 49 
563 Ibid 
564 Bill 20, supra, note 125; See above, part 2 for more about the bill 
565 "Projet de loi 20: la grogne s'installe chez les médecins", La Presse (26 March 2015), online: 
<http://www.lapresse.ca>; “Quebec won't invoke closure on Bill 20 before National Assembly breaks for summer”, 
The Montreal Gazette (11 June 2015), online: http://montrealgazette.com/news/quebec-wont-invoke-closure-on-
bill-20-before-national-assembly-breaks-for-summer  
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been criticized by FEMEN566 and pro-choice advocates567 who said it would limit access to 
abortion for women.  The Health Minister, Gaétan Barrette denied the latter claims.568   
In February 2016, after the passing and enactment of Bill 20, the Conseil du statut de la femme 
(the Council)569 made a public statement and issued its opinion on the practice of surrogacy in 
Québec.570  Despite being opposed to surrogacy for several years571, the Council opined that, 
                                                            
566 “My uterus, my priority: Topless protester interrupts Quebec minister’s press conference”, The National Post 
(30 April 2015), online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/my-uterus-my-priority-
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567 “After the government trashed a report that Quebec would limit access to abortion, Anne-Marie Messier, 
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direct access to contraceptive services and abortion […] Bill 20 would impose a patient load on doctors rising up 
to 1,512 per year in some cases. If they fall short of their goal, doctors’ paycheque could be reduced up to 30 per 
cent.  A draft of the bill’s regulations counts some activities toward the quota, including abortions.  One abortion 
equals one patient, for a maximum of 504.  In other words, if a doctor is required to take on 1,512 patients and 
performs 200 abortions, they would have to be responsible for 1,312 patients.  Messier told Le Devoir that this 
wasn’t enough to carry out the 25,000 abortions performed in Quebec each year on average.” 
568 Geoffrey Vandeville, “Barrette denies Bill 20 will threaten women's access to abortion” The Montreal Gazette 
(March 26th, 2015), online: <http://montrealgazette.com/news/quebec/barrette-denies-bill-20-will-threaten-
womens-access-to-abortion>  
569 The Conseil du statut de la femme online at https://www.csf.gouv.qc.ca/ [the Council]: “The Council on the 
Status of Women is a government agency which has been active since 1973.  With the objective of achieving 
equality between women and men, it has the dual task of advising the Minister and the Government of Quebec on 
any subject related to equality and respect for the rights and status of women and to provide relevant information 
to women and the public”[my translation].  
570 Some of the views expressed by the Council, namely, in its press release, are similar to the views expressed in 
the Roy Report, supra note 176 (see above, part 5.4 for more on the Roy Report); “Communiqué – Le Conseil du 
statut de la femme estime qu’il faut protéger les mères porteuses et les enfants”, (February 17 2016), online: 
<https://www.csf.gouv.qc.ca/article/2016/02/17/communique-le-conseil-du-statut-de-la-femme-estime-quil-faut-
proteger-les-meres-porteuses-et-les-enfants/ >[Communiqué CSF 2016]: “Based on its research, the Council 
believes that reform is needed.  A framework should be provided for women who wish to bear a child for another 
person and have access to assisted reproduction treatments, as well as for the intended parents.  The Council wants 
the intended parents to bear the financial responsibility of the surrogate mother and the child in case of abandonment 
of the project, which is currently not provided for in Québec law.  A surrogate mother should be able to remain the 
legal mother of the child if she wants and this right should not be constrained by the terms of a contract.  The 
Council also recommends that intended parents be recognized as the legal parents of the child in cases where the 
surrogate voluntarily surrenders their child” [my translation]. 
571 Communiqué CSF 2016, supra note 570: “In the spring 2014, following criticism surrounding the coverage by 
the province of fertility treatments received by surrogate mothers, the government gave the Council a mandate to 
study the issue.  Throughout its history, the Council has repeatedly addressed this topic at a time when knowledge 
of the phenomenon was very limited and the Quebec courts had not yet had to rule on specific cases.  The findings 
in recent studies on the subject worldwide, as well as various judgments of the courts of Quebec, led the Council 
to update its thinking” [my translation]. 
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although it does not encourage surrogacy practice and strongly disregards commercial 
surrogacy, a legal framework should be put in place in order to protect women and children 
involved, because the practice constitutes a reality in our society today572.  It also issued fifteen 
recommendations573.  The Council recognized certain issues that are involved when being a 
surrogate that is subjected to assisted reproduction techniques:  it opined that surrogates are not 
sufficiently informed that they have the right to control the treatments which are administered 
on their pregnant body:  
All pregnant women have some rights, whether they bear a child for another person or not.  
Thus, a surrogate mother could always refuse medical treatment (art. 11 C.C.Q.) and any 
medical intervention aimed at the foetus she is carrying.  However, surrogates do not 
necessarily know their rights.  They could therefore sometimes comply with conditions that 
they have no obligation to comply with.  According to the Council, it is necessary for 
surrogate mothers to be informed of their fundamental rights regarding their bodies, so that at 
all times, they retain their decision-making autonomy574.  
It also highlighted the fact that Bill 20 did nothing to address surrogate issues in the APA575 as 
well as the fact that, based on their own internal guidelines, certain fertility clinics in Québec 
offer assisted reproduction to surrogates, whereas others do not576.  Fortunately, the Council’s 
view on consent is shaped by concerns for ethics and equality and is not limited to a purely 
contractual matter of “choice”, in a strict civil law sense.  Instead, it views consent as a 
continuum, as a fundamental principle that is ongoing and must be ensured to the surrogate 
throughout her process: 
That said, the presence of a ‘choice’, although it may appear rational in the circumstances, 
does not guarantee the ethics of practice […] Indeed, it is important to also consider other 
important factors, including potential violations of surrogates’ physical and psychological 
integrity.  To determine whether a practice meets certain ethical standards, our thinking must 
not therefore be limited to considering the presence of a choice but also extend to the content 
of that choice (what did  the surrogate mother agree to ).  In other words, the Council considers 
that the presence of free and informed consent is essential, but not sufficient, for the practice 
                                                            
572 The Council’s Advisory 2016, supra, note 123. 
573 Ibid, at 135-143 for a detailed account of the fifteen recommendations, or see supra, note 567 for a summary; 
Essentially, the Council recommends that: the Québec government should actively pressure the Federal government 
to prevent and punish commercial surrogacy nationally, as well as prevent any form of its practice by Canadian 
nationals abroad, i.e. that Canada should refrain from encouraging reproductive tourism; that the surrogate’s legal 
right to be the child’s mother should be protected in the province; that research should be conducted on surrogates; 
that intended parents should be held financially responsible toward the child and the surrogate, should they abandon 
the project; that, besides parentage issues, legal reform on parental projects involving surrogates should focus on 
consent as an issue, and ensure that surrogates are properly informed  about their rights before, during and after 
their pregnancy. 
574 The Council’s Advisory 2016, supra note 123 at 86-87 [my translation]   
575 See below, the last paragraph of this section 
576 The Council’s Advisory 2016, supra note 123 at 108-109  
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to be ethically acceptable… the Council does not conceive of autonomy just as initial 
consent, but as a fundamental principle that must be observed through the entire process.577 
 
The Council did not, however, delve into details about the power dynamics between the biotech 
industry, the medical field and protecting patients’ best interests.  The Council made its 
recommendations about assisted reproduction prior to the enactment of Bill 20 in a brief for the 
National Assembly’s special hearings held in February and March 2015.578  It highlighted the 
distinct parts of the bill: the first being access to health services and the second being assisted 
reproduction, stating that both are of great concern to the Council because of their major impact 
on the lives of Québec women.579  In that brief, the Council outlined the importance of frontline 
medical services for women in the province, as they are generally the caregiver in the family, 
they generally have a longer life span, they use health services more frequently and have specific 
reproductive needs.580  Moreover, the Council argued that in the current system, too much 
emphasis is placed on practising in hospital environments, whereas home-based health care 
should be encouraged among physicians.581  Where ARTs are concerned, the Council generally 
agreed with what was initially tabled in Bill 20, with certain exceptions:  (1) the council 
suggested the age limit of 42 years for IVF should only apply in the public setting and (2) that 
deciding which fertility treatment sequence is most appropriate should be left to the doctors to 
decide on a case by base basis.582  The Council also recommended the following: (1) that doctors 
should be obliged to record their data regarding all ART procedures (not only IVF)583 and that 
they should produce a yearly statement, (2) that a national evaluation should be conducted every 
three years,584 (3) that more control should be placed in instances where ART practices occur 
outside procreation centers since the lack of expertise seems to be increasing the occurrence of 
                                                            
577 Ibid at 36 [my translation] 
578 Briefs tabled under the order to the committee ‘Special consultations and public hearings on Bill 20’ online: 
<http://www.assnat.qc.ca/en/travaux-parlementaires/commissions/CSSS/mandats/Mandat-29201/memoires-
deposes.html> (the site was last visited on August 11th, 2015) 
579 Québec, Conseil du statut de la femme, Mémoire sur le projet de loi n° 20, Loi édictant la Loi favorisant l’accès 
aux services de médecine de famille et de médecine spécialisée et modifiant diverses dispositions législatives en 
matière de procréation assistée (February 2015) online:  < https://www.csf.gouv.qc.ca/wp-
content/uploads/memoire_projet_loi20.pdf > [The Council’s Memoir 2015]. 
580 Ibid at 11 
581 The Council’s Memoir 2015, supra note 579 at 12 
582 Ibid at 26: Although the Council recognizes that “IVF is generally used when less invasive treatments have not 
worked.  This is a guideline that makes sense to meet in the vast majority of cases”. 
583 Ibid at 31 
584 Ibid at 27 
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ovarian hyper stimulation (OHS) cases as well as multiple births,585 (4) that the province should 
invest in infertility prevention586 and (5) that public coverage for IVF should available for 
segments of the population with lower income.587  
Although the Minister made certain amendments and repealed the section of the bill which 
limited access to in vitro fertilization for women to 42 years of age, he maintained the section 
which limits public coverage to artificial insemination and fertility preservation.588  Therefore, 
the enactment of Bill 20 removed public health insurance coverage for in vitro fertilization.  
Instead, patients will be eligible to receive a tax credit.589  Patients will still be able to choose 
between a private or public clinic, but in both cases they will have to pay for non-covered 
services.590  The bill does not mention surrogates.  According to the Council, when he was asked 
about the issue during a press conference on November 28th 2014, the Health Minister Barette 
said: “The issue of surrogacy is not yet resolved […] surrogates currently have access to 
programs under the same conditions [than others] […] it is the fertility of the mother [carrier] 
that must be demonstrated, it is her income that is considered in the calculation of the refundable 
tax credit.591” 
 
7.3 Intersecting Medical “Conditions”: Egg Donors and Surrogates 
 
                                                            
585 Ibid at 28-29: Pursuant to the APR in Québec, ovarian stimulation and artificial insemination can be conducted 
in any medical facility (i.e it does not need to be a procreation center as defined by the law at section 11 APA).  Bill 
20 has not changed this situation, see APA, supra note 118, s 11; APR, supra note 119, s 16. 
586 Ibid at 29 
587 Ibid at 31 
588 Quebec National Assembly, “Committee Stage”, Amendments Adopted online: 
<http://www.assnat.qc.ca/en/travaux-parlementaires/projets-loi/projet-loi-20-41-1.html> (last viewed on August 
10th, 2015); “Quebec health care law amendments broaden access to IVF”, CTV News Montreal (26 May 2015), 
online: <http://montreal.ctvnews.ca/quebec-health-care-law-amendments-broaden-access-to-ivf-1.2391544>  
[CTV News May 2015] 
589 The Council’s Advisory 2016, supra note 123 at 108; CTV News May 2015, supra note 588; “New Quebec 
health bill to restrict IVF treatments, impose quotas for family doctors” CBC News (28 November 2015),  online:  
<http://www.cbc.ca/m/touch/canada/montreal/story/1.2853715> . 
590 “Sherbrooke et Québec n’auront pas leurs cliniques de FIV”, Le Devoir (11 December 2014), online: 
<http://www.ledevoir.com/societe/sante/426394/procreation-assistee-sherbrooke-et-quebec-n-auront-pas-leurs-
cliniques-de-fiv> 
591 The Council’s Advisory 2016, supra note 123 at 108-109 [my translation]: “However, the minister specified 
that the situation could change depending on the findings of the Roy Report on family law, which was not yet 
published at the time of his declaration. The Council also considers that IVF treatments received by surrogates 
should not be covered by the tax credit, since this could be interpreted as a form of encouragement to the MPA by 
the Quebec government” [my translation] 
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Before making general claims about women’s autonomy regarding their bodies, it is important 
to examine the health care context in which women are actually making decisions about their 
reproduction.  The AHRA explicitly recognizes that women’s bodies are uniquely affected by 
ARTs technology and that their well-being must be ensured.592  Despite this principled 
statement, there is no comprehensive health-related policy regarding ARTs in Canada, as the 
matter has been relegated to provincial authorities since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
2010.593  As I mentioned previously,594 Québec has developed a regulatory framework for 
ARTs,595 while the rest of Canadian provinces are essentially relying on medical practice 
guidelines issued by associations.  In Alberta, for example, the College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of Alberta issued a Standard & Guideline on IVF in 2011.596  Although these standards 
are enforceable under provincial legislation,597 I would like to point out that they are only 
relevant to IVF procedures, leaving other ARTs procedures out.  
Where egg donation is concerned, it is important to note that women generally go through a 
physically demanding process, the realities of which, at the time of consenting to the procedure, 
are often ignored.598  Health problems may arise several years after the egg retrieval, but these 
are usually not accounted for, especially since doctors generally do not follow up with the 
donors, except in severe cases like OHSS (ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome).599  In Québec, 
for example, where ARTs policy is the most comprehensive in Canada, assisted procreation 
                                                            
592 AHRA, supra note 2, s 2 
593 Reference Re AHRA, supra note 1; See above, part 1 
594 See part 1, above 
595 Informed consent is regulated at ss 19- 20 of the APR, supra note 119 
596“In Vitro Fertilization Standards and Guidelines” ( 2011) online: 
<http://www.cpsa.ab.ca/Libraries/Pro_QofC_Non-Hospital/NHSF_IVF_Standards_-_December_2011.pdf> 
597 “Standards of Practice: Standards of professional behaviour and ethical conduct expected of all physicians 
registered in Alberta” College of Physicians and Surgeons of Alberta, online: 
<http://www.cpsa.ab.ca/Resources/StandardsPractice.aspx>: “The CPSA Standards of Practice, along with the 
CPSA Code of Conduct and the Code of Ethics, outline the minimum standards of professional behaviour and 
ethical conduct expected of all physicians registered in Alberta.  Specific standards are supplemented with Advice 
to the Profession, which supports physicians in implementing the standards in their practice.  Standards of practice 
are enforceable under the Health Professions Act and are referenced in complaints resolution and discipline 
hearings.  Any proposed new or amended standards are subject to a formal consultation process.” 
598Alison Motluk, “Your eggs, my uterus, shared motherhood,” The Globe and Mail (April 1 2008), online: 
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/parenting/your-eggs-my-uterus-shared-motherhood/article597091/>; 
Alison Motluk, “Is egg donation dangerous?” “Is egg donation dangerous?”, Maisonneuve (21 January 2013), 
online:< http://maisonneuve.org/article/2013/01/21/egg-donation-dangerous>  [Motluk, Egg donation 
dangerous?];  Claire Burns, “We are egg donors,” Impact Ethics Online Forum (11 July 2013), online: 
<https://impactethics.ca/2013/07/11/we-are-egg-donors/ > [Burns] 
599Motluk, “Egg donation dangerous?”, supra note 598 
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centers must file a report to the Minister of Health on a yearly basis, however, the Regulation 
respecting clinical activities related to assisted procreation600 does not explicitly require 
reporting back on fertility treatment side-effects.601  Moreover, clinics reporting to the Canadian 
Fertility and Andrology Society (CFAS) do so on a voluntary basis.  According to investigative 
journalist Alison Motluk, the Canadian Assisted Reproductive Technologies Registry 
(CARTR), a database managed by the CFAS, is not complete when it comes to reporting long-
term effects on patients.602  Moreover, the CFAS has refused to make clinic success rates 
public.603   
One egg donor expresses her experience as follows: “To me, the lack of care for the women 
who provide the eggs for someone else’s fertility treatment is the single most frightening aspect 
of the fertility industry.  The second is that, for the most part, the prospective egg providers are 
not made aware of the fact that there is no after-care.  If more women egg providers would speak 
up, “we are people, not merely vendors”, then these processes would have to change to account 
for our health considerations.”604  Motluk poses an important question: if no one in Canada is 
tracking the health of egg donors, then what are doctors telling women about the risks of the 
practice?605  Indeed, many questions remain unanswered for these women, for example, whether 
fertility is affected by egg retrieval and whether there is an increased risk in cancer or premature 
                                                            
600 APR, supra note 119, s 27 
601 Ibid: “The annual report sent to the Minister by a centre for assisted procreation must contain and be 
accompanied, where applicable, by the following information and documents:(1)the name of the centre;(2)the state 
of the accreditation;(3)the number of patients, the type and number of treatments administered;(4)the distribution 
of treatments for each person and each of the centre's clinical activities;(5)the number of multiple pregnancies and 
their type, in particular twins and triplets;(6)detail about the type, state and quantity of biological material 
transferred to a physician or another centre, including the name of the physician or centre, the person in charge and 
the purpose for which the material was transferred; and(7)the number of persons per sector of activity.” 
602 Motluk, “Egg donation dangerous?”, supra note 598: “There are many reasons why CARTR data on donor-
adverse events may not be complete.  For one thing, it’s not common practice for fertility doctors to formally follow 
up with donors after a procedure, unless the women are specifically at risk of OHSS. Several physicians told me 
that they simply invite donors to get in touch if there’s a problem. Some women do so, but others may have already 
left town, or they’re told by brokers not to contact doctors directly. Health concerns can also turn up weeks, months 
or even years after the donation. By that point, it’s not clear if they’re related, so some donors don’t mention these 
issues to their fertility doctors. Without deliberate follow-up, doctors may not be aware of what goes wrong after 
the fact.”  
603 Tom Blackwell, “The fertility clinic guessing game: Canadians have no way to find out success rates of pricey 
IVF treatments”, The National Post (22 June 2014), online: http://news.nationalpost.com/health/the-fertility-clinic-
guessing-game-canadians-have-no-way-to-find-out-success-rates-of-pricey-ivf-treatments>  [Blackwell, “The 
Guessing Game”] 
604 Burns, supra note 598 
605 Motluk, “Is egg donation dangerous?” supra note 598 
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menopause that comes with undergoing these procedures.606  Moreover, Lupron, a drug which 
is active on the Canadian market607 and which has been approved for treatment of prostate 
cancer and endometriosis,608 is being used to suppress ovulation during multiple egg extraction 
procedures, despite its effects being unknown:  is this true informed consent for women?609   
It has also been pointed out that doctors performing ART procedures are in a conflict of interest, 
as they must serve opposing needs: on the one hand, manage the health risks of the egg donor 
(too many eggs retrieved can cause severe complications like OHSS), and on the other, provide 
for the infertile patient who needs as many eggs as possible to have a child.610 Where surrogates 
are concerned, the picture is not rosier: 
The rates of pregnancy-induced high blood pressure, pre-eclampsia (hypertension with 
protein in the urine), gestational diabetes and hysterectomies are all several times higher for 
women carrying twins or more.  And multiple pregnancies are made much more likely by 
IVF.  Evidence even suggests that pregnancy involving donated eggs — almost always the 
case with contract surrogacy – is more likely to trigger hypertension or post-partum 
hemorrhage.  Sally Rhoads-Heinrich, a consultant who helps bring together surrogates and 
intended parents, said she has seen an increase in serious complications among her mothers 
lately, possibly because their average age is getting older as demand outstrips the supply of 
younger women.  One suffered a cardiac arrest while giving birth in Saskatchewan in 2013, 
another developed a blood clot in her lungs and two others lost their wombs; all are unable to 
have more children, said the owner of Surrogacy in Canada Online.611 
 
Nancy, an Ontarian mother of five, expressed that although she supports the practice of 
surrogacy, she felt neglected and used in the process: “Did I feel like an employee?  Damn 
straight I did, like a piece of trash.  They used me and just threw me away like I was nothing.”612  
She said women are not sufficiently informed about the medical risks of being a surrogate.  In 
her case, carrying triplets for a couple led her into a medically induced coma and resulted in the 
                                                            
606 Ibid; “Can egg donation cause cancer?” (13 November 2015) (blog) online: We Are Egg Donors 
<http://weareeggdonors.com/category/advocacy-tips/> 
607 Research I conducted on the “Drug Product Database”, Health Canada online: < http://webprod5.hc-
sc.gc.ca/dpd-bdpp/dispatch-repartition.do?lang=eng>  (last viewed in august 2015) 
608 “Product Monograph”, Health Canada online: <http://webprod5.hc-sc.gc.ca/dpd-
bdpp/info.do?code=63321&lang=eng> 
609Judy Norsigian, “Egg donation dangers”, online at: 
<http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/ViewPage.aspx?pageId=103>  
610 Motluk, “Is Egg donation dangerous?” supra note 598 
611 Tom Blackwell, “This Ontario surrogate wanted to help another woman have a child, but the decision nearly 
killed her”, The National Post (October 15 2015), online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/health/this-ontario-
surrogate-wanted-to-help-another-mom-have-kids-it-was-a-decision-that-nearly-killed-her>[Blackwell, “Ontario 
Surrogate”] 
612 Tom Blackwell, “Ontario Surrogate,” supra note 611 
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retrieval of her uterus and early menopause: “Once you become a surrogate and something goes 
wrong, there’s no support, there’s no support for you whatsoever.”613 
There is generally a “need for much broader and transparent patient education procedures, 
particularly as they relate to the higher rates of risky twin and triplet births resulting from 
multiple embryo transfers or the use of ovarian induction and stimulation with IUI.”614   Dr. 
Renate Klein, a professor, activist and researcher in the areas of international feminism, 
reproductive medicine and feminist ethics, insightfully points out the irony of seeking surrogacy 
as a remedy to infertility: “infertility can be very sad but we need to also understand that many 
women are pushed into surrogacy because of IVF failures (more income for IVF clinics).”615  
Indeed, in the USA, the Advanced Fertility Center of Chicago reported that embryo transfers 
have been successful in only about 25% of cases, the success rate varies depending on the 
mother’s age.616  It has also reported that IVF failure is related to egg quality.  In other words, 
when a women’s IVF procedure does not work, using her embryo in a surrogate will most likely 
not work either because it is the quality of the eggs that determines how well the embryo “sticks” 
to the uterus.  The uterus itself is not the main problem.617  It should be noted that numbers vary 
across clinics in Canada, however, unlike in the USA, women do not have access to an 
independent source to consult individual clinic success rates (as I mentioned above, the CFAS 
does not disclose individual-clinic results).618  
                                                            
613 Ibid 
614 Miriam Zoll,“ART Ethics and Health Risks in the Unregulated Market” Impact Ethics Online Forum (25 April 
2014) online: <https://impactethics.ca/2014/04/25/art-ethics-and-health-risks-in-the-unregulated-market/>; 
Jennifer Damelio & Kelly Sorensen, “Enhancing Autonomy in Paid Surrogacy” (2008) 22:5 Bioethics 269. 
at 271; The Council’s Memoir 2015, supra note 579 at 28-29. 
615 Renate Klein, “Baby Gammy has shown the need for debate on surrogacy”, The Age (20 August 2014), online:   
<http://www.theage.com.au/comment/baby-gammy-has-shown-the-need-for-debate-on-surrogacy-20140819-
105pfx.html> 
616 “Implantation Failure”, Advanced Fertility Center of Chicago online:  
<http://www.advancedfertility.com/ivf-implantation-failure.htm> 
617 Ibid: “When IVF does not work after numerous attempts - switching the uterus is not likely to result in success.  
However, the egg donation experience teaches us that switching to eggs from a young egg donor would be very 
likely to be successful. This tells us that the problem is not the uterus but is the egg quality.  Therefore, it works 
when we switch to different eggs from a young woman […]  This is not to say that the sperm and the uterus are not 
sometimes contributing factors in the IVF success equation.  However, the sperm and the uterus are relatively minor 
factors as compared to the major factor of egg quality.”  
618 Blackwell, “The guessing game”, supra note 603 
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Given the above and taking into considerations the experiences egg donors and surrogates have 
lived, I question to which extent physician guidelines and a privately held database like CATR 
(which is held by a group whose aim is to ensure fertility experts’ interests) constitute sufficient 
measures to ensure women’s long-term reproductive health care interests in Canada.  In the 
province of Québec, the statute regulating ARTs619 does not account for surrogate and egg donor 
issues per se, nor does it maintain a long-term vision for the protection of women’s health in 
practice:  just like in the case of egg donors, nothing in the statute or its associated regulations 
obliges centres for assisted procreation to track and collect data on long-term health impacts of 
fertility treatments on surrogates.620   
In my view, debate on surrogacy in Québec is still too narrow.  Seemingly, civil law has been 
evolving separately from the framework on artificial reproduction in the province.  All in all, 
legal thought in Québec may be responding too slowly to the practical reality of surrogacy and 
ARTs: egg donors and surrogates are consenting to fertility treatments in a fragmented policy 
context which lacks accountability and oversight.  Despite the fact that both the APA621 and the 
AHRA stipulate that Canada holds women’s health as a priority,622 much is left to be done on 
this front.623  Indeed, it has come to the attention of the Québec Health and Welfare 
Commissioner that “there is an urgent to need to introduce monitoring and governance 
                                                            
619 APA, supra note 118 
620 Québec Summary Advisory Report 2014, supra note 122 at 35, 40: “Ongoing monitoring of long-term clinical 
and psychosocial outcomes is required because of a number of factors, including the state of knowledge on the 
risks associated with assisted reproduction, the potential for prenatal risk factors having very long-term impacts, 
and the rapid changes in ART practices. The scientific literature clearly indicates that obstetrical risks and certain 
other risks for women and children are higher with assisted reproduction than spontaneous conception [...]  It is 
essential to continuously monitor the costs and risks associated with assisted reproduction in order to inform and 
be accountable to the public […] There is an urgent to need to introduce monitoring and governance mechanisms 
in order to acquire a wide perspective on the entire field of practice and its development, identify unusual practices 
or phenomena, and follow the clinical, psychological, ethical, and social consequences of assisted reproduction, 
including long-term impact.” 
621 APA, supra note 118, s 1: “This Act recognizes the necessity of preventing infertility and promoting reproductive 
health and is designed to protect the health of persons and more particularly the health of women who resort to 
assisted procreation activities that may be medically required and of children born of such activities, whose filiation 
is then established according to the provisions of the Civil Code.  For that purpose, the object of this Act is to 
regulate clinical and research activities relating to assisted procreation in order to ensure high-quality, safe and 
ethical practices. The Act is also designed to encourage the ongoing improvement of services in that area.” 
622 AHRA, supra note 2, s 2 (c): “while all persons are affected by these technologies, women more than men are 
directly and significantly affected by their application and the health and well-being of women must be protected 
in the application of these technologies.” 
623 Québec Summary Advisory Report 2014, supra note 122 at 35 
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mechanisms in order to acquire a wide perspective on the entire field of practice and its 
development, identify unusual practices or phenomena, and follow the clinical, psychological, 
ethical, and social consequences of assisted reproduction, including long-term impact.  In the 
field, the lack of mechanisms for standardizing practices has resulted in a diversity of medical 
and psychosocial practices that could be accentuated by competition among clinics and potential 
conflicts of interest.” 624  Moreover, is the removal of public coverage on artificial reproductive 
technology procedures in Québec (Bill 20) really a move that considers reproductive health a 
priority?  
As Professor Erin Nelson has stated: “[…] The fact that comprehensive research into the safety 
of ARTs was not conducted prior to their introduction into clinical practice illustrates that 
concerns over health outcomes for women and children take second place to the march of 
progress in ART practice.”625  Women in Québec and across the country are entitled to more.  
 
7.4 Social “Conditions”: Infertility and Sexual Orientation 
 
“Social systems create our wants as surely as they create the ways in which we meet them.”626 
I would like to start by pointing out the above statement by Rothman627, which elegantly 
highlights an important feedback loop regarding reproductive policy.  Particularly, when it 
comes to ARTs, I think it is important to reiterate that infertility is not solely an objective 
medical condition, it is also a complex social issue and so is its treatment.  Besides the fact that 
not only biology, but sexual orientation is increasingly a reason for seeking out ARTs, the 
severity of infertility as a medical condition is relative, as it is based on the perceptions and 
goals of the woman experiencing it.   
In Recreating Motherhood, Barbara Katz Rothman proposes a theoretical framework that 
creates a distinction between infertility as a disability, infertility as impairment and infertility as 
handicap.628  The first is a social concept, the second a medical one, and the third, is a concept 
which exists at the intersection of socio-medical and environmental factors.  That is to say, the 
                                                            
624 Ibid at 38-39 
625 Nelson, supra note 5 at 49; About Erin Nelson see supra, note 48 
626 Rothman, supra note 344 at 141 
627 About Barbara Katz Rothman, supra note 343 
628 Rothman, supra note 344 at 143 
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inability to ovulate, to conceive and to gestate (disability) is lived differently, depending on how 
a woman’s goals are defined, as well as the societal resources available to her in meeting the 
said goals.629  In other words, where a reproductive disability may become a real handicap for 
one woman it may constitute a mere impairment for another.  Ultimately, then, the condition 
touches upon a woman’s identity more or less severely depending on her reality.  It is no secret 
that the identity of women as child-bearers has carried heavy weight throughout history.  The 
irony of it is that childbearing is perceived by some as an obstacle to women’s emancipation 
today, just as it was decades ago, despite years of feminist pursuits.  Today, women delaying 
their childbearing activities in order to obtain an education and pursue careers oftentimes have 
to deal with infertility.  In that sense, infertility is not solely a medical condition for women, it 
is also a social one.  Moreover, unless one considers one’s sexual orientation to be a disability 
or an illness, it can hardly be argued that access to ARTs constitutes “medical necessity” for the 
LGBT community, in the technical sense of that term.  
 
I share the opinion of those who argue that, to a certain extent, infertility in women can be 
decreased by preventative social-policy.  Indeed, the choice to postpone childbirth is made in a 
societal context which does not encourage women to have children at an early age630 and this 
choice is facilitated by the presence of ARTs as an option.  Dr. Roger Pierson, a leading 
Canadian researcher in ovarian physiology has supported this view: “If we were to suddenly 
stop ART and say, ‘We’re going to support women having children in their early 20s,’ I would 
say that most of the infertility issue would go away […] we have to come to a better 
understanding of our biological imperatives, and our social expectations.”631  In other words, 
better social policy could make it possible for educated working women to have children at a 
fertile age.   
 
                                                            
629 Ibid at 144 
630 Rothman, supra note 344 at 146-147; Marie-Ève Lemoine, “Toward a Public Health Approach to Infertility: 
The Ethical Dimensions of Infertility Prevention” (2013) 6:3 Public Health Ethics 287 at 292 [Lemoine]. 
631 Sharon Kirkey, “Infertility on the Rise in Canada: Study,” The National Post (15 February 2012) online:  
http://news.nationalpost.com/health/infertility-on-the-rise-in-canada-study> [Kirkey] 
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Much needs to be learnt about the pervasiveness of infertility in Canada, although we do know 
that it is on the rise and so is the use of ART.632  In Québec, before the ART program was put 
into place, infertility prevention was viewed as a wise investment choice by several interest 
groups including civil associations and even the Commission de l’éthique en science et en 
technologie (CEST)633 and the Conseil du statut de la Femme.634  In Québec, the APA does 
stipulate the importance of infertility prevention,635 yet initiatives have not been taken on the 
matter in the province.636  In his 2014 detailed report regarding the ART program, the Health 
and Welfare Commissioner stated that, should a national policy aiming at prevention be put in 
place, it could easily be integrated in already existing health prevention initiatives which aim at 
sensitizing and informing the public.637  In my opinion, it is regretful that the Commissioner 
chose not to address the issue of prevention in detail.638  
Although the exact amount of preventable causes of infertility is generally unknown, it appears 
that they are numerous and many of them are general public health concerns: smoking, sexually 
transmitted infections, exposure to environmental toxins and chemicals, eating disorders, 
excessive alcohol as well as caffeine intake, stress and wireless internet and phone use, as well 
as cancer treatment,639 just to name a few.640 “The existence of ARTs speaks to the importance 
placed by our society on genetic relatedness, and is evidence of our tendency to medicalize 
social problems.”641  Therefore, in my view, besides trying to manage ART, provincial 
                                                            
632 Tracey Bushnik & al. “Estimating the Prevalence of Infertility in Canada” (2012) 27:3 Hum Reprod 738. 
633 Québec, Health and Welfare Commissioner, Avis détaillé sur les activités de procréation assistée au Québec 
(2014) at 3, 8, 9 [Québec Avis Détaillé 2014] 
634 The Council’s Memoir 2015, supra note 579 at 29 
635 APA, supra note 118, s 1: “This Act recognizes the necessity of preventing infertility and promoting reproductive 
health and is designed to protect the health of persons and more particularly the health of women who resort to 
assisted procreation activities that may be medically required and of children born of such activities, whose filiation 
is then established according to the provisions of the Civil Code.” 
636 Québec Avis détaillé 2014, supra note 633 at 9 
637 Québec Avis détaillé 2014, supra note 633 at 9 
638 Ibid at 9: "Le Commissaire a choisi de ne pas approfondir ces questions dans la mesure où de nombreux autres 
correctifs au programme ont retenu son attention". 
639 The American Cancer Society, “Fertility and Women with Cancer,” online : 
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authorities in Québec and across Canada should be quicker at investing in a proactive approach 
by encouraging infertility prevention and research for women.642   
By “facilitating” women’s lives when it comes to reproduction, ARTs are contributing to the 
fragmentation of the biological mother-identity.  Dr. Al Yuzpe, co-founder of the Genesis 
Fertility Centre in Vancouver, one of the largest in-vitro-fertilization clinics in Canada has 
accounted to the fact that “people are much more likely today to report difficulty conceiving 
than they would have been in the past, [when] there wasn’t much we could do for them.”643  The 
Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada has stated its concern as to women 
overestimating technology’s capacity to help them get pregnant once they are ready.644  The 
Quebec Health and Welfare Commissioner has expressed the same view.645  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
642 Rothman, supra note 344 at 133, 145; Nelson, supra note 5 at  51 
643 Kirkey, supra note 631  
644 Ibid 
645 Québec Avis Détaillé 2014, supra note 633 at 9 
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Conclusion 
 
Canadian law on assisted reproduction and surrogacy has been ambivalent for a long time now.  
Although the AHRA does not prohibit surrogacy and egg donation per se, it maintains a 
contradictory stance: in theory, there is an intention to protect women and children from 
exploitative commercial practices, but in reality, the prohibitions have not been enforced and 
nothing has been done to encourage Canadians to keep these practices within our national 
borders.  This murky and fragmented stance at the national level has done nothing to make 
things easier for the provincial legislatures and governments in the country, indeed, provinces 
have been reluctant to enact legislation on assisted reproduction and parentage laws in surrogacy 
cases are not coherent in the country.   
Relational theory and Against Family Law Exceptionalism’s contributions are important to 
consider in the legal discourse on surrogacy and assisted reproduction.  Particularly in Québec 
civil law, the province on which I focused, these schools of thought bring to the surface the legal 
and human relationships and conflicts that are at the intersection of these matters.  While Against 
Family Law Exceptionalism contributes to brushing a fuller picture of legal interconnections 
between family law and other areas of law, particularly respecting the notion of consent, 
Relational theory highlights the limitations of using institutionalized forms of consent as a 
substitute for autonomy.   
Nedelsky and Illich’s reflections on human autonomy, institutions and the law are very 
important to keep in mind no matter which hat we are wearing: that of the legal scholar, the 
lawyer or of the independent citizen.  As I see it, they remind us that institutions of law and 
medicine are imperfect ones, as they are not fully equipped to reflect human autonomy at its 
fullest: consent is institutional, just as the law has its definition of consent, so does medicine.  
Their contributions are especially important because they encourage individuals to use their 
creative power to derive change from conflictual and institutional relationships.  Indeed, 
shedding light on relationships and adjacent conflicts creates a deeper and more comprehensive 
perspective on how the outside world (technology/institution/law) can curtail and/or advance 
our inside world as human beings (individual autonomy and creativity) and vice-versa.  As such, 
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the brighter side of the picture is that conflicts brought up by the advent of assisted reproduction 
and biotechnologies are an opportunity for creativity and change both at an individual and 
collective level.  
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